The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
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York Times, 09/12/2005) Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as this intelligence made <strong>the</strong> administration more convinced <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
wisdom <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> war against Iraq, it also bears some responsibility <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> massive costs, reputational,<br />
human and fiscal, <strong>of</strong> that invasion, as well as <strong>the</strong> surge in anti-American sentiment in <strong>the</strong> Middle East<br />
and around <strong>the</strong> world, and <strong>the</strong> subsequent recruiting boon <strong>for</strong> al Qaeda itself. 109<br />
If <strong>the</strong> costs <strong>of</strong> having accepted this in<strong>for</strong>mation were so dire, <strong>the</strong>n how can we explain <strong>the</strong><br />
administration's apparently unquestioning acceptance <strong>of</strong> it? Why did <strong>the</strong> administration take <strong>the</strong> word<br />
<strong>of</strong> a man under torture? It might be argued that <strong>the</strong> administration had no interest in <strong>the</strong> truth, but was<br />
merely searching <strong>for</strong> a rationale <strong>for</strong> a war it was already committed to – thus <strong>the</strong> story's veracity had no<br />
importance. This seems unlikely on balance: if <strong>the</strong> administration were interested in fabricating<br />
evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Iraq regime's links with al Qaeda <strong>for</strong> domestic purposes, it could easily have done so<br />
via a member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Iraqi exile community like Ahmed Chalabi without bringing in <strong>the</strong> controversial<br />
element <strong>of</strong> torture. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> administration did not need this intelligence to gain UN backing <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> war <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> simple reason that it did not particularly need that backing: <strong>the</strong> administration had<br />
already claimed authority to invade Iraq under UN Resolution 1441, and was perfectly willing to go to<br />
war even without <strong>the</strong> UN's blessing, as indeed it eventually did. 110 Using a deliberately false story<br />
gained through torture that – once revealed – risked international and domestic support <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> war in<br />
Iraq and <strong>the</strong> President's own reelection unnecessarily and <strong>for</strong> little gain would have been deeply<br />
irrational. It is far likelier that <strong>the</strong> administration felt that <strong>the</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mation must have been true – and<br />
had it been, it would have strongly justified <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> armed <strong>for</strong>ce.<br />
And yet <strong>the</strong>re was considerable controversy over al-Libi's veracity even be<strong>for</strong>e <strong>the</strong> invasion<br />
began: an analysis <strong>of</strong> al-Libi's statements by <strong>the</strong> Defense Intelligence Agency argued, <strong>for</strong> several<br />
reasons, that <strong>the</strong> story <strong>of</strong> Iraqi WMD support to al Qaeda was deeply problematic – al-Libi left<br />
important holes in his story, seemed not to know important names and dates that would have<br />
corroborated his account, which ignored <strong>the</strong> severe unlikelihood <strong>of</strong> Saddam's secular regime arming an<br />
Islamic revolutionary movement “it cannot control.” (DITSUM 044-02) Moreover, this analysis also<br />
argued that <strong>the</strong>re was good reason to think that al-Libi was “intentionally misleading <strong>the</strong> debriefers:”<br />
109 <strong>The</strong> war in Iraq has been estimated to have cost <strong>the</strong> US approximately $751 billion by 2010 in direct appropriations,<br />
according to <strong>the</strong> Congressional Research Service (Belasco, p.2), and over $3 trillion by 2008 (as a “conservative<br />
estimate”) in economic costs, according to economists Joseph Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes. (Washington Post,<br />
09/03/2008) On <strong>the</strong> war's effect on al Qaeda's recruitment, see IISS, 2003.<br />
110 See <strong>the</strong> news conference by Pres. Bush (USA), Prime Minister Blair (UK), Prime Minister Aznar (Spain) and Prime<br />
Minister Durao Barroso (Portugal) on March 16 th 2003. (New York Times, 17/03/2003)<br />
130