World Development Report 1984

countries regain their momentum of the 1960s, but until well into the twentieth century, the world's
at only 4.7 percent a year in that period if the population grew at the then unprecedented rate of
industrial countries do no better than in the past about 0.5 percent a year, faster in today's develten
years. That would make the difference oped countries, slower elsewhere. World populabetween
almost every country in the world raising tion size doubled again, this time in about 150
per capita incomes and people in many of the years; it had reached about 1.7 billion by 1900. In
world's poorest countries growing steadily poorer. the twentieth century, growth continued to accel-
Chapter 3 also explores the gains that develop- erate, from 0.5 to 1 percent until about 1950 and
ing countries could make by improving their own then to a remarkable 2 percent. In just over thirty
economic policies, irrespective of what happens in years, between 1950 and today, world population
the industrial countries. It concludes that, if they nearly doubled again-growing from 2.5 billion to
make such improvements, some countries might almost 4.8 billion (see Figure 1.1).
be able to add close to an extra percentage point to Since 1950 population growth has been concentheir
economic growth rates. None of these trated largely in the developing countries. Though
improvements can be regarded as unachievable, a postwar baby boom combined with falling morsince
they have already been achieved by some tality in the industrial countries, the population
developing countries. The chapter stresses the growth rate never exceeded 1 percent in Europe
valuable contribution that appropriate pricing poli- and seldom exceeded 1.5 percent in North Amercies
can make to faster economic growth. In partic- ica. At its peak, fertility in the United States meant
ular, it contrasts the record of countries that have that families had on average little more than three
adopted outward-looking trade policies with those children; in Europe and Japan postwar families
that have concentrated on import substitution. were even smaller. By the 1970s, in most devel-
The predicament of sub-Saharan Africa is a oped countries fertility had fallen to a level near or
recurring theme throughout this Report. Though even below "replacement"-about two children
its total GDP growth was not much slower than in per couple being the level which, over the long
other regions in the 1970s, Africa's population run, holds population constant (demographic
grew faster; for the region as a whole, GDP per terms are defined in the glossary).
capita fell during the 1970s. It could well do so The postwar experience of developing countries
again in the years up to 1995. Of the policy failings was not only different but historically unprecethat
contributed to slow growth in other develop- dented. Driven by falling mortality and continued
ing countries, all can be found in more or less high fertility, their population growth rate rose
chronic form in many African countries. The scope above 2 percent a year. It peaked at 2.4 percent in
for raising growth rates by improving policies is the 1960s. It is now around 2.0 percent a year,
therefore greatest in Africa. In addition, however, because of a slightly greater decline in birth rates
many of Africa's weaknesses require extra conces- than in death rates (see Figure 1.1). Further decline
sional aid if they are to be tackled effectively. in population growth will not come automatically.
Much of the slowdown so far can be attributed to
Population and demographic change China, where fertility is already low, close to an
average of two children per family. Most families
While the causes of poor economic performance in other developing countries now have at least
can be traced back twenty years, the links between four children, in rural areas five and more. In a few
demography and development can be understood countries in which fertility fell in the 1970s, there is
only by going back even farther into the past. In evidence that it has leveled off recently. For parts
the long run of history, the second half of the of South