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Production functions for third-season vegetables<br />

Land area mainly determined <strong>the</strong> output of third-season vegetables for adopters<br />

(Table 10). Although <strong>the</strong> estimated coefficients for area of land cultivated,<br />

preharvest labor/ha, and dummy variable 4 for <strong>the</strong> nonadopter group were not<br />

significant at conventional levels of significance, <strong>the</strong>y were larger than <strong>the</strong>ir standard<br />

errors. (Note that labor/ha was used to avoid <strong>the</strong> multicollinearity problem). The<br />

correlation coefficients between land area and labor were 0.58 for adopters and 0.55<br />

for nonadopters. The significant parameter estimates of dummy variable 1 in <strong>the</strong><br />

production function for vegetables grown by nonadopters indicated that <strong>the</strong> farmers<br />

who were adopters by persuasion were better than <strong>the</strong> farmers who voluntarily<br />

adopted <strong>the</strong> technology.<br />

Preharvest labor per unit area contributed significantly and positively, but<br />

dummy variable 4 had a coefficient with a negative sign in <strong>the</strong> production function<br />

of adopters. This significant parameter estimate of dummy v:iriable 4 indicated that<br />

<strong>the</strong> production of vegetables by tenant farmers was more efficient than production<br />

by owner-farmers. The tenancy arrangement was leasehold; <strong>the</strong>refore, it is possible<br />

that leased lands were cultivated with better care and intensity to obtain yields that<br />

were high enough to cover land rent.<br />

Functional and personal income distribution<br />

Factor-share analysis. It is assumed that each factor of production is paid its<br />

marginal-value product; <strong>the</strong>refore, <strong>the</strong> expenditures on all primary factors reflect<br />

<strong>the</strong> value <strong>the</strong>se factors add to total production. If long-term equilibrium prevails, <strong>the</strong><br />

total payments to each factor plus <strong>the</strong> payments on current inputs would exhaust <strong>the</strong><br />

total value of production. Never<strong>the</strong>less, because <strong>the</strong>se situations do not commonly<br />

prevail, <strong>the</strong>re is a difference between <strong>the</strong> total value of <strong>the</strong> product and <strong>the</strong> total<br />

cost, i.e., <strong>the</strong> net income or profit. Because management cannot be easily separated<br />

as a factor of production in rural agriculture, this difference really contains<br />

payments to management and profit. Therefore, it is more appropriately called a<br />

residual.<br />

Payments to all primary factors, <strong>the</strong> residual (value added), and payments to<br />

purchase current inputs show <strong>the</strong> functional or factor-income distribution. Because<br />

payments to current inputs go to <strong>the</strong> sectors that produce, <strong>the</strong> value added accrues<br />

to <strong>the</strong> factor owners in agriculture. Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> distribution of personal income<br />

of <strong>the</strong> various factor owners is determined by <strong>the</strong> levels of use of <strong>the</strong>ir resources.<br />

The personal income of peasant farmers in <strong>the</strong> current setting most probably<br />

consists of <strong>the</strong> residual, payments for farm-family labor, and payments to farmer-<br />

owned capital items. This analysis was conducted on <strong>the</strong>se basic principles.<br />

Factor sllure in first-season rice. Except for factor income of labor and<br />

residual, <strong>the</strong>re were no marked differences between adopter and nonadopter groups<br />

of farmers (Table 11). Adopters used more family and exchange labor, which are<br />

not paid for, and less hired labor. The nonadopters used more hired labor and less<br />

family and exchange labor. The negative values of <strong>the</strong> residuals for both adopters

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