World Development Report 1984

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fertility in a changing world is a symptom of lack of efits to other families' children and grandchildren? access: to health services, which would reduce the Even when each couple decides to have many need for many births to insure against infant and children, and achieves its wish, it might have been child mortality; to education, which would raise happier with fewer children if it could have been parents' hopes for their children and would sure that other couples would have done the same. broaden women's outlook and opportunities; to Poor couples who hope their children will support social security and other forms of insurance for old them in their old age may rightly fear that, because age; to consumer goods and social opportunities other couples are having so many children, any that compete with childbearing; and to family one of their own children has less chance of going planning services, which provide the means to to school and eventually of finding a good job. limit births. Assured that each child would have a better chance of school and work in a less crowded The need for public policy world, each couple might be happy with fewer children. There are two broad justifications for government In this setting, people will not be confident that action to encourage people to have fewer children. provision of contraceptives by private suppliers The first is the gap between the private and social will alone lead to widespread reduction in fertility. gains from having many children. Suppose that, Only through the public sector can people make, even as each couple hopes to benefit from many in effect, a contract with each other: "If each of us children, it wishes its neighbors would have fewer, has fewer children, we can rely on government so that its children would face less competition for support for nationwide measures (to improve land and jobs. In other words, the couple's wish access to family planning services and to create for society as a whole is different from its wish for incentives for their use) to ensure that everybody itself. One reason private and social gains differ is makes the same decision. That way, we and our the existence of "externalities": parents do not children will all enjoy a better chance in life." By internalize the costs of their children to society as a developing a social contract, the government frees whole. For example, one family's children will each individual couple from its "isolation parahave little effect on the availability of land; but the dox," from its need to decide alone to have more children born of many families will. The same is children than it would want if others were limiting true of the effects on forests or pasture. To narrow their family size (see Box 4.1). this gap between private and social perceptions, Private and social gains from children also differ governments can act as custodians of society. They in the developed countries, although usually in the are meant to have longer time horizons than their opposite direction. As public social security sysindividual constituents, and to weigh the interests tems develop and people have many ways to save of future generations against those of the present. for their old age, the private economic benefits of Where natural resources are abundant, so-called children diminish. At the same time their private congestion costs caused in part by externalities costs rise. Thus many couples choose to have only may not be great, at least at the national level. But one child or even none. In some countries governin most countries there is another source of differ- ments use financial and other incentives to encourence between the private and social gains from age higher fertility; this too is a population policy many children. Health and education costs of chil- to achieve a common goal (see Chapter 8). dren are heavily subsidized by the public sector, as Private and social gains also differ in areas other are roads, communications, and other public serv- than fertility. For the common good, legislation ices that boost jobs and income. The result, dis- requires that children go to school and that everycussed in the next chapter, is that high fertility con- body be vaccinated against contagious diseases. strains the amount of resources available for Limits, often backed by financial penalties, are investment and hence for future income growth. placed on automobile speeds, chopping down for- Even as some couples have many children because ests, and polluting air and water. Government proof a lack of health services and schooling opportu- duces social goods and services, the benefits of nities, their large families make it more difficult for which individuals cannot capture and will not prothe public sector to extend health and schooling to duce on their own: police protection, clean water all. Yet why should one couple, on its own, give up to protect health, parks for common enjoyment. the possible private benefits of children, when its The second justification for government action to sacrifice alone would provide only minuscule ben- reduce fertility is that people may have more chil- 54
