World Development Report 1984

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IBox 4.6 Three views of population change The cl-.rt' 'in tk3hi.-'~ pr--., U1 hr.: diiopirher.bni- .nd ihiin ir.rent p~r,p-,c'i - f t p ai'n re3e~Id r .;:t ri ? ii *lh th-s Jt-p iir t I~rrn,n: arId fi.l p.:-piaI r*n c~rc. ii Ai- Uc,ih :ik hurh:--tndrl. .a *nd n~c- b r.! -7- pc-pFulatc.fl Tlw t--p ch-art f . I 'hc chVa rzt _,In r h miuch m. qu.LkIk thin *n th~ tir;r aLt t ..-.rld pi-pultii n irL-m a-- w r---iII--w nt: cr a>i. ib, -lI,tq it I B C i. the b-:cinr-in,. I: ih -. r. flu'I rI I,. r-r-i n rd p-rlii r iri:.l iCTIculturilA,. I r . rh, nji ..t rhr pre-ent rjid rtI *n *-r ' 'he it3 IIe-mrr ..i ulir.. c,lue Th, nuiddl, cha-rt ;h.- * p'-:paI.- -i) . - '[ Edi From.r th- lit.... -,lit 1 .nth :e_ntar. ti7 ri L rat-' zr.--r [FE l_;II .T i i 'I'D' l'L .:, th,,fl.ridu ;tr,.I !ciC tr'A!r, --L third tur-r The bc-it--iT- chi,rr 1 k i-p -nc -4 r-~--Ptili ---r, r. -. rh It began from a ~h-ch.i.r'cI irt rhe _.i; the hurri,n much higher base and has covered a pc-publl *r, L~u' I a,i rt ile r penr, -c- *..Ii~ pll- 1tIiULh rhrer eri-I- ut i 'rth hac,k to I mflls-n F '_ -.ini *n a i,rt. 111111 t -I taptr nm 1 rpi CI rle ,ru-clta air4-A rh puttr Th, th,ree Kirh:w, ige3 4mkrik gl , jii i ht1ch LIrh e~tprt. t pa4ii flU rtt. nipre n' ~,-.-n 1 .tp-g-iaiIjij. *i r. tr [. h *:. rc t tr tr t~u r u.r Ti- p in ni-'ll-, F-c.-ruIa,tI,- r. I'In -nL, n -rc:. t h curl-.~~~gnnnv -rn-lint-~~~ Itvr 1i `1I I - b- c infli , orl il I ke *-utn rsi. l age --n ' nt -p,rt-nc, a[-.,ri Irn. mI ht, i rids of r A _xI,rF r,ii~ ,E iense Lins -rdIt thiL *a itiri i .. pat--ii.r Th, ntl ch irt hizhlgi-hr; the ntn In-it I he niidile c:hart ri.I-3ti-tt ibiftiae-air in c.r-- 'Ih rites, 'hr,; r 'cenrt darn~at IL in'crca ;, hav-. pai in the p~r qIuarter :-intury, t'**iripr ~idiuL-LJ 1: %relii3 % , rn-iI 311l ti ~i iL Ihi p r.i~dud tim- e'lar..Žr Jr-L4-,in the ih- ;r- 1cim tim icc-i-ran rre; -.*A ~-4 .I -n.* iittt-lt d1 --.n-ird trrend in -'rie \nn .Ia:i rih a. i t- out ii 4 p-ercErrt t C':I - l 1_1 u" and Is). i:rcp.r up. 1-ciaddl- 1 mi S- -L 'I ~~ -iC. t' h3r lilCIl -if-Lu1 ition I- p.-i--bI Time h7--FFrI:-r Igure until 1 it ' a O- Ji II ern e uii I c - * uttierlinf- thm- i-1,Ilih - cl it irn rit.tual rid th~n r- C -rp . I., I - ..r,n flt r ... be-r . rel n at. d h-,rI r 1-.fl al 3r.J I TI1-i Ii - :-r h--r -u . -. -It h, r im adlr:Iie in c rc -I Iit rat-. ;p,-, up,, ird b-ut r h,-i , birth rates or an unwelcome rise in death r,Erent -i,p arid i, lh--r,t-r, itt-t ai- dr:i. li- It calls attention to the need to tM ti limp: hr.aI l -e I i-, that n ti i- .-p IF--rm i-e ul.u-brtinrr- by a decline in birth cha-rt r/t Tim bu .-i Irr. .-ha,r t sh -. 'ha p,-pul- iii tiri ha Cr i fl t rif -n ,-rm.i. h-t le- than- li ill,--n --ri rtim : o i t h, ri1UIL It LIIriI i-,tlb-' -- F. in th.. tir.1ri .,, irn ri cut, p,r-puLl- , 0 ' - r-r n- addcrd l:i. rid th, lin-itr would produce a population 25 percent smaller in is already low and fertility has fallen, the popula- the year 2050 than that resulting from the standard tion in 2050 would be only 2 to 3 percent greater if fertility decline. Combined with rapid mortality rapid mortality decline were added to rapid fertildecline, the population would still be 20 percent ity decline. But where mortality and fertility smaller (see Figure 4.8). Insofar as mortality and remain high-as in sub-Saharan Africa and South fertility declines are linked, the combined rapid Asia-rapid mortality decline combined with path for both is more realistic; it illustrates the rela- standard fertility decline would produce a populatively small effect that rapid mortality decline tion in 2050 about 10 percent greater. But even that would have on population size, especially ff fertil- difference is much smaller than the difference ity is falling. However, the implications of a faster between rapid and standard fertility decline: mortality decline are not the same for all regions. South Asia's population would be more than 20 In Latin America and in East Asia, where mortality percent smaller and Africa's about 50 percent 76
TABLE 4.5 Projections of population size in selected countries, 2000 and 2050 (millions) Population in 2000 Population in 2050 Rapid fertility Rapid fertility Standard decline and Rapid Standard decline and Rapid fertility and standard fertility and fertility and stancdard fertility and 1982 mortality mortality mortality mortality mnortality mortality Country Population decline decline decline decline decline decline Bangladesh 93 157 136 139 357 212 230 Brazil 127 181 168 169 279 239 247 Egypt 44 63 58 58 102 84 88 El Salvador 5 8 8 8 15 12 13 India 717 994 927 938 1,513 1,313 1,406 Indonesia 153 212 197 198 330 285 298 Kenya 18 40 34 35 120 69 73 Korea, Rep. of 39 51 49 50 67 63 65 Mexico 73 109 101 101 182 155 160 Nigeria 91 169 143 147 471 243 265 smaller with a rapid rather than a standard decline standard fertility decline is assumed, the number in fertility (see Figure 4.8). of people under twenty would be 31 percent of the These differences between rapid and standard population instead of 32 percent in the year 2020 declines in fertility have far-reaching conse- (see Figure 4.9). In absolute numbers, there would quences. To take the example of Bangladesh, Table be almost as many young people as there are today 4.6 shows what would happen to its population because of the momentum effect of today's young density and the size of its school-age and working- people becoming parents in the next two decades. age population under the standard and rapid As for old people, their proportion does increase assumptions about declining fertility. Under both, rapidly, but it does so in both projections. With population and average density will increase for rapid declines in both fertility and mortality, the the next seventy years. But the pressure on land elderly, now about 4 percent of the population, (reflected in the projections of agricultural densi- would constitute 9.2 percent of the population in ties), already high, would more than double by the 2020, compared with 7.7 percent under the standyear 2050 under the standard assumption; under ard declines-in either case still less than the 12 the rapid assumption, it would be higher than now percent obtaining in the United States today. in the year 2000 but would then begin to fall. The The rapid paths of mortality and fertility decline number of school-age children would almost dou- would be