The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
03/10/2004)<br />
Moreover, <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> evidence presented varies widely in quality: in addition to <strong>the</strong> 11<br />
individuals who were charged with having personally met Osama bin Laden, o<strong>the</strong>rs were identified as<br />
enemy combatants <strong>for</strong> possessing rifles or a Casio watch, wearing olive drab clothing, sleeping at a<br />
guest house used in <strong>the</strong> past by al Qaeda, and having been conscripted into <strong>the</strong> Taliban's armed <strong>for</strong>ces.<br />
(p. 17) One detainee was declared an enemy combatant on <strong>the</strong> following evidence:<br />
Detainee is associated with <strong>the</strong> Taliban.<br />
<strong>The</strong> detainee indicates he was conscripted into <strong>the</strong> Taliban.<br />
Detainee engaged in hostilities against <strong>the</strong> US or its coalition partners.<br />
<strong>The</strong> detainee admits he was a cook's assistant <strong>for</strong> Taliban <strong>for</strong>ces in Narim, Afghanistan<br />
under command <strong>of</strong> Haji Mullah Baki.<br />
Detainee fled from Narim to Kabul during <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Alliance attack and surrendered<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Alliance. 97<br />
Problematically, <strong>the</strong> apparent assumption that those fighting with <strong>the</strong> Taliban, including those<br />
conscripted by <strong>for</strong>ce, could be classified as dead-enders, or as '<strong>the</strong> worst <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> worst' in <strong>the</strong> words <strong>of</strong><br />
Donald Rumsfeld is somewhat attenuated by <strong>the</strong> recent finding that over 90% <strong>of</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn Afghanis<br />
(i.e., those most likely to support or have been under <strong>the</strong> control <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Taliban) were unaware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
link between <strong>the</strong> 9/11 attacks and <strong>the</strong> invasion <strong>of</strong> Afghanistan, even almost nine years after <strong>the</strong> fact.<br />
(ICOS, p. 28)<br />
<strong>The</strong> limited nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> allegations against most detainees, as well as <strong>the</strong> fact that some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
evidence alleged stemmed from (potentially coerced) denunciations by o<strong>the</strong>r detainees must make us<br />
question how much intelligence <strong>the</strong>se individuals would be able to provide. This suspicion is<br />
streng<strong>the</strong>ned when we consider that <strong>the</strong> highest value detainees, high ranking members <strong>of</strong> al Qaeda and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Taliban, were not sent to GTMO until September 2006. Until <strong>the</strong>n, <strong>the</strong>se individuals had been held<br />
by <strong>the</strong> CIA in so-called 'black sites,' and had been hidden from <strong>the</strong> Red Cross. (ICRC, 2007)<br />
None<strong>the</strong>less, interrogations did proceed against detainees, and <strong>the</strong>re are several indications that <strong>the</strong>se<br />
interrogations were essentially coercive. On January 5 th , 2005, <strong>the</strong> American Civil Liberties Union<br />
(ACLU) released a group <strong>of</strong> emails from FBI agents at GTMO complaining <strong>of</strong> abusive methods used<br />
97 From <strong>the</strong> summary <strong>of</strong> evidence <strong>for</strong> an unidentified detainee, quoted in Denbeaux and Denbeaux, p. 17.<br />
111