dren than they want, or would want had they as rhythm and withdrawal, which are less effective more information about, and better access to, eas- in preventing conception, or on abortion, which, if ier fertility control. For example, couples may lack primitively performed, puts the mother's life at (or disbelieve) information about falling child mor- risk. tality-or about their chance to reduce the risks to In this situation, the role of the government is their existing children by keeping numbers critical. As a start, it can encourage parents in their down-and thus have more children than needed desire to have fewer children simply by providing to reach desired family size. They may not know more information-about changing mortality and that by stopping breastfeeding they risk more the health benefits of controlling fertility. It can closely spaced births. They may not be fully aware encourage wider provision of modern contracepof the health risks, to mothers and children, of tives. This can be achieved by private suppliers, Box 4.1 The isolation paradox Ir. -*rrT,1 .,11;. in i.ia C \tr : i I .tim . r, burid ur lr IIiI. i riIh ,cr r. l -nr.j r h- n , nm A'. dU.,irh-r ..t , . ... .r.d n . ei ,aI,.tdr r.. h-.-r h . : r,ik- k ind manr. n '--iIr rca. ntli *r r, ' putb IIr. ncrrt r i..,n dr.h r.I ihrh h ni. mir- r .r5.1 .r.. btflri ir l § .-- *el.-- h th-ir r. mr3r., .1 i drr . i I-i.4 r h.. 1r.-1,, I-t n .9I. l.fl . - plan hi th-n. -t_uid i,e.h J. liiiii In rl,-, .t .r : .- Ia tirC t.-t * i. h .I hi- * r, it ;h rt-h 1 ',h ainm r .t :t ., ri,in *r. tl.- .i- .ihr it i l h.ldr,n hd tl-it,.-,r ,. 3, ro in. i | .ri r.l h r - n er.. Cr h p ,n ci.,riri: n.i . -utc,d trhr m.ntI.rlt. ih-n'i i.ul i i.h rlier iI.--.,r *' 1.:rayrrrp:.rir.s .in.i l:,r : ttrz n,th- I, r,..i l,c .i ,h r t *erm..rI r.:cI i. i.- :I.m.uri rr . - tit- Irri,iiL. ,Jr-d,. 'i .' i_*rh,r I er ir- p.riiku 1nJ l i. rira.. ii i I.|li i.ifliilt- L lir i ii-'.. t, i i n- it . n rnru- * r 1I , i .. e . h I':. htIIr. ri r1 -rr, . -r. khidr'n .. .r r.ie' :r and ii[ui.;- .1. Jiiit Fc-ivil n;. . t. h* r-i., Air J. I li, ri:jf prl.,. th.: lar.1 th-d h ha. -:. .tt t hr u id j' :h-r h, ..t a ii'.cr.ci,.............. i .i.uitcrm ul ; . k.-r \1 '-1 (MAt-Cr,n ill *ii-u. a ;l nll .*. 1-r L dr h- iht hrc Cl -.. T-.:htC.1-,r ..; r .tu,i, u iti t' . i i - ti; a ' c I.Irl i -r,.- P, rr. r,- th .ni,- uld t fu aiea - ni.'u4h ihe , il,r iIii-.:r- 1,nnr r ii r:h -: i1p31 : p d l I . but I f. 1 3 .. e .rx. t. ,11 . i- !1. .... .' ani sher d. .r .it. hii .It at- ii-rr t h k lea :--ai l'. m.r rr 11.r a .:ti r.iir. a-I-r the .1.,t .i. t-c: li. \ 1 .d-ul rk hi: lrd1 iaid tehir 1rildr.:r. ...,r-.tU .tt ih.r.I rhr. t -r,, ,rii . tt- 'up-r i hern E,.r...rn-i:i .n . ..r,:ei.r,t.i. .. Jr 11t.- .u r, t 1I.- I. I r t i, l r. LuI tc-ildr.:r . r ha' tatii.r l,il.: Ih- h ir n .1 h--J ie hid,Eii1 i ni l IVh l.: ne.ir- th.'iim ile.h :nipr-... enriie r itrt iin cr it.- rrca -er C. . tar-r mnir i t ri., - th,: -,ri r., . e . doti d: i[h-. r.. iirt . -r-. .-.u p.:c -pir nm:. )l1 r...r --n-c.-arr. i.e r 1lir ili - rid i ri . e.-'ce eArn r.- n r r p i.r nr, hrriir rA alddup .-r Tartarrr . .r.1 r th. tr.r.A, i r hi,l t.r r. -. ,,nincaj. and rtr '3 . , K rnir eel.,1 [hr..a. r tl - *4rt nii.. t r rh. J ira m. r, re r.: xi,:.tr.i-i- at- r I hl-p m i tc lre t . n i .t. .- .It rih and t.i r 3. i . hi. 1t ti; pur u.t . r,- .nt, m n a. rr3r, I. H :1 hi trri ,i-, r- h.ir. ;ti. o It rh- ..Id-r r l- idrnd , h- ii .ir . am c . r.,k- m1 t p'' t,- ir -i-.,--: h.mrrt a-,. ircem thiir * A I bL-t.t.;.ri- bu; nl m I. _it' IJUit -. il A, rth.iii oIt On, trnm liii i hcfl')rrfl.rr I. ih.. th.., idi nfl.ftir 1cr4- n.. chirar P. eart, n arn, , r il.-ri -'. .. i. A... - .l-rr r -. a.-.r`. paul.1 - !ni, dual' in ar'd r.-ia- I. .: it.- - it , un ru . But ;h ; rEd .ubh r ment riirr. ,:nmrnrt. in- hi.-iic in t,,in a .ct e thr, dctrni,rni .-,t Sa li ,ithrr F-" trtt i hardl . tl-: tjheo:ii. i1 ih, . alli e ne.irc . t i. .illidrbrn n c.rri '1.ii, unti .- rhe. i r..-., a i th -i eir i' , ii Ac'l .i,1r'm,ni * it .Lir. I,t He, itr ii . -A h. ut Ci In J.. : Cr APr-ir that -r-e:* thr g.rnaril many and closely spaced births. The very idea of especially in towns and, for some methods (such planning pregnancies may be unknown, especially as condoms), in rural areas as well. But private if social norms dictate early marriage for young suppliers are unlikely to provide the full range of women and if couples do not discuss sexual family planning services, especially in remote matters. areas. Many modern means of contraception can Even if they know about family planning, cou- be made available only with medical backup, and ples may not know how to practice it. They may be there is little profit in disseminating information reluctant to ask questions, especially if their par- and contraceptives where distribution systems are ents pressure them to have many children. Or they poor, health care is limited, and demand is may lack ready access to modern contraceptives unknown and possibly limited. In many countries and be forced to rely on traditional methods such government may need to subsidize or even orga- 55
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Public Disclosure Authorized Public
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Oxford University Press NEW YORK OX
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labor markets. And they have a vest
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8 The policy agenda 155 Population
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Boxes 1.1 The arithmetic of populat
