World Development Report 1984

North America's population in 2000 is 16 percent 1950 and the present by eleven developing counbelow
the 1963 projection because fertility is lower tries, including Colombia, Korea, Singapore, and
than expected; the 1980 projection for Asia as a Thailand, where at times the total fertility rate
whole is 3 percent above the 1963 projection declined by almost 0.2 a year. Similarly, rapid morbecause
fertility has fallen less than expected (even tality decline is based on the experience of fourteen
though the projection for one country, China, countries, including Costa Rica, Cuba, Hong
where fertility has fallen more than expected, is Kong, and Kenya, where life expectancy increased
below the 1963 projection). by at least one year every two years between 1950
Two critical assumptions guide the World Bank and 1980 (and at a faster rate where initial life
projections of each country's population. expectancy was lower).
* Mortality will continue to fall everywhere Three points are clear from these projections.
until life expectancy for females is eighty-two 0 Even with rapid fertility (and mortality)
years. As Figure 4.6 shows, these projections decline, the developing world's population would
essentially continue the trends that are already more than double by the year 2050, rising to 6.9
well established in the ten largest developing billion. The population of Indonesia would still
countries. They ignore the possibility of any major increase from 153 million to about 300 million, that
catastrophe, such as war or virulent disease. of Bangladesh from 93 million to about 230 million,
* Fertility will eventually reach and stay at and that of India from 717 million to 1.4 billion (see
replacement level everywhere. When that will Table 4.5). For countries of Africa, Central Ameroccur
obviously varies from country to country, ica, and the Middle East, where the proportion of
depending on current fertility levels, recent young people is higher and where fertility is still
trends, and family planning efforts. For most high and would take longer to decline to replacedeveloping
countries, replacement level is pro- ment level, the increases would be much greater.
jected to be reached between 2005 and 2025; for Even with rapid fertility decline, Kenya would not
most countries in Africa and the Middle East, it is reach replacement-level fertility until 2015, and
projected to be reached later. For most of the larg- today's population of 18 million would increase to
est developing countries, the projections of declin- almost 70 million by 2050. Under the standard
ing fertility essentially extend declines that have declines, replacement-level fertility would not be
been happening for several years. However, a few attained until 2030, and Kenya's population would
countries, for example Nigeria, have yet to experi- grow to 120 million by 2050. With rapid fertility
ence fertility declines; for those countries projected decline, El Salvador's population would still grow
declines are assumed to start in the near future from 5 million to 12 million.
(see Figure 4.7). * Population growth beyond the year 2000
The consequences of these "standard" assump- depends critically on falling fertility in the next
tions for the population of all developing countries decade or two. As Table 4.5 shows, the difference
are shown in Figure 4.8. As shown in the figure, in population size between the standard and rapid
the increases still to come are likely to exceed what declines is not great in 2000-less than 20 percent
has happened so far. This is naturally a cause for in most countries. Under any assumption, the
concern, but not for despair (see Box 4.6). The pace populations of most developing countries are
of population growth need not be taken as given- likely to increase by 50 percent or more by 2000; a
it also depends on policy. And the way societies few, including Kenya and Nigeria, will almost
cope with a growing population depends on eco- double. By the year 2050, however, the differences
nomic and social policy as well as on how fast they will be huge. If fertility falls sooner rather than
grow. later in Kenya, population there in 2050 will be
The potential effect of policy can be illustrated by reduced by about 50 million compared with what it
comparing population projections under the would otherwise be, against today's total populastandard
assumptions with two other paths: tion of 18 million.
"rapid" fertility decline (with standard mortality 0 In determining the ultimate size of world popdecline),
and "rapid" mortality decline added to ulation, fertility matters more than mortality.
rapid fertility decline. Country projections and the Rapid mortality decline combined with standard
assumptions behind the standard and rapid paths fertility decline would produce population in
are explained in detail in the Population Data Sup- developing countries 7 percent larger in the year
plement. Rapid fertility decline is at a rate equiva- 2050 than that resulting from the standard mortallent
to that achieved in certain periods between ity decline. In contrast, rapid fertility decline
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