The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

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examining it through the lens of rational choice. The terrible cycle of purges unleashed by Amirouche and others in the bled followed the same pattern identified in Salem Village: where the torturer's preconceptions (based on spectral evidence, or GRE false-flags) are incorrect, the use of torture leads to a cycle of denunciations with a profoundly dangerous effect on the group that hopes to benefit from coerced interrogation. For the French in the Battle of Algiers, torture does not appear to have gained the French much intelligence, but it did lead to a widening and systematic violence perpetrated on the Muslim population that would severely damage France's ability to find a political solution to the Algeria question. The failure of torture cannot be measured in terms of the information given by the knowledgeable – rather, it can be inferred by necessity from the fact that the French were not able systematically to weed out misinformation given by ignorant captives. The spread of torture also affected the willingness of the French populace to pay the costs considered necessary to keep Algeria French. And this result came about despite the fact that the leaders of the French forces were particularly alive to the political nature of revolutionary war – despite the fact that they knew the danger in torturing large numbers of ignorants. By examining torture in the Casbah and the bled, we can compare two cases that are similar in important ways. Not only did the two cases occur at the same time, and largely in the same place, they were also geared towards combating an actual conspiracy, by authorities whose interests militated against indiscriminate coercion, and where both were able to operate in an information environment that offered the potential for verifying the information educed. The major difference between them was in their prior beliefs about the nature of that conspiracy: whereas the French were generally well informed about the nature of their opposition, the FLN colonels were convinced to focus their torture regime on those who were outside of, and ignorant of, the real conspiracy. Nonetheless, both cases ended in a deceptive cycle that caused irreparable harm to each side. For the FLN, the costs were paralysis, the decimation of the dynamic political cadres of Wilaya 4, and the loss of two of their most effective leaders, Amirouche and Si M'Hammed, at the hands of their own men. For the French, the costs were, if anything, worse. Not only was any political solution ultimately precluded by the terror inflicted on innocent Muslims, the torture regime bred an alliance between the military and the colons that brought down the Fourth Republic itself. The torture of ignorant and innocent captives on both sides was not the result of negligence or irrationality: rather it was the necessary outcome of using torture as a means of gathering information, and its result was the sparking of a cycle of deception. 103
Paul Teitgen appears to have been correct in his assessment of the use of torture: “All right, Massu won the Battle of Algiers; but that meant losing the War.” (Horne, p. 207) In the following chapter, I extend the analysis by examining the role of torture by the United States during the War on Terror. There are several reasons to believe that the US was in a better position to make use of torture than either France or the FLN. Firstly, the United States benefits from a far more stable political system than France did under the Fourth Republic: the Presidential system and fixed terms ensure continuity of policy over four to eight years, while the average life span of a government in France was around six months. In addition, the US military is more firmly under the control of the civilian government than was the ex-colonial military of France in the mid-twentieth century. Lastly, the preponderance of power held by the United States, both militarily and technologically, allows us to examine whether France's failure to torture successfully was the result of institutional factors, or if the problem lies with torture more broadly. 104
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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEG
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This work is dedicated to my wife,
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TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT vii 1. T
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ABSTRACT In the aftermath of the Se
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judged by their effects. The deonto
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etter than chance on average, no ma
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from fiction, and also in the time
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the cases differ in how well inform
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characterization by method. Torture
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gather such evidence was strong, to
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ineffective. Something must prevent
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The description which it would be n
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powerful themselves. 21 While histo
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known by the misnomer 'torture-ligh
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substitute for intelligence gatheri
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This lack of good data on torture t
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found that the procedure can cause
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captive who has faced torture, and
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state cannot credibly commit to pla
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incentive not to present as favorab
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units, those engaged in the applica
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of causal mechanisms in a very dire
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the threats they face are real, whe
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3.1. Introduction. CHAPTER 3 THE WI
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discovered by Sir Thomas Newton and
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two, and the execution of the convi
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years preceding the outbreak at Sal
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these women - non-Church members, p
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Hubbard) and four grown and married
Page 59 and 60: innocent, and recalled that when he
Page 61 and 62: crowd was deeply and troublingly mo
Page 63 and 64: it was precisely in these terms tha
Page 65 and 66: came to an end. Misogyny was all to
Page 67 and 68: only the witch-trials that brought
Page 69 and 70: partners in their own (apparent) de
Page 71 and 72: possibility would be to question th
Page 73 and 74: John Bridges (whose own wife and da
Page 75 and 76: she again broke down and named seve
Page 77 and 78: forcing the already convicted to re
Page 79 and 80: We can thus see Tituba's confession
Page 81 and 82: Samuell Parris. 70 The strongest ev
Page 83 and 84: order to purge political dissidents
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Page 87 and 88: torture - the state will apply it e
Page 89 and 90: time, the government in Paris was c
Page 91 and 92: for two reasons - first, because Me
Page 93 and 94: The Soummam conference in the Summe
Page 95 and 96: one of the primary justifications f
Page 97 and 98: DOP in particular is instructive fo
Page 99 and 100: us stops in the city center. These
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Page 103 and 104: dismantling of the ZAA organization
Page 105 and 106: found in the literature: the revela
Page 107 and 108: In fact, the use of torture did hav
Page 109: e.g.), by March (when the DPU had b
Page 113 and 114: the French public. 95 Secondly, the
Page 115 and 116: conditions theoretically necessary
Page 117 and 118: the reasons for holding the detaine
Page 119 and 120: y military interrogators. (Washingt
Page 121 and 122: fact come verbatim from a 1957 jour
Page 123 and 124: ole in the acquisition of intellige
Page 125 and 126: to those believed to have informati
Page 127 and 128: name for metanetwork analysis. 102
Page 129 and 130: other words, the CIA High Value Det
Page 131 and 132: Padilla was accused by KSM of plott
Page 133 and 134: and an enemy of the United States,
Page 135 and 136: alternative mechanism) by Darius Re
Page 137 and 138: York Times, 09/12/2005) Insofar as
Page 139 and 140: these interrogations were conducted
Page 141 and 142: al-Qaeda is structured, names of in
Page 143 and 144: CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION: The Misleadin
Page 145 and 146: problem by the authorities - and ye
Page 147 and 148: situations (France in Algeria and V
Page 149 and 150: Jack Bauer was used as justificatio
Page 151 and 152: Biderman, Albert D. “Effects of C
Page 153 and 154: Crelinstein, Ronald and Alex Schmid
Page 155 and 156: History Teacher. 30:4 (1997): pp. 4
Page 157 and 158: International Council on Security a
Page 159 and 160: Lewis, Neil A. “Red Cross Finds D
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Obuchowski, Chester W. “Algeria:
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Schiemann, John W. “Interrogation
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Barack Obama is Inviting the Next A
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United States, Department of Defens
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Patrick Armshaw
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