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Glossary Demographic terms informat
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I I
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countries regain their momentum of
Page 18 and 19: 4 Box 1.1 The arithmetic of populat
Page 20 and 21: example. Between 1955 and 1980 inco
Page 22 and 23: ment-all the more so if human skill
Page 24 and 25: etween 1 and 2 percent-moderate com
Page 26 and 27: FIGURE 2.1 directions-with a lag in
Page 28 and 29: 14 Distribution of product among se
Page 30 and 31: TABLE 2.2 Rates of growth in the re
Page 32 and 33: export restraints and orderly marke
Page 34 and 35: Box 2.2 Comparisons between the 193
Page 36 and 37: TABLE 2.6 indebtedness is denominat
Page 38 and 39: TABLE 2.7 Change in export prices a
Page 40 and 41: Burundi, Guinea, Mali, Malawi, and
Page 42 and 43: TABLE 2.9 Exports from developing c
Page 44 and 45: of rapid and painful adjustment for
Page 46 and 47: In many countries internal adjustme
Page 48 and 49: 3 Prospects for sustained growth Wi
Page 50 and 51: TABLE 3.2 Growth of GDP per capita,
Page 52 and 53: TABLE 3.4 Current account balance a
Page 54 and 55: over time. The main focus of indust
Page 56 and 57: TABLE 3.6 Growth of trade in develo
Page 58 and 59: Box 3.3 Delinking from the world ec
Page 60 and 61: nal surplus. The resulting rise in
Page 62 and 63: Because the public sector in low-in
Page 64 and 65: developing-country creditworthiness
Page 66 and 67: themselves and, by caring for young
Page 70 and 71: nize contraceptive services. As wil
Page 72 and 73: Economic transformation: Europe, Ja
Page 74 and 75: scious control of family size, prob
Page 76 and 77: Box 4.3 The European fertility tran
Page 78 and 79: FIGURE 4.2 Birth and death rates an
Page 80 and 81: Box 4.4 Alternative measures of fer
Page 82 and 83: largest city in 1950, will not even
Page 84 and 85: FIGURE 4.4 Fertility in relation to
Page 86 and 87: government goal is a nationwide rat
Page 88 and 89: North America's population in 2000
Page 90 and 91: IBox 4.6 Three views of population
Page 92 and 93: TABLE 4.6 Population size and densi
Page 94 and 95: Box 5.1 Consequences of population
Page 96 and 97: implied by a simple division of tot
Page 98 and 99: and on farms. But the evidence on e
Page 100 and 101: get in GDP. Alternatively, all or p
Page 102 and 103: youths, who are presumably able to
Page 104 and 105: saving because they come from the c
Page 106 and 107: acre increased from 15.4 million to
Page 108 and 109: food they need. Although the amount
Page 110 and 111: is so scarce, they can do so only o
Page 112 and 113: from rural to urban areas mainly re
Page 114 and 115: other developing countries suggests
Page 116 and 117: emigration by providing information
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Box 5.7 Coping with rapid fertility
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6 Slowing population growth Experie
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feTtility; nor is it easy to judge
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the education of mothers increases
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etter education and health services
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TABLE 6.1 Total fertility rates and
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effectiveness of existing laws, ins
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in the 1950s and 1960s, fertility w
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FIGURE 6.6 Fertility dedine within
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Box 6.3 Mleasuring the value of chi
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few births; to encourage spacing, T
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Box 6.4 A deferred incentive scheme
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Box"7.1 Family planning for health
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FIGURE 71 88 in Romania (1979). Res
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132 Box 7.2 Birth planning technolo
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TABLE 7.2 Percentage of married wom
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TABLE 7.3 Discontinuation of contra
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may be delaying a first pregnancy,
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family planning and maternal and ch
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clients may develop can be promptly
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Box 7.6 The impact of service quali
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medical examination was not always
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measuring social acceptability, or
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Box 7.7 Military versus social expe
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costs per user. Public cost per use
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sanguine, however, as soon as one t
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TABLE 8.1 Population policy indicat
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Box 8.2 China's census: counting a
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FAMILY PLANNING. In many countries-
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improving the availability of famil
