World Development Report 1984

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government goal is a nationwide rate of 2.7 by 1990. thousand and the death rate thirteen per thou- It is of course possible that the stalling may be sand, so Indonesia's population is growing at 2.1 temporary. In Korea fertility decline was checked percent a year. In countries in which desired family for a while in the 1960s and then resumed. Yet size is four or more, fertility will fall further only stalling could also mean that initial, easily met with more social and economic change, along with demand for contraception has been largely satu- greater efforts to bring better family planning servrated at a level of fertility that is lower than it was, ices to more people. but a level that is still relatively high. Judging from There is also some evidence that improvements recent research on desired family size in many in life expectancy are slowing down. In developed developing countries, this may well be the case. In countries, life expectancy rose steadily until it the late 1970s parents still wanted about four chil- reached about sixty; beyond that, rises are natudren, even in those countries in which fertility had rally slower in coming. But in some developing initially declined. The average, for example, was countries, progress has not been so steady (see Box 4.1 in Colombia and Indonesia, 4.4 in the Philip- 4.5). Much of the gain in life expectancy has come pines, and 3.7 in Thailand. Yet if each couple in a from various public health programs such as vaccicountry has four children, population growth will nation and antimalarial spraying, which generally remain rapid. Take the example of Indonesia, made a bigger difference in the 1950s and 1960s where the fertility rate of 4.3 is close to the desired than in the 1970s. This is especially true in Latin family size. The crude birth rate is thirty-four per America. In Asia, and particularly in East Asia, 72 Box 4.5 Is the rise in life expectanc) slowing too soon? Th, cur. in h~ clh3rr rp!e-.l`rr he Th-, x . ,13le, kl .lara .1,- il.,..r ,1... . to be sure. Some slowdown could also ir.nd ir, 1m hrc cI.t ir, .s 'r J.--d. di-r nL el-e .h'rr i. Lr, \car,; ;nd have akvr, riac in sub-Saharan Africa; count,,.r it 4ho . rhir h ii .rit U .;b. l *.uritt rhr b, n m:;i prncr.urn.:e. n 3 in A;, ., ;I......-. .d. n was probably .si,hi. < .'n . er,. U 1 ra3.z- ii?., k. : -ucr a- -'.rcenr,ni B.irb3 ..r modest. The chart does indicate that e pE.l;n. Irn t rcT -n. t Ir *.:r Eari. t,cuir it .:- Trinidad 3nd i ru,dUn gains t-II ;lilghrI short of the standard in th it-.51 in L w.; or Ihit.nd d .t:e n -* D.d - ihi- *h-xi-. d ccu. r, ; , -r Sri Lanka in the 1960s, but they were on. -i' ,i i:'UT Ibu: CUrT rr le, E I rm rrn., t h -i r, K.au.. rV., d t.;ia ire greater in China and probably also in ind-tr.al ;, Luniro-1 The rh e ,min3il1. m .,h ik.:r,:h,er el e h-re Ii ,. dircic,it India. .1,. "u.6 up- l'FE .'rwnd ch.Žn er:,LduMI. The .I!a,n jI, -n fl pai- Trends in llle e%pedtnc-: mhiee de%hoping coudrtriei and the mean tend Irl marird - 1-, pecn: r,;.; elb : m.e -- enr. -r inhl c hc L.h, -rtr de.eIed .: nt. :raounir,h,E nr..n:-, .- t he d,-e:.z,E . r cti. 3 tlZ r e c.~ cl- i, ' C. LI ihat [ ill F-qlc Irn :ailu,nr T unrier - ;uch ,; llc arc dit-airnd ,a,,cer-xlt,t.-ndi ,,r,I '1,1, h. Pvr- ri7 40,1978. 0-.. nme.j,al r.-arch "O, I :': 1.' *0 1975. F'ur.r. 17 tre m i" de l.an .1 .pr.c 4- 1 963, 1971 :.-.rr,ur,- r ;,.cer- ;ut,tirmnriaI gain; in iilk c p-;tanc. ,'.!'ni, ;u:h .. r .I.:.n3,L Nite ,o, ind ri Lini,3 outperik.rnredt rhe *1candard reFrr;ent-c t. tht cur. Thc r-ord T,.r Th.c l-Q'i 3 nd 1c1ii I, z mr.uc:h nir- nil Duri., the lanrinth. Ficain. ii '-. .-ac, In iTr. pec3rn. ; ;nms,ll . nd yr rm 1-1 l.; l--. .- I,.n/ t- 4iar,ni '1 3 -eFra ar.nrnull, E e- . all.. . r, r lo.s tr c.,in- t hilhhr. r le. - .I../,h,-, - .1 their p' ire. . 1'. di pp.i cin rh,: - ,I x: . EunTr,c h3,d maccl,ed th, 1 .,, 4,' -, at indird it .- a,t h., t puiled! 1- 4 * .,:ri- ,nn-ill. . .r rh... _r-...t
economic development has been rapid enough to tries, has already fallen considerably. But there are offset the declining contribution of public health other reasons. Mortality declines affect population improvements, so life expectancy has gone on ris- growth less when fertility is falling, as is and will ing steadily. In India in the past decade, however, be the case in most countries. Long-range populapoverty and illiteracy in rural areas of the north tion growth is less dependent on the addition of seem to have kept infant mortality high, slowing people whose lives are saved than on the number any further rise in rural life expectancy despite eco- of children they subsequently bear. When fertility nomic growth. In Africa slower economic progress is high, saving a baby's life adds a great deal of (in some countries, even regression) has slowed reproductive potential. To save the lives of an the rise in life expectancy. Rural mortality tends to infant girl and boy who will go on to have 6 chilexceed urban mortality, so a slightly slower pace of dren is to add those people plus (perhaps) their 36 urbanization in the late 1970s may also have grandchildren, 216 great grandchildren, and so on. slowed progress against mortality. By contrast, the But as fertility declines, so does the amount of remarkable gain in life expectancy in China-from extra reproductive capacity. The infant girl who forty-one in 1960 to an estimated sixty-seven in survives, grows up, and gives birth to 3 instead of 1982-shows what can be achieved, even by a 6 children has 27 rather than 216 great grandlargely rural society, through a combination of children (assuming that each of her children will education, income gains, and a strong health care follow her pattern). Furthermore, as mortality program. declines, more and more deaths are shifted from For the future, increasing life expectancy seems younger to older ages. To extend the life of somelikely to depend more than ever on improved liv- one sixty years old is to keep the population just ing conditions, education for women, and better one person larger than it would otherwise be, not health care for the poor. Three indicators lend sup- to boost it by that person plus descendants. port to this view. In addition, as Chapter 6 will indicate, lower * Mortality from diarrhea in the developing mortality contributes directly to lower fertility. For world is two to three times higher than it was in the individual family, fewer deaths usually mean today's developed countries when overall mortal- fewer births (though the net effect is a somewhat ity levels were similar. Diarrhea is a disease of the larger family on average). Finally, because further poor, primarily of poor children. It