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World Development Report 1984

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scious control of family size, probably by abortion only in an arithmetical ratio." Population growth,<br />

and infanticide. If it is assumed that parents did he suggested in his first essay, could be checked<br />

not report the births of infants killed, birth rates only by a shortage of food and a resulting increase<br />

may have been higher than measured. Baby girls in deaths. The proposition rested on two assumpwere<br />

probably the main victims, since there is evi- tions: technological change could not increase food<br />

dence that more boys than girls survived. supply faster than population, and population<br />

Compared with Europe and Japan, North Amer- growth (at least of the poorer classes) would not be<br />

ica, rich in natural resources and with good eco- limited by fewer births, only by more deaths. On<br />

nomic opportunities, experienced faster popula- the second assumption, Malthus later modified his<br />

tion growth in the nineteenth century. Fertility views; universal education, he noted in later ediwas<br />

relatively high, mortality was low; these con- tions of his Essay, could give people the foresight<br />

ditions, together with heavy immigration from to limit childbearing, and improved living stand-<br />

Europe, boosted the rate of population growth ards could lead to "new . . . tastes and habits"<br />

well above 2 percent in the early years of the cen- before rising income induced a self-defeating rise<br />

tury. But fertility began to decline earlier than in in population. His first assumption also proved<br />

Europe, so the population growth rate fell well incorrect. The Industrial Revolution, beginning<br />

below 2 percent by the early twentieth century. just before Malthus wrote, brought to Europe, and<br />

About one-third of total growth in population dur- later to other economies, a new age of technologiing<br />

1850-1910 came from immigration of working- cal change, geometrical increases in agricultural<br />

age people. and industrial production, and what has come to<br />

The demographic situation of today's developed be called the "demographic transition": the transicountries<br />

in the nineteenth century differed from tion from high to low fertility and mortality rates.<br />

what is happening in today's developing countries What are the lessons for developing countries in<br />

in several other respects. During the nineteenth what caused fertility to decline in today's develcentury<br />

rural population growth in today's devel- oped world, especially in what encouraged couoped<br />

countries averaged less than 1 percent a year. ples to choose smaller families? Three decades ago<br />

By 1850 fewer than half of England's population the reasons fertility declined in today's developed<br />

lived in rural areas. By the 1880s Japan's agricul- world might have been stated quite simply. With<br />

tural labor force was already declining. In contrast, economic growth, living conditions improve, so<br />

the rural population in most parts of Asia and mortality begins to fall. Contrary to what Malthus<br />

Africa today is still growing by more than 2 percent feared, fertility responds to falling mortality and<br />

a year, despite substantial migration to towns and adjusts downward, eventually producing the<br />

cities. Technology was less advanced in the nine- slower rate of population growth that prevailed<br />

teenth century, so people did not need to be well before economic conditions started to improve.<br />

educated (as they now do) to work in the modern There is a lag between falling mortality and falling<br />

economy. Nor did technology displace labor, as it fertility, but one follows the other quickly enough<br />

now tends to do, especially if it is supplied by the so that economic gains are not eaten up by a larger<br />

capital-intensive developed countries. Where pop- population, and real incomes rise continuously.<br />

ulation growth was most rapid, in North America, In fact the story is not so simple. In Europe, and<br />

land was plentiful. later in Japan, the pattern of declining mortality<br />

All these factors-combined with low birth rates, and fertility was not so orderly-nor is it today in<br />

death rates that declined slowly as a consequence developing countries. In a few places fertility<br />

of economic and not merely medical advance, and decline preceded mortality decline; in others, ferthe<br />

safety valve of emigration, at least for Europe- tility did not start falling soon after mortality did.<br />

meant that population growth never represented And economic growth-if narrowly perceived as<br />

the burden that it now does for developing industrialization, urbanization, and the shift from<br />

countries. family to factory production-was neither necessary<br />

nor sufficient for demographic transition.<br />

The transition to lozvfertility In England fertility within marriage did not<br />

begin to fall until the 1870s, almost 100 years after<br />

In 1798 the English parson Thomas Malthus wrote the start of the Industrial Revolution and at least as<br />

in the Essay on Population his now-familiar proposi- long after a sustained decline in mortality had<br />

tion that "Population, when unchecked, increases begun. Why the delay? Average real incomes rose<br />

in a geometrical ratio . . . Subsistence increases by more than 1 percent a year in the nineteenth<br />

60

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