The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

with deep seated flaws, and detainees brought in through the agency of questionable allies (bounty
hunters, the Iraqi police) all point towards the strong possibility that ignorant detainees were tortured.
But where interrogations at Guantanamo Bay could take place in relative isolation and a highly
controlled (at least in theory) environment, interrogations in Iraq were essentially being conducted in
potentially hostile areas. The lack of standardized operating procedures also meant that merely keeping
track of prisoners, even High Value Detainees, was an Herculean effort subject to frequent mistakes.
The time lost due to errors and incompetence also meant a loss of time-sensitive information, as
detainees might go up to 90 days in Abu Ghraib before being interrogated. (Schlesinger, p. 67) But the
distinctions between Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo should not overshadow the similarities: in both
cases guards were either ordered or encouraged to abuse detainees as part of the interrogation process,
and both cases saw large numbers of almost certainly ignorant detainees under question. In both cases
detainees were interrogated and kept confined even where the authorities believed or suspected that
they had little intelligence value. Whatever the value of the information extracted under these
conditions, unless the interrogators were well positioned to investigate that information by checking it
against other sources (empirical as well as from other detainees), then the interrogations were almost
certain to have extracted bad information with the good.
5.4. Torture by the CIA
If the use of torture for information at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib was reliant on, and
undermined by, the cooperation of prison guards in the interrogation process, then the CIA detainee
program represent US torture at its most refined. It was in this program that the most severe techniques
were used, and in which the US government could interrogate captives with a complete lack of
oversight. At least 14 individuals were held by the CIA in so-called black-sites throughout the world
between 2002 and September 2006: during this time the Red Cross was kept completely ignorant of
their whereabouts, conditions, identities, and even existence. (ICRC, 2007; 3) The detainees, unlike
those held at Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib, were generally high-level members of al Qaeda whose
interrogation could be expected to reveal significant information. In stark contrast to the situation in
Cuba and Iraq, the techniques used tended to be outlined explicitly by the Agency, rather than adopted
unofficially by lower level guards with the encouragement (but not in writing) of their superiors. 103 In
103 See in particular the testimony of Sgt. Javal Davis and Spc. Jason Kennel in the Taguba report, pp. 18-9
121