The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

alternative mechanism) by Darius Rejali (2007), who argues that torture leads even skilled policemen
(and police systems) to increasingly rely on coercion to the exclusion of empirical evidence: a process
he dubs “de-skilling.” A policeman in the British Raj in 1872 described the logic thusly: “[i]t is far
pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing pepper into a poor devil's eyes than go about in the
sun hunting up evidence.” (Rejali, p. 456) He might well have added that it was far better for career
advancement too.
5.5. A Critical Case: Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi
In the prior three sections I have examined how torture has been used by both the US military
and the Central Intelligence Agency in the War on Terror, and have pointed out several reasons why we
should not be quick to assume that torture worked particularly well, and many reasons to fear that it has
led the US to accept misinformation on a systematic basis. As mentioned in the second chapter, torture
does not replace the need for strong intelligence and empirical investigation – it presupposes it. But
even the best intelligence apparatus fails when it is not used. If those engaging in torture do not
investigate the information they receive from detainees then the detainee is best off lying, and the
interrogator will not find out until it is (at least potentially) too late. In order to choose a critical case
for torture, we must therefore find a case where the US government was most likely to have tortured
'correctly' – that is, to have investigated the captive's story to ensure it was not false. The state is most
likely to have done this when the consequences for accepting misinformation are most dire – where the
credibility of the government is at stake, as well as the political future of elected leaders. In addition,
the agents engaged in torture should be reliable, to ensure that they are concerned with the quality (and
not merely the quantity) of the information. The detainee in question should be knowledgeable, and
not tortured under false pretenses. Finally, the state should have the capacity to investigate the captive's
story correctly, whether it chooses to or not. In such a case, there would be nothing theoretically
preventing the state from torturing in a such a manner as to derive good intelligence: as long as the
state can credibly commit to actually investigating, the captive is better off telling the truth.
The case which best approximates these conditions, and about which we know the most, is the
case of Ali Mohammed al Fakheri, alias Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. Al-Libi, unlike Zubaydah, was indeed a
highly placed member of al Qaeda, and unlike KSM had been a part of the group for a considerable
length of time. Al-Libi in fact was a major player in the infrastructure of al Qaeda: he had been in
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