The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

one that would turn the dangers of torture against the FLN itself.
4.5. Torture in the Bled
With Yacef's days numbered as head of the ZAA, he nominated as his successor none other than
'Safy le Pûr' – leaving the GRE effectively in charge of the FLN in Algiers. Léger had Safy open up
communication with the chief of Wilaya 3 – the brutal Amirouche – in order to begin reconstituting the
ZAA. As the organization began to reconstruct itself, it was 'aided' by the GRE – executing victimless
bombings around the city – while double-agents worked to gain as accurate a picture as possible of the
Wilaya structure. At the end of January, the operation came to a close: Hani Mohammed and Safy
called a meeting of the ZAA chiefs which was promptly surrounded by the French, and the chiefs taken
into custody. (ibid. p. 259) But by then, the GRE had a good idea of the tensions that were threatening
to tear the FLN apart – in particular, the increasing autonomy of the Wilayas against the CCE
(especially after the latter's flight to Tunis), the personal rivalries that spread mistrust between the
Wilayas, and the fear of 'traitors' just like those in the GRE. By planting 'evidence' of treachery on the
bodies of dead FLN mujahidin and sending others to spread the word directly, the GRE was able to
spark a massive series of purges in Wilayas three and four: these purges would have the double effect
of drastically reducing the effectiveness of these Wilayas in the revolution, but would lead to the
execution of thousands of militants at a time when the FLN could least afford it
More importantly, the purges very quickly took on a life of their own, and the reason for this
was the torture of those suspected of treason: as militants came under suspicion (through the indirect
promptings of Léger's GRE), they would be tortured for information – and as in all cases of torture,
many of them talked. The torture of one individual might lead to the 'revelation' of more names,
especially where the ALN commanders were predisposed to fear a larger plot that they were only then
becoming aware of. It is crucial to recognize that these purges were not irrational: there were after all
traitors to the FLN who were engaged in aiding the French, and the colonels had every reason to
suspect as much. Neither were they a sham: unlike the Great Purges under Stalin, where individuals
were tortured into confessing to crimes in order to remove them for unrelated political purposes, the
purges in the Wilayas were in deadly earnest. Amirouche by August 3 rd 1958 would write to the other
Wilaya chiefs, and to the newly established provisional government of Algeria (GPRA), of “ the
discovery of a vast plot woven over long months by the French secret service with the complicity of the
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