The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
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<strong>the</strong>se interrogations were conducted under CIA oversight: <strong>the</strong> US government was not in a position <strong>of</strong><br />
having to rely on <strong>the</strong> Egyptian authorities to determine <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> educed in<strong>for</strong>mation. Lastly, <strong>the</strong><br />
nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intelligence, and <strong>the</strong> way in which it was used by <strong>the</strong> administration, placed a major<br />
emphasis on getting it right: with so much individual and institutional prestige on <strong>the</strong> line over<br />
intelligence that, while helpful, was not strictly necessary in order to go to war against Iraq, it is highly<br />
unlikely that <strong>the</strong> administration had no interest in finding out <strong>the</strong> truth. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong><br />
al-Libi, we have a situation where we can assume that <strong>the</strong> state was torturing 'in good faith' (actually<br />
looking <strong>for</strong> true in<strong>for</strong>mation and not simply false confessions), where where <strong>the</strong> state had strong<br />
intelligence capacity (it could separate truth from fiction), where <strong>the</strong> pain inflicted was severe, those<br />
directing <strong>the</strong> torture reliable, and where <strong>the</strong> US was able to distinguish truth from fiction with a high<br />
degree <strong>of</strong> certainty. <strong>The</strong> outcome was an intelligence catastrophe.<br />
5.6. Conclusion<br />
As we have seen in this chapter, torture in <strong>the</strong> real world does not approximate torture in <strong>the</strong><br />
movies, or on TV. While it is <strong>the</strong>oretically possible <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> state to gain good in<strong>for</strong>mation through <strong>the</strong><br />
use <strong>of</strong> torture, <strong>the</strong> causal mechanism underlying claims <strong>of</strong> torture's effectiveness does not seem to<br />
work. <strong>The</strong> problem comes down to <strong>the</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mation asymmetry between <strong>the</strong> captive and <strong>the</strong> state: <strong>the</strong><br />
state does not know what <strong>the</strong> captive does and does not know. Because <strong>of</strong> this, <strong>the</strong> state is in a position<br />
<strong>of</strong> having to check <strong>the</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mation that is revealed under torture: if it cannot credibly commit to doing<br />
so, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> captive has literally no incentive to cooperate, because <strong>the</strong> state will not be able to identify<br />
defection when it occurs. <strong>The</strong> sad truth about torture is that it is no different from any o<strong>the</strong>r method <strong>of</strong><br />
interrogation: it relies on an intelligence apparatus that can investigate claims and identify lies. When<br />
<strong>the</strong> state can credibly commit to investigating, <strong>the</strong> rational captive will cooperate when <strong>the</strong> state<br />
threatens to waterboard <strong>the</strong>m – but would do so as well if threatened with execution, or life<br />
imprisonment, or <strong>of</strong>fered time <strong>of</strong>f, or sufficiently nicer prison accommodations, or a financial reward,<br />
or any o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong>fer that <strong>the</strong> detainee values more than <strong>the</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mation <strong>the</strong>y have to give. If <strong>the</strong> state<br />
cannot credibly commit to investigating <strong>the</strong> claims made, or if <strong>the</strong> state cannot commit not to torture<br />
blindfolded; suspended from a ceiling or doorframe with feet just touching <strong>the</strong> floor; beaten with fists, whips, metal<br />
rods, or o<strong>the</strong>r objects; subjected to electrical shocks; and doused with cold water and sexually assaulted.” (“Country<br />
Report on Human Rights Practices 2003,” US Department <strong>of</strong> State. Available at<br />
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27926.htm . )<br />
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