difficult but not impossible to attain. For ble under the standard fertility decline by the year India a rapid decline implies a total fertility rate of 2000; were fertility rates to decline rapidly, the 2.2 in the year 2000 (compared with 2.9 under the number would still increase by 50 percent by the standard assumption and about 4.8 today); for Brayear 2000 but would then stop increasing. Though zil it implies a rate of 2.1 (compared with 2.6 under the number of people of working age would con- the standard assumption and about 3.9 today). tinue to rise under both scenarios, far fewer new These rates are below those in China (now about jobs would need to be created if fertility declined 2.3) and Korea (2.7) today. They require that girls rapidly; in the year 2050 there would be 100 million who are now growing up in families of about four fewer people of working age. Of course, Bangla- children have only two children themselves, desh is just one example. And since its current whereas their grandmothers had five or six. Rapid fertility is high, the differences between the two mortality decline would mean, for Brazil, life projections are especially large. expectancy in the year 2000 of 73, compared with The effects of a rapid fertility decline on the age 69 in the standard projection. In India life expectstructure of a country could, in principle, be a con- ancy would be 65 in 2000 instead of 61. cern. It is often thought that rapid fertility decline The implied declines still produce relatively high causes a sharp rise in the ratio of old people to annual rates of population growth in the year 2000: young, or a shrinking of the work force. In fact, 1.6 percent in Brazil, 1.2 percent in India, and 2.6 this does not happen. In Brazil, if rapid rather than percent in Kenya (compared with 3.9 percent in 77
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Public Disclosure Authorized Public
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Oxford University Press NEW YORK OX
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labor markets. And they have a vest
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8 The policy agenda 155 Population
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Boxes 1.1 The arithmetic of populat
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Glossary Demographic terms informat
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I I
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countries regain their momentum of
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4 Box 1.1 The arithmetic of populat
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example. Between 1955 and 1980 inco
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ment-all the more so if human skill
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etween 1 and 2 percent-moderate com
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FIGURE 2.1 directions-with a lag in
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14 Distribution of product among se
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TABLE 2.2 Rates of growth in the re
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export restraints and orderly marke
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Box 2.2 Comparisons between the 193
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TABLE 2.6 indebtedness is denominat
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TABLE 2.7 Change in export prices a
Page 40 and 41: Burundi, Guinea, Mali, Malawi, and
Page 42 and 43: TABLE 2.9 Exports from developing c
Page 44 and 45: of rapid and painful adjustment for
Page 46 and 47: In many countries internal adjustme
Page 48 and 49: 3 Prospects for sustained growth Wi
Page 50 and 51: TABLE 3.2 Growth of GDP per capita,
Page 52 and 53: TABLE 3.4 Current account balance a
Page 54 and 55: over time. The main focus of indust
Page 56 and 57: TABLE 3.6 Growth of trade in develo
Page 58 and 59: Box 3.3 Delinking from the world ec
Page 60 and 61: nal surplus. The resulting rise in
Page 62 and 63: Because the public sector in low-in
Page 64 and 65: developing-country creditworthiness
Page 66 and 67: themselves and, by caring for young
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Page 70 and 71: nize contraceptive services. As wil
Page 72 and 73: Economic transformation: Europe, Ja
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Page 76 and 77: Box 4.3 The European fertility tran
Page 78 and 79: FIGURE 4.2 Birth and death rates an
Page 80 and 81: Box 4.4 Alternative measures of fer
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Page 84 and 85: FIGURE 4.4 Fertility in relation to
Page 86 and 87: government goal is a nationwide rat
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Page 92 and 93: TABLE 4.6 Population size and densi
Page 94 and 95: Box 5.1 Consequences of population
Page 96 and 97: implied by a simple division of tot
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Page 100 and 101: get in GDP. Alternatively, all or p
Page 102 and 103: youths, who are presumably able to
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Page 106 and 107: acre increased from 15.4 million to
Page 108 and 109: food they need. Although the amount
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Page 114 and 115: other developing countries suggests
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Page 118 and 119: Box 5.7 Coping with rapid fertility
Page 120 and 121: 6 Slowing population growth Experie
Page 122 and 123: feTtility; nor is it easy to judge
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Page 126 and 127: etter education and health services
Page 128 and 129: TABLE 6.1 Total fertility rates and
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Page 134 and 135: FIGURE 6.6 Fertility dedine within
Page 136 and 137: Box 6.3 Mleasuring the value of chi
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Box 6.4 A deferred incentive scheme
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Box"7.1 Family planning for health
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FIGURE 71 88 in Romania (1979). Res
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132 Box 7.2 Birth planning technolo
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TABLE 7.2 Percentage of married wom
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TABLE 7.3 Discontinuation of contra
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may be delaying a first pregnancy,
