World Development Report 1984

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ecause few effective methods are offered, and which in turn means new investments just to because follow-up services are limited. maintain per capita output. In cities, rapid popula- It has been almost two decades since the peak of tion growth heightens the organizational and population growth in developing countries was administrative difficulties of managing urban passed. But the turnaround to slower growth has growth; redistribution policies offer little relief at been slow and has not occurred everywhere. high cost. Increases in population size are projected to mount Population growth would not be a problem if for another two decades, and in many countries of economic and social adjustments could be made the developing world, populations will triple in fast enough, if technical change could be guaransize by the year 2050, even assuming substantial teed, or if rapid population growth itself inspired declines in fertility. Two decades after the turn- technical change. But rapid population growth, if around, the slow pace of change and its uneven anything, makes adjustment more difficult. It incidence point more than ever to rapid population brings at best only the gradual adaptation that is growth as a central development concern. typical of agriculture, maintaining but not increasing per capita output. The money and research A development problem skills needed for modern technological change are overwhelmingly in the rich countries, where pop- The focus of this Report has been different from ulation growth is slow. If anything they produce neomalthusian descriptions of population as a labor-saving, not labor-using, innovations. In problem. World population has grown faster, to today's developed countries fertility was never as higher numbers, than Malthus would have imag- high as in developing countries now, and mortalined; world production and income have grown ity fell more slowly. Population growth rarely too. The future may be more difficult; in the very exceeded 1.5 percent a year; rural population long run, history may seem to vindicate Malthus growth had virtually ended by the beginning of and the problem of population may indeed be one the twentieth century. of numbers outrunning world resources. But for the next five or six decades, the problem goes Appropriate policies beyond one of global resources and is less easily amenable to any technological fix. It is a mismatch Part 11 of this Report dwells at length on the meanbetween population and income-producing ability, ing and implications of a paradox. On the one a mismatch that leaves many of the world's people hand, the social costs of large families are high, in a vicious circle of poverty and high fertility. In and in some families children suffer directly from this Report rapid population growth is associated, having many siblings. On the other hand, poor at household and national levels, with slower parents make a reasonable choice in having many progress in raising living standards, especially of children. High infant and child mortality and poor the poor. At the national and the family level, educational and job opportunities mean that parrapid population growth exacerbates the difficult ents with few children cannot feel secure about choice between higher levels of living now and their own future until they have had four or five investment, for example in children's schooling, to babies-including, in some settings, two or three bring higher levels of living in the future. It is the sons. The very idea of planning pregnancies may poor who have many children; caught by the pov- be unknown, and modern contraceptives may be erty of their parents, those children carry their dis- unavailable or expensive. In such a context, each. advantages into the next generation. Still rapid individual family's decision to have another child population growth in most countries-2 percent to seems rational. Yet added together, these separate more than 4 percent a year-means up to 50 per- decisions make all families, and especially chilcent of populations are under age fifteen, so job dren, worse off in the end. There is a gap between creation for many years will be a formidable task. the private and social gains to large families. The For some countries and many rural families, high gap is caused in large part by poverty and the fertility means extra resources must go into agri- resulting lack of access to opportunities that would culture just to keep pace with food requirements. encourage small families. In many countries still largely dependent on agri- The process of economic development itself genculture, there is little or no unused land that can be erates new signals that lower fertility. Decisions cheaply brought under cultivation; raising produc- change as women become more educated, as more tion means increasing yields on existing land, children survive childhood disease, as children 184
ecome less valuable as workers and sources of As Chapter 7 showed, if current public expendiold-age security, and as information about the pos- tures on family planning in developing countries sibility of birth control spreads. Parents time the were increased by 50 percent, it would be possible births of children, have fewer of them, and spend to meet the need that more than 65 million couples more on their health and schooling. now have for family planning services. Quadru- The gap between the private and social gains to pling the funds by the year 2000 is necessary to high fertility provides additional justification for bring the "rapid" fertility decline described in governments to act in areas that already merit gov- Chapter 4. These targets are ambitious but not ernment action. This Report has emphasized pol- hugely expensive: quadrupling the foreign aid icy measures to increase people's welfare as well spent on population programs would mean spendas (and as a means) to reduce fertility: education ing a total of about $2 billion (in 1980 dollars), (particularly for girls) and more primary health equivalent to about 5 percent of all aid programs in care for mothers and children. But it has also noted 1982. A new generation of programs is now buildthat measures to raise living standards take time to ing on the past, emphasizing easier access through lower fertility. On the one hand, this underscores outreach programs, and, to reduce discontinua- - the need to act now to improve education, to tion, greater choice of methods, follow-up of clireduce mortality, and to improve women's oppor- ents, and better communication between protunities, so that a sustained decline in fertility can viders and clients. These programs are not be realized in the long run. On the other hand, it expensive but will require new financing to reach also means that other actions with