The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

to supply the French with much needed information. These sources tended to be those who had been
betrayed in some way by the FLN - for example, 'Ourhia la Brune' had turned to the French after her
husband, an FLN militant, left her for another woman - while others had been turned after being
captured – the most crucial of these being the former chiefs of the eastern and western sections of
ZAA, Hani Mohammed and Gandreche Hacene (aka 'Safy le Pûr'). (Rejali, p. 484) It was these
informants who offered the Forces of Order the greatest leverage against the FLN, and their
contributions to the French success in the Battle cannot be overestimated. On August 26 th , thanks to
information provided by the GRE, two FLN members, 'Mourad' and 'Kamel' – Yacef's bomb-squad
chief and his deputy – were cornered and killed after opening fire on the surrounding paratroopers. The
October 8 th death of Ali la Pointe (Yacef's right-hand man) came as a result of information given by
'Safy' – although the explosion that killed Ali and his compatriots also killed 17 innocent neighbors.
The GRE was also responsible for locating Yacef's final hiding place at No. 3 Rue Caton, although this
information would not be acted upon until September 24 th . The reason for the delay is instructive:
while the GRE had informed the DPU of the hideout's location, they were also being given information
from the owner of the flat, who was posing as an informant to lead them off the trail. (Horne, p. 216)
In fact, the French only moved on Rue Caton after having their suspicions confirmed via torture – a
dangerous indication that the information educed through torture was given equal (or greater) weight
than uncoerced sources.
The apparent preference among the French for coerced over non-coerced information is
particularly ironic, since in a strict sense neither should be trusted at all: both captives and allies have a
similar incentive to take advantage of the information asymmetry that exists by definition to benefit
themselves. But whereas the incentives of the captive are by definition opposed to the torturer, the
members of the GRE had considerable reasons to aid France, even if they were certainly not motivated
by a love of l'Algérie Française. Whether motivated by personal revenge, political disagreement or
monetary gain, the GRE had much to lose from a French loss since this would leave them vulnerable to
FLN retribution. In a sense, the GRE offers a mirror image of the tortured captive: whereas the captive
under torture is presumed to be forced to tell the truth via pain, the members of the GRE were
motivated to tell the truth by gain. In other words, the GRE could not be trusted, except to do what was
in their own interests – which coincided considerably wth the larrger interests of France. In fact, this
commonality of interest would lead to the greatest French intelligence success in the whole of the war -
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