World Development Report 1984
World Development Report 1984
World Development Report 1984
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fertility in a changing world is a symptom of lack of efits to other families' children and grandchildren?<br />
access: to health services, which would reduce the Even when each couple decides to have many<br />
need for many births to insure against infant and children, and achieves its wish, it might have been<br />
child mortality; to education, which would raise happier with fewer children if it could have been<br />
parents' hopes for their children and would sure that other couples would have done the same.<br />
broaden women's outlook and opportunities; to Poor couples who hope their children will support<br />
social security and other forms of insurance for old them in their old age may rightly fear that, because<br />
age; to consumer goods and social opportunities other couples are having so many children, any<br />
that compete with childbearing; and to family one of their own children has less chance of going<br />
planning services, which provide the means to to school and eventually of finding a good job.<br />
limit births. Assured that each child would have a better<br />
chance of school and work in a less crowded<br />
The need for public policy world, each couple might be happy with fewer<br />
children.<br />
There are two broad justifications for government In this setting, people will not be confident that<br />
action to encourage people to have fewer children. provision of contraceptives by private suppliers<br />
The first is the gap between the private and social will alone lead to widespread reduction in fertility.<br />
gains from having many children. Suppose that, Only through the public sector can people make,<br />
even as each couple hopes to benefit from many in effect, a contract with each other: "If each of us<br />
children, it wishes its neighbors would have fewer, has fewer children, we can rely on government<br />
so that its children would face less competition for support for nationwide measures (to improve<br />
land and jobs. In other words, the couple's wish access to family planning services and to create<br />
for society as a whole is different from its wish for incentives for their use) to ensure that everybody<br />
itself. One reason private and social gains differ is makes the same decision. That way, we and our<br />
the existence of "externalities": parents do not children will all enjoy a better chance in life." By<br />
internalize the costs of their children to society as a developing a social contract, the government frees<br />
whole. For example, one family's children will each individual couple from its "isolation parahave<br />
little effect on the availability of land; but the dox," from its need to decide alone to have more<br />
children born of many families will. The same is children than it would want if others were limiting<br />
true of the effects on forests or pasture. To narrow their family size (see Box 4.1).<br />
this gap between private and social perceptions, Private and social gains from children also differ<br />
governments can act as custodians of society. They in the developed countries, although usually in the<br />
are meant to have longer time horizons than their opposite direction. As public social security sysindividual<br />
constituents, and to weigh the interests tems develop and people have many ways to save<br />
of future generations against those of the present. for their old age, the private economic benefits of<br />
Where natural resources are abundant, so-called children diminish. At the same time their private<br />
congestion costs caused in part by externalities costs rise. Thus many couples choose to have only<br />
may not be great, at least at the national level. But one child or even none. In some countries governin<br />
most countries there is another source of differ- ments use financial and other incentives to encourence<br />
between the private and social gains from age higher fertility; this too is a population policy<br />
many children. Health and education costs of chil- to achieve a common goal (see Chapter 8).<br />
dren are heavily subsidized by the public sector, as Private and social gains also differ in areas other<br />
are roads, communications, and other public serv- than fertility. For the common good, legislation<br />
ices that boost jobs and income. The result, dis- requires that children go to school and that everycussed<br />
in the next chapter, is that high fertility con- body be vaccinated against contagious diseases.<br />
strains the amount of resources available for Limits, often backed by financial penalties, are<br />
investment and hence for future income growth. placed on automobile speeds, chopping down for-<br />
Even as some couples have many children because ests, and polluting air and water. Government proof<br />
a lack of health services and schooling opportu- duces social goods and services, the benefits of<br />
nities, their large families make it more difficult for which individuals cannot capture and will not prothe<br />
public sector to extend health and schooling to duce on their own: police protection, clean water<br />
all. Yet why should one couple, on its own, give up to protect health, parks for common enjoyment.<br />
the possible private benefits of children, when its The second justification for government action to<br />
sacrifice alone would provide only minuscule ben- reduce fertility is that people may have more chil-<br />
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