a more immedi- growing numbers of users. ate payoff are desirable. Virtually no developing This Report has shown that economic and social country is yet doing all it might to promote later progress helps slow population growth; but it has marriage and to inform people of the health and also emphasized that rapid population growth fertility benefits of breastfeeding. And in countries hampers economic development. It is therefore in which parents have only as many children as imperative that governments act simultaneously they want, but the desired number of children is on both fronts. For the poorest countries, developstill high, carefully designed financial incentives ment may not be possible at all, unless slower popprovide an additional mechanism to encourage ulation growth can be achieved soon, even before lower fertility. higher real incomes would bring down fertility At the same time, new data on fertility and con- spontaneously. In middle-income countries, a contraceptive use show that many couples still have tinuation of high fertility among poor people could more children than they want and do not benefit prolong indefinitely the period before developfrom adequate family planning services. The gap ment significantly affects their lives. No one would between actual and desired family size means that argue that slower population growth alone will a public policy to provide family planning informa- ensure progress; poor economic growth, poverty, tion and services will bring fertility closer to and inequality can persist independently of popusocially desirable levels at the same time that it lation change. But evidence described in this helps couples have the number of children they Report seems conclusive: because poverty and want. Though the private sector might be expected rapid population growth reinforce each other, to fill this need, and has done so to some extent in donors and developing countries must cooperate urban areas, it cannot make much progress in rural in an effort to slow population growth as a major areas, where backup health systems are poor and part of the effort to achieve development. information about birth control spreads only slowly, 185
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Public Disclosure Authorized Public
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Oxford University Press NEW YORK OX
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labor markets. And they have a vest
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8 The policy agenda 155 Population
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Boxes 1.1 The arithmetic of populat
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Glossary Demographic terms informat
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I I
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countries regain their momentum of
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4 Box 1.1 The arithmetic of populat
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example. Between 1955 and 1980 inco
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ment-all the more so if human skill
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etween 1 and 2 percent-moderate com
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FIGURE 2.1 directions-with a lag in
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14 Distribution of product among se
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TABLE 2.2 Rates of growth in the re
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export restraints and orderly marke
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Box 2.2 Comparisons between the 193
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TABLE 2.6 indebtedness is denominat
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TABLE 2.7 Change in export prices a
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Burundi, Guinea, Mali, Malawi, and
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TABLE 2.9 Exports from developing c
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of rapid and painful adjustment for
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In many countries internal adjustme
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3 Prospects for sustained growth Wi
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TABLE 3.2 Growth of GDP per capita,
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TABLE 3.4 Current account balance a
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over time. The main focus of indust
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TABLE 3.6 Growth of trade in develo
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Box 3.3 Delinking from the world ec
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nal surplus. The resulting rise in
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Because the public sector in low-in
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developing-country creditworthiness
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themselves and, by caring for young
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fertility in a changing world is a
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nize contraceptive services. As wil
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Economic transformation: Europe, Ja
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scious control of family size, prob
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Box 4.3 The European fertility tran
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FIGURE 4.2 Birth and death rates an
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Box 4.4 Alternative measures of fer
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largest city in 1950, will not even
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FIGURE 4.4 Fertility in relation to
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government goal is a nationwide rat
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North America's population in 2000
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IBox 4.6 Three views of population
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TABLE 4.6 Population size and densi
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Box 5.1 Consequences of population
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implied by a simple division of tot
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and on farms. But the evidence on e
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get in GDP. Alternatively, all or p
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youths, who are presumably able to
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saving because they come from the c
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acre increased from 15.4 million to
