The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

etter than chance on average, no matter which style they observed. Worse, they were more likely to
falsely accuse subjects under accusatory questioning, and more likely to be confident in their false
accusations. Since of the three interrogation under torture is most likely to resemble the accusatory
approach, this implies that torturers are more likely to believe false information offered by captives
than to discount it, and are unable to self-correct due to their higher complacency.
This bias towards false accusations is doubly concerning when we consider the danger of false
confessions from the captives themselves, even when the interrogation is not conducted under torture,
and where the captive has much to lose from a false confession. A review of 40 overturned murder and
rape cases found that 96% of suspects who had falsely confessed gave “surprisingly rich, detailed, and
accurate information” that must have been fed (perhaps unknowingly) to the suspects by the
interrogating officers. These false confessions were enough, in at least one case, for the jury to
disregard exculpatory DNA evidence. Interrogation by police can often mimic the logic of torture as
well: when asked why he had falsely confessed, one individual argued “[t]hey were trying to get me the
death penalty for something I didn't do … Why should I die for something I didn't do?” (Ibid., pp.1062
– 3) It has been noted as well that a similar logic holds with plea-bargaining: individuals confess
falsely in order to prevent a worse punishment under trial. (Langbein, 1978) If innocent individuals
can confess falsely and seemingly sincerely – relating a story to the interrogator that, while fitting the
interrogators preconceived notions, does not fit the facts – then what prevents a knowledgeable captive
from lying to the interrogator, revealing a plausible although false set of information?
Torturers are unable even to rely on so-called 'lie detectors' to help them out in the torture
chamber, and it is no mistake that they are not a common adjunct to the torture chamber. Lie detectors
do not in fact exist: since truth and fiction are purely abstract concepts, there is simply nothing for a
machine to measure. Instead, most lie detectors are at best stress-detectors and are more often a
psychological ploy. In fact, lie detectors work only when the subject believes that they work: if the
subject is convinced that the interrogator knows when he is lying, then he is likely to tell the truth. This
effect can be reinforced by interrogators who ask questions designed to encourage the respondent to lie:
a sort of 'control' question. Leonarde Keeler, the great popularizer of the device, asked subjects to pick
a card from a deck, replace it, and deny each in turn was his: Keeler would then astound the subject by
determining from the machine's readout which card was his. The deck was marked, of course – but it
established the critical idea in the subject's mind. (Alder 2002, p. 15) Furthermore, many popular
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