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Box 8.4 Africa: how much land, how
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Box 8.5 Infertility: a challenge to
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FIGURE 8.2 upper Egypt want no more
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growth. Fertility has declined in t
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Box 8.7 Changing policies and attit
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FIGURE 8.6 childbearing age have un
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able several types of condoms, pill
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housing schemes to parents with onl
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and training, data collection and a
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9 Ten years of experience Much that
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ecause few effective methods are of
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Population data supplement The six
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Table 4. Factors influencing fertil
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190 Births and total fertility =Ice
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Table 1. Population projections Rat
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Table 2. Population composition Low
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Table 3. Contraceptive use and unme
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Table 5. Status of women Number enr
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Table 6. Family planning policy _ _
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Bibliographical note This Report ha
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Background papers Note: Source refe
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-1984. "The Malthusian Case: Preind
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I I
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Table 10. Structure of merchandise
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Key In each table, economies are li
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same order is used in all tables. T
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Population I~~~~ - * S: ~ -- ' X -
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Table 1. Basic indicators GNP per c
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Table 2. Growthi of production Aver
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Table 3. Structure of production GD
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Table 4. Growth of consumption-and
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Tadble 5. Structure of demand Distr
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Table 6. Agriculture and food Value
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Table 7. Industr Distribution of ma
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Table 8. Commercial energy Energy c
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Table 9. Growthi of merchandise tra
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Table 12. Origin and destination of
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Table 13. Origin and destination of
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Table 14. Balance of payments and r
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Table 15. Flow of public and public
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Table 16. External public debt and
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Table 17. Terms of public borrowing
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Table 18. Official development assi
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Table 19. Population growth and pro
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Table 20. Demographic and fertility
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Table 21. Labor force Percentage of
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Table 22. Urbanization Urban popula
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Table 23. Indicators related to lif
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Table 24. Health-related indicators
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Table 25. Education Number Number e
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Table 26. Central goverrnment expen
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Table 27. Central government curren
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Table 28. In-come distribution Perc
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Technical notes This edition of the
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difficulties in assigning subsisten
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series in national currencies are a
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Public loans are external obligatio
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estimates, the total fertility rate
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expenditure and current revenue sho
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Bibliography of data sources Nation
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World Development Report 1984

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