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family planning and maternal and ch
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clients may develop can be promptly
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Box 7.6 The impact of service quali
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medical examination was not always
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measuring social acceptability, or
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Box 7.7 Military versus social expe
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costs per user. Public cost per use
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sanguine, however, as soon as one t
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TABLE 8.1 Population policy indicat
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Box 8.2 China's census: counting a
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FAMILY PLANNING. In many countries-
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improving the availability of famil
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Box 8.4 Africa: how much land, how
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Box 8.5 Infertility: a challenge to
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FIGURE 8.2 upper Egypt want no more
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growth. Fertility has declined in t
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Box 8.7 Changing policies and attit
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FIGURE 8.6 childbearing age have un
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able several types of condoms, pill
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housing schemes to parents with onl
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and training, data collection and a
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9 Ten years of experience Much that
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ecause few effective methods are of
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Population data supplement The six
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Table 4. Factors influencing fertil
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190 Births and total fertility =Ice
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Table 1. Population projections Rat
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Table 2. Population composition Low
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Table 3. Contraceptive use and unme
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Table 5. Status of women Number enr
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Table 6. Family planning policy _ _
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Bibliographical note This Report ha
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Background papers Note: Source refe
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-1984. "The Malthusian Case: Preind
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I I
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Table 10. Structure of merchandise
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Key In each table, economies are li
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same order is used in all tables. T
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Population I~~~~ - * S: ~ -- ' X -
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Table 1. Basic indicators GNP per c
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Table 2. Growthi of production Aver
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Table 3. Structure of production GD
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Table 4. Growth of consumption-and
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Tadble 5. Structure of demand Distr
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Table 6. Agriculture and food Value
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Table 7. Industr Distribution of ma
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Table 8. Commercial energy Energy c
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Table 9. Growthi of merchandise tra
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Table 12. Origin and destination of
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Table 13. Origin and destination of
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Table 14. Balance of payments and r
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Table 15. Flow of public and public
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Table 16. External public debt and
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Table 17. Terms of public borrowing
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Table 18. Official development assi
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Table 19. Population growth and pro
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Table 20. Demographic and fertility
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Table 21. Labor force Percentage of
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Table 22. Urbanization Urban popula
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Table 23. Indicators related to lif
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Table 24. Health-related indicators
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Table 25. Education Number Number e
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Table 26. Central goverrnment expen
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Table 27. Central government curren
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Table 28. In-come distribution Perc
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Technical notes This edition of the
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difficulties in assigning subsisten
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series in national currencies are a
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Public loans are external obligatio
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estimates, the total fertility rate
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expenditure and current revenue sho
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Bibliography of data sources Nation
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World Development Report 1984

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