The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
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<strong>the</strong> reasons <strong>for</strong> holding <strong>the</strong> detainees at GTMO. <strong>The</strong>se summaries included <strong>the</strong> following statement:<br />
“<strong>the</strong> United States Government has previously determined that <strong>the</strong> detainee is an enemy combatant.<br />
This determination is based on in<strong>for</strong>mation possessed by <strong>the</strong> United States that (…),” indicating that<br />
<strong>the</strong> summaries were not allegations but conclusions previously arrived at. A detailed examination <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>se summaries by Denbeaux and Denbeaux (2006) finds disturbing trends regarding <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> this<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation. Among <strong>the</strong> 517 detainees held as enemy combatants, and whose summaries were<br />
examined, fully 55% were not accused <strong>of</strong> having any hostile acts against <strong>the</strong> US, but were ra<strong>the</strong>r held<br />
on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> being connected in some degree to al Qaeda, <strong>the</strong> Taliban, or o<strong>the</strong>r groups considered by<br />
<strong>the</strong> US to be hostile in some fashion. 96 While 60% were categorized as belonging to 'al Qaeda' (32%)<br />
or 'al Qaeda and Taliban' (28%), <strong>the</strong> vast majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se were considered only to be 'associated with'<br />
<strong>the</strong>se groups (57% <strong>of</strong> 'al Qaeda' and 78% <strong>of</strong> 'al Qaeda and Taliban'), with a large minority categorized<br />
as 'members' (34% and 19%, respectively). A very small minority were given <strong>the</strong> strongest<br />
classification <strong>of</strong> 'fighter <strong>for</strong>' (9% and 3% respectively). Only among those classified as 'Taliban' (22%<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total) do 'members' make up a plurality (48%), but 'fighters' still represented a small minority<br />
(16%). Among all detainees, <strong>the</strong> breakdown <strong>for</strong> 'fighters', 'members' and 'associates' is as follows: 8%,<br />
30% and 60%, respectively, with 2% having no alleged connection to any group at all. (pp. 9, 10)<br />
Detainees were also categorized by <strong>the</strong> authorities that had captured <strong>the</strong>m. This in<strong>for</strong>mation is<br />
particularly important, since it gives some idea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provenance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> allegations made against <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
It turns out that only 5% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> detainees held at GTMO as enemy combatants had been captured by US<br />
<strong>for</strong>ces: 36% had been captured by <strong>the</strong> Pakistani government, and 11% by <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Alliance, <strong>the</strong><br />
anti-Taliban coalition. A full 44% had been captured by unidentified persons. This last category is<br />
highly problematic, in that <strong>the</strong>se detainees were captured at a time when <strong>the</strong> US government was<br />
<strong>of</strong>fering bounties <strong>for</strong> members <strong>of</strong> al Qaeda and <strong>the</strong> Taliban, raising <strong>the</strong> possibility that some portion <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>m were taken by bounty hunters and sold regardless <strong>of</strong> actual ties to ei<strong>the</strong>r group. (p. 15) Lt. Col.<br />
Anthony Christino, senior watch <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism in<br />
2003, has alleged that “most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> approximately 600 detainees at Guantanamo (…) at worst had<br />
supported <strong>the</strong> Taliban in <strong>the</strong> civil war it had been fighting against <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Alliance be<strong>for</strong>e <strong>the</strong><br />
September 11 th attacks, but had had no contact with Osama bin Laden or al-Qaeda.” (Observer,<br />
96 It should be noted, however, that many <strong>of</strong> those o<strong>the</strong>r groups were not necessarily viewed as dangerous by all sections <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> US government: several enemy combatants were held <strong>for</strong> being associated with groups whose members 'would be<br />
allowed into <strong>the</strong> United States by <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Homeland Security.” (Denbeaux and Denbeaux, p. 17)<br />
110