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World Development Report 1984

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cial aid, which has risen in real terms at only 6.5 end of the scale, middle-income major exporters of<br />

percent a year in the past ten years, not much manufactures would enjoy GDP growth averaging<br />

above the rate of growth of population. 6.3 percent a year in 1985-95. The diversity that<br />

The problems of sub-Saharan Africa are of a dif- has been such a prominent feature of the world<br />

ferent order from those faced by the middle- economy in the past ten years seems likely to<br />

income countries. Most African countries still lack persist.<br />

the institutions and human skills that are prerequisites<br />

for rapid economic growth. These resources Population change: success and new challenge<br />

need to be developed as a matter of urgency, and<br />

substantial foreign assistance must be forthcoming The accumulating evidence on population change<br />

to finance the effort. Nevertheless, African coun- in developing countries underscores the strong<br />

tries could do much to improve their prospects by link between fertility decline and the general level<br />

reforming their policies. Even among the poorest of socioeconomic development, and the contribucountries,<br />

some have done better than others, tion that family planning programs can make to<br />

largely by raising producer prices to farmers, by slowing population growth. Differences in fertility<br />

maintaining competitive exchange rates, and in among and within countries are related less to<br />

general by using prices rather than government income per person than to life expectancy, female<br />

directives to allocate resources. literacy, and the income of poorer groups. They<br />

The need for adjustment is not confined to the are also related to availability of family planning<br />

developing countries. Part I of this <strong>Report</strong> argued services. Thus Sri Lanka has lower fertility than<br />

that many of the failings in the world economy India, and India has lower fertility than Pakistan.<br />

have their roots in the industrial countries, whose Colombia has lower fertility than Brazil, and Brazil<br />

financial and economic weight greatly influences has lower fertility than Peru. Egypt has lower fereconomic<br />

prospects in the developing world. To tility than Morocco. Countries which have made a<br />

varying degrees, the industrial countries have substantial and sustained effort in family planning<br />

been unwilling to tackle the rigidities in their econ- have achieved remarkable success; where educaomies.<br />

They have maintained capacity in obsoles- tion is widespread, the success is even more strikcent<br />

industries, by subsidies or by restricting ing. The evidence accumulated in the past decade<br />

imports. Their macroeconomic policies caused, is especially convincing. Contraceptive use tripled<br />

first, a rapid inflationary buildup in the 1970s and and fertility fell by 30 percent in Mexico between<br />

then, in the past three years of disinflation, high 1974 and 1979. In Java, Indonesia, contraceptive<br />

real interest rates resulting from the conflict use rose from 11 percent to more than 50 percent<br />

between monetary restraint and relative fiscal and total fertility fell from almost 5 to about 4<br />

laxity. between 1974 and 1980. In Kerala state of India,<br />

Until the industrial countries correct these the total fertility fell from 4.1 in 1972 to 2.7 in 1978;<br />

underlying weaknesses, the prospects for the per capita income is low, but female literacy is high<br />

world economy will remain clouded. Some sce- and family planning services are widespread.<br />

narios presented in Chapter 3 suggest that, with- But there is also evidence that further fertility<br />

out an improvement in the performance of the decline, and the initiation of decline where it has<br />

industrial countries, GDP in the developing world not begun, will not come automatically. There are<br />

as a whole would grow at only 4.7 percent a year in two points to bear in mind. One is that in most<br />

1985-95. Within that total, growth in sub-Saharan developing countries desired family size is about<br />

Africa would be as low as 2.8 percent a year. This is four. It is higher in rural areas and among the less<br />

less than the likely rate of population growth, so educated. Without sustained improvements in livthat<br />

people in many of the world's poorest coun- ing conditions, desired family size could remain<br />

tries would get steadily poorer. Among developing around four-implying population growth rates at<br />

countries as a group, improvement in domestic or above 2 percent. The second is that family planpolicies<br />

could raise growth to 5.1 percent a year if ning programs, successful as they have been, have<br />

industrial-country growth is weak. Even with by no means reached their full potential. In virtufaster<br />

growth in the industrial countries (and no ally every country surveyed, many couples who<br />

change in domestic policies), Africa's prospects say they want no more children do not use contrawould<br />

not brighten much; GDP growth of 3.2 per- ception-usually because they have poor access to<br />

cent a year in that region in 1985-95 would not be modern services. In many areas where services are<br />

enough to raise per capita incomes. At the other available, discontinuation rates are high-often<br />

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