accompanies mortality declines depend more than before on malnutrition and is exacerbated by poor sanitation, progress in women's education and on improved lack of elementary health services, and lack of the living conditions and health care, programs that basic education that might allow parents to take reduce mortality are likely to reduce fertility as the necessary precautions to prevent it. well. * Infant and child mortality, the major contributors to low life expectancy in developing countries, Demographic prospects and goals are closely linked to economic and social welfare. In Latin America infant and child mortality rates Demographic projections should not be treated as are five times greater among children whose moth- forecasts. The purpose in making projections is to ers have no schooling than among those with illustrate what the future could be, given certain mothers having ten or more years of schooling. assumptions. It is the assumptions that determine * In countries with life expectancy higher than whether the projections will match reality. Some might be expected from their average incomes- projections have been wide of the mark; for exam- Costa Rica, Cuba, Korea, and Sri Lanka-income ple, the size and duration of the baby boom after tends to be more equally distributed than in other 1945 in the United States was unexpected. But developing countries. Illiteracy is also lower and since the 1950s, when the United Nations began health services more widespread. producing systematic projections of world population, demographers have done well in predicting 7. Further declines in mortality rates will boost popu- future trends. In 1963 the United Nations prolation growth much less from now on than they did in jected a 1980 population of 4.3 billion, only a shade the 1950s and 1960s. off the 4.4 billion suggested by the latest estimates, For most of the developing world, the time when and projections of world population in the year declining mortality produced surges in population 2000 have hardly changed since 1963. is passing rapidly. In part this is because mortality, But projections for particular regions and counthough still high compared with developed countries have varied. The 1980 UN projection for 73
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Public Disclosure Authorized Public
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Oxford University Press NEW YORK OX
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labor markets. And they have a vest
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8 The policy agenda 155 Population
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Boxes 1.1 The arithmetic of populat
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Glossary Demographic terms informat
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I I
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countries regain their momentum of
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4 Box 1.1 The arithmetic of populat
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example. Between 1955 and 1980 inco
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ment-all the more so if human skill
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etween 1 and 2 percent-moderate com
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FIGURE 2.1 directions-with a lag in
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14 Distribution of product among se
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TABLE 2.2 Rates of growth in the re
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export restraints and orderly marke
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Box 2.2 Comparisons between the 193
Page 36 and 37: TABLE 2.6 indebtedness is denominat
Page 38 and 39: TABLE 2.7 Change in export prices a
Page 40 and 41: Burundi, Guinea, Mali, Malawi, and
Page 42 and 43: TABLE 2.9 Exports from developing c
Page 44 and 45: of rapid and painful adjustment for
Page 46 and 47: In many countries internal adjustme
Page 48 and 49: 3 Prospects for sustained growth Wi
Page 50 and 51: TABLE 3.2 Growth of GDP per capita,
Page 52 and 53: TABLE 3.4 Current account balance a
Page 54 and 55: over time. The main focus of indust
Page 56 and 57: TABLE 3.6 Growth of trade in develo
Page 58 and 59: Box 3.3 Delinking from the world ec
Page 60 and 61: nal surplus. The resulting rise in
Page 62 and 63: Because the public sector in low-in
Page 64 and 65: developing-country creditworthiness
Page 66 and 67: themselves and, by caring for young
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Page 70 and 71: nize contraceptive services. As wil
Page 72 and 73: Economic transformation: Europe, Ja
Page 74 and 75: scious control of family size, prob
Page 76 and 77: Box 4.3 The European fertility tran
Page 78 and 79: FIGURE 4.2 Birth and death rates an
Page 80 and 81: Box 4.4 Alternative measures of fer
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Page 84 and 85: FIGURE 4.4 Fertility in relation to
Page 88 and 89: North America's population in 2000
Page 90 and 91: IBox 4.6 Three views of population
Page 92 and 93: TABLE 4.6 Population size and densi
Page 94 and 95: Box 5.1 Consequences of population
Page 96 and 97: implied by a simple division of tot
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Page 100 and 101: get in GDP. Alternatively, all or p
Page 102 and 103: youths, who are presumably able to
Page 104 and 105: saving because they come from the c
Page 106 and 107: acre increased from 15.4 million to
Page 108 and 109: food they need. Although the amount
Page 110 and 111: is so scarce, they can do so only o
Page 112 and 113: from rural to urban areas mainly re
Page 114 and 115: other developing countries suggests
Page 116 and 117: emigration by providing information
Page 118 and 119: Box 5.7 Coping with rapid fertility
Page 120 and 121: 6 Slowing population growth Experie
Page 122 and 123: feTtility; nor is it easy to judge
Page 124 and 125: the education of mothers increases
Page 126 and 127: etter education and health services
Page 128 and 129: TABLE 6.1 Total fertility rates and
Page 130 and 131: effectiveness of existing laws, ins
Page 132 and 133: in the 1950s and 1960s, fertility w
Page 134 and 135: FIGURE 6.6 Fertility dedine within
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Box 6.3 Mleasuring the value of chi
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few births; to encourage spacing, T
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Box 6.4 A deferred incentive scheme
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Box"7.1 Family planning for health
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FIGURE 71 88 in Romania (1979). Res
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132 Box 7.2 Birth planning technolo