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food they need. Although the amount
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is so scarce, they can do so only o
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from rural to urban areas mainly re
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other developing countries suggests
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emigration by providing information
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Box 5.7 Coping with rapid fertility
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6 Slowing population growth Experie
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feTtility; nor is it easy to judge
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the education of mothers increases
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etter education and health services
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TABLE 6.1 Total fertility rates and
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effectiveness of existing laws, ins
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in the 1950s and 1960s, fertility w
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FIGURE 6.6 Fertility dedine within
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Box 6.3 Mleasuring the value of chi
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few births; to encourage spacing, T
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Box 6.4 A deferred incentive scheme
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Box"7.1 Family planning for health
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FIGURE 71 88 in Romania (1979). Res
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132 Box 7.2 Birth planning technolo
Page 148 and 149: TABLE 7.2 Percentage of married wom
Page 150 and 151: TABLE 7.3 Discontinuation of contra
Page 152 and 153: may be delaying a first pregnancy,
Page 154 and 155: family planning and maternal and ch
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Page 158 and 159: Box 7.6 The impact of service quali
Page 160 and 161: medical examination was not always
Page 162 and 163: measuring social acceptability, or
Page 164 and 165: Box 7.7 Military versus social expe
Page 166 and 167: costs per user. Public cost per use
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Page 170 and 171: TABLE 8.1 Population policy indicat
Page 172 and 173: Box 8.2 China's census: counting a
Page 174 and 175: FAMILY PLANNING. In many countries-
Page 176 and 177: improving the availability of famil
Page 178 and 179: Box 8.4 Africa: how much land, how
Page 180 and 181: Box 8.5 Infertility: a challenge to
Page 182 and 183: FIGURE 8.2 upper Egypt want no more
Page 184 and 185: growth. Fertility has declined in t
Page 186 and 187: Box 8.7 Changing policies and attit
Page 188 and 189: FIGURE 8.6 childbearing age have un
Page 190 and 191: able several types of condoms, pill
Page 192 and 193: housing schemes to parents with onl
Page 194 and 195: and training, data collection and a
Page 196 and 197: 9 Ten years of experience Much that
Page 200 and 201: Population data supplement The six
Page 202 and 203: Table 4. Factors influencing fertil
Page 204 and 205: 190 Births and total fertility =Ice
Page 206 and 207: Table 1. Population projections Rat
Page 208 and 209: Table 2. Population composition Low
Page 210 and 211: Table 3. Contraceptive use and unme
Page 212 and 213: Table 5. Status of women Number enr
Page 214 and 215: Table 6. Family planning policy _ _
Page 216 and 217: Bibliographical note This Report ha
Page 218 and 219: Background papers Note: Source refe
Page 220 and 221: -1984. "The Malthusian Case: Preind
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Page 224 and 225: Table 10. Structure of merchandise
Page 226 and 227: Key In each table, economies are li
Page 228 and 229: same order is used in all tables. T
Page 230 and 231: Population I~~~~ - * S: ~ -- ' X -
Page 232 and 233: Table 1. Basic indicators GNP per c
Page 234 and 235: Table 2. Growthi of production Aver
Page 236 and 237: Table 3. Structure of production GD
Page 238 and 239: Table 4. Growth of consumption-and
Page 240 and 241: Tadble 5. Structure of demand Distr
Page 242 and 243: Table 6. Agriculture and food Value
Page 244 and 245: Table 7. Industr Distribution of ma
Page 246 and 247: Table 8. Commercial energy Energy c
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Table 9. Growthi of merchandise tra
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Table 10. Structure of merchandise
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Table 11. Structure of merchandise
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Table 12. Origin and destination of
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Table 13. Origin and destination of
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Table 14. Balance of payments and r
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Table 15. Flow of public and public
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Table 16. External public debt and
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Table 17. Terms of public borrowing
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Table 18. Official development assi
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Table 19. Population growth and pro
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Table 20. Demographic and fertility
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Table 21. Labor force Percentage of
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Table 22. Urbanization Urban popula
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Table 23. Indicators related to lif
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Table 24. Health-related indicators
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Table 25. Education Number Number e
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Table 26. Central goverrnment expen
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Table 27. Central government curren
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Table 28. In-come distribution Perc
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Technical notes This edition of the
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difficulties in assigning subsisten
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series in national currencies are a
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Public loans are external obligatio
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estimates, the total fertility rate
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expenditure and current revenue sho
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Bibliography of data sources Nation
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World Development Report 1984

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