The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
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conditions <strong>the</strong>oretically necessary <strong>for</strong> successful torture were in place. Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi was in<br />
charge <strong>of</strong> an Islamist training camp in Afghanistan when he was picked up and remanded to CIA<br />
custody. His torture in Morocco under CIA direction revealed crucial in<strong>for</strong>mation that <strong>the</strong> Bush<br />
administration used in order to marshal support <strong>for</strong> an invasion <strong>of</strong> Iraq – in<strong>for</strong>mation that was entirely<br />
fabricated, and may even have been deliberately geared to draw <strong>the</strong> US into a costly war in order to<br />
benefit al Qaeda. I conclude that torture failed to work or <strong>the</strong> United States, and evidence is abundant<br />
that <strong>the</strong> US accepted misin<strong>for</strong>mation as <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> torture. <strong>The</strong> implication is that – even though it<br />
might be attenuated through better verification and reliability <strong>of</strong> agents – states that torture cannot<br />
prevent <strong>the</strong>mselves from falling into <strong>the</strong> deceptive cycle that characterizes torture at its worst. To<br />
torture is to be misin<strong>for</strong>med.<br />
5.2. <strong>Torture</strong> at Guantanamo<br />
A review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> documentation surrounding <strong>the</strong> approval <strong>of</strong> interrogation methods by Donald<br />
Rumsfeld, <strong>the</strong>n Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense, makes clear that <strong>the</strong>re was a concern with broadening as far as<br />
possible <strong>the</strong> techniques available to military interrogators at GTMO. A memo from Rumsfeld to <strong>the</strong><br />
Chairman <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Joint Chiefs <strong>of</strong> Staff dated January 19 th , 2002 announced <strong>the</strong> executive's determination<br />
that <strong>the</strong> Geneva conventions did not apply to captured members <strong>of</strong> al-Qaeda or <strong>the</strong> Taliban, although<br />
<strong>the</strong>y were to be treated “humanely and, to <strong>the</strong> extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity,<br />
in a manner consistent with” those conventions. (emphasis mine) <strong>The</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> this qualification<br />
becomes clear from an October 11 th memorandum <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same year from <strong>the</strong> Joint Task Force on<br />
Guantanamo Bay (hereafter JTF-170 or JTF-GTMO) requesting that <strong>the</strong> head <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> US Sou<strong>the</strong>rn<br />
Command approve <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> several more aggressive techniques, including stress positions, nudity,<br />
'<strong>for</strong>ced grooming' (Category II) as well as more dire techniques (Category III) such as induced<br />
hypo<strong>the</strong>rmia, waterboarding, and threats “to convince <strong>the</strong> detainee that death or severely painful<br />
consequences are imminent <strong>for</strong> him and/or his family.” (JTF-170 CG 11/10/2002, JTF-170 J2<br />
11/10/2002 p. 2) <strong>The</strong> accompanying legal brief by LTC Beaver, Staff Judge Advocate, USA, appears to<br />
originate many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> arguments underpinning <strong>the</strong> April 4 th Final JTF-170 report outlined above: as<br />
long as <strong>the</strong> torture is used <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> ga<strong>the</strong>ring in<strong>for</strong>mation, it is not torture at all.<br />
While <strong>the</strong>se techniques were initially approved <strong>for</strong> use at <strong>the</strong> discretion <strong>of</strong> USSouthCom by<br />
Rumsfeld on December 2 nd , he later rescinded that approval in a memo dated January 15 th , 2003,<br />
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