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TABLE 7.2 Percentage of married wom
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TABLE 7.3 Discontinuation of contra
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may be delaying a first pregnancy,
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family planning and maternal and ch
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clients may develop can be promptly
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Box 7.6 The impact of service quali
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medical examination was not always
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measuring social acceptability, or
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Box 7.7 Military versus social expe
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costs per user. Public cost per use
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sanguine, however, as soon as one t
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TABLE 8.1 Population policy indicat
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Box 8.2 China's census: counting a
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FAMILY PLANNING. In many countries-
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improving the availability of famil
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Box 8.4 Africa: how much land, how
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Box 8.5 Infertility: a challenge to
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FIGURE 8.2 upper Egypt want no more
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growth. Fertility has declined in t
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Box 8.7 Changing policies and attit
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FIGURE 8.6 childbearing age have un
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able several types of condoms, pill
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housing schemes to parents with onl
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and training, data collection and a
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9 Ten years of experience Much that
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ecause few effective methods are of
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Population data supplement The six
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Table 4. Factors influencing fertil
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190 Births and total fertility =Ice
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Table 1. Population projections Rat
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Table 2. Population composition Low
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Table 3. Contraceptive use and unme
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Table 5. Status of women Number enr
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Table 6. Family planning policy _ _
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Bibliographical note This Report ha
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Background papers Note: Source refe
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-1984. "The Malthusian Case: Preind
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I I
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Table 10. Structure of merchandise
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Key In each table, economies are li
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same order is used in all tables. T
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Population I~~~~ - * S: ~ -- ' X -
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Table 1. Basic indicators GNP per c
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Table 2. Growthi of production Aver
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Table 3. Structure of production GD
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Table 4. Growth of consumption-and
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Tadble 5. Structure of demand Distr
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Table 6. Agriculture and food Value
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Table 7. Industr Distribution of ma
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Table 8. Commercial energy Energy c
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Table 9. Growthi of merchandise tra
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Table 12. Origin and destination of
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Table 13. Origin and destination of
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Table 14. Balance of payments and r
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Table 15. Flow of public and public
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Table 16. External public debt and
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Table 17. Terms of public borrowing
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Table 18. Official development assi
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Table 19. Population growth and pro
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Table 20. Demographic and fertility
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Table 21. Labor force Percentage of
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Table 22. Urbanization Urban popula
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Table 23. Indicators related to lif
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Table 24. Health-related indicators
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Table 25. Education Number Number e
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Table 26. Central goverrnment expen
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Table 27. Central government curren
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Table 28. In-come distribution Perc
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Technical notes This edition of the
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difficulties in assigning subsisten
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series in national currencies are a
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Public loans are external obligatio
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estimates, the total fertility rate
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expenditure and current revenue sho
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Bibliography of data sources Nation
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World Development Report 1984

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