The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
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that is, deliberately taking advantage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> administration's a priori beliefs. (Id.) A motive <strong>for</strong> this<br />
deception is not hard to find. Firstly, by telling <strong>the</strong> interrogators what <strong>the</strong>ir bosses wanted to hear, al-<br />
Libi might be able to gain freedom from torture, at least <strong>for</strong> some time. But it is also possible that al-<br />
Libi saw manipulating <strong>the</strong> US into a war with Iraq as a means <strong>of</strong> benefiting al Qaeda, in a sense<br />
replicating <strong>the</strong> jihadi movement's greatest victory in Afghanistan against <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union by bleeding<br />
<strong>the</strong> US in an endless (and expensive) war <strong>of</strong> occupation. In fact, a <strong>for</strong>mer jihadist who claims to have<br />
been a mole <strong>for</strong> MI5, MI6, and <strong>the</strong> French intelligence service (GDSE) argues that this was precisely<br />
<strong>the</strong> case. “Omar Nasiri” trained at Khalden under al-Libi where he received training in bombings,<br />
assassinations, withstanding torture and lying under interrogation. He claims that, when asked by<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r jihadist where <strong>the</strong> “best country to fight <strong>the</strong> jihad,” al-Libi replied “Iraq,” because it was <strong>the</strong><br />
“weakest” Muslim country. (Standard, 23/11/2006) Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, Hussein's regime was a secular<br />
dictatorship – exactly <strong>the</strong> sort <strong>of</strong> corrupted state that al Qaeda sought to replace with an Islamic<br />
Republic: al-Libi “knew what his interrogators wanted, and was happy to give it to <strong>the</strong>m. He wanted to<br />
see Saddam toppled even more than <strong>the</strong> Americans did.” 111 If <strong>the</strong> administration's goal was simply to<br />
invade Iraq, and saw torture as a means to generate false confessions that it did not need, <strong>the</strong>n this<br />
would imply a commonality <strong>of</strong> interests between <strong>the</strong> US and al Qaeda – <strong>the</strong> simpler explanation is that<br />
al-Libi's story fit <strong>the</strong> administration's prior beliefs sufficiently well that even analysis that recognized<br />
<strong>the</strong> canard was ignored.<br />
<strong>The</strong> case <strong>of</strong> al-Libi is critical <strong>for</strong> understanding how torture operates in <strong>the</strong> real world, <strong>for</strong><br />
several reasons. Firstly, <strong>the</strong> detainee in question did in fact have intelligence crucial to <strong>the</strong> conduct <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> War on Terror: o<strong>the</strong>r detainees, like Abu Zubaydah, had no intelligence, and thus guaranteeing that<br />
<strong>the</strong> interrogator (when it accepted <strong>the</strong>ir story) would be accepting misin<strong>for</strong>mation. So torture could<br />
have worked in al-Libi's case. Secondly, <strong>the</strong> US was in a position to have investigated <strong>the</strong> detainee's<br />
claims – and in fact had done so, as we saw in <strong>the</strong> DIA analysis (DITSUM 044-02). Thirdly, <strong>the</strong><br />
interrogators were conducted by Egyptians, whose state has a long history <strong>of</strong> using torture during<br />
interrogations: it is <strong>the</strong>re<strong>for</strong>e exceedingly unlikely that <strong>the</strong> torture was not painful enough. 112 Fourthly,<br />
111 <strong>The</strong> quote is taken from Nasiri's book, “Inside <strong>the</strong> Jihad: My Life with al Qaeda: a Spy's Story.” Perseus Books Group,<br />
NY (2006), p. 230. It is important to note that none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intelligence services mentioned above has taken issue with<br />
Nasiri's claim to have been an in<strong>for</strong>mant, and at least one member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CIA has spoken highly <strong>of</strong> his work as a spy,<br />
stating that Nasiri's claims track with his own knowledge as <strong>the</strong> <strong>for</strong>mer head <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CIA's bin Laden desk from .<br />
( Washington Post, 20/03/2008;New York Times, 17/11/2006)<br />
112 While we do not know exactly how al-Libi was tortured in Egypt, <strong>the</strong>re are many stories regarding <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong><br />
Egyptian interrogation. <strong>The</strong> State Department noted in a 2002 report that Egyptian detainees faced being “stripped and<br />
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