The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

severely undercut by the CIA's own assessment of how such tortures work: according to the OIG report
of 2004, the use of the waterboard was unlikely to rise to the level of 'severity' described by the OLC to
constitute torture, since “repetition will not be substantial because the techniques generally lose their
effectiveness after several repetitions.” (OIG, annex C: 18) In other words, it makes no sense from the
CIA's own understanding of how waterboarding works to argue that KSM, after holding out for 182
applications of the waterboard, suddenly gave way on the 183 rd . Similarly, it makes no sense to argue
that KSM cooperated before the that 183 rd application: a detainee who expects to be tortured whether
he cooperates or not has no incentive to cooperate.
The interrogation of Abu Zubaydah provides an even starker example of how a reliance on
torture can lead to problems for the state that uses it. When Zubaydah was initially captured on March
28 th 2003 in Afghanistan, the CIA believed him to be the “third or fourth man in al Qa'ida,” and he was
described in press accounts at the time as “chief of operations for al Qaeda.” (CIA, “Psychological
Assessment of Abu Zubaydah” [OIG]:1; New York Times, 01/04/2003) At first, Zubaydah was
interrogated by the FBI using non-coercive methods, but his interrogation was soon taken over by the
CIA after he was flown to a black site in Thailand where he then became the first captive to be
subjected to the new HVD program. (New York Times, 18/04/2009) From the beginning of his
interrogation by the CIA he claims to have been subjected to sleep deprivation for about three weeks in
Afghanistan, as well as a liquid diet and forced nudity in a cold room (but not cold enough to induce
hypothermia). (ICRC 2007: 28-9) During this period, according to one of his FBI interrogators, he
revealed that KSM had been the “mastermind” behind the September 11 th attacks, and that Jose Padilla
was plotting to explode a so-called “dirty bomb” in the US. (Soufan, “Tortured Decision”) However,
CIA headquarters apparently became convinced that Zubaydah was holding out: about 10 to 12 weeks
after interrogations began, and after 4 weeks without any questioning, the CIA moved towards using
their sharpest methods, including “close confinement,” beatings, walling, and waterboarding, inter alia.
(ICRC 2007: 29-30) During this time Zubaydah apparently revealed a far larger amount of
information, much of which was used as evidence by the administration that coercive methods were
working properly.
In actuality, the use of enhanced interrogation on Zubaydah had worked very differently.
Despite the reported belief of the intelligence community that Abu Zubaydah was a highly-placed man
in the al Qaeda framework, this was apparently far from the truth. Zubaydah was a jihadist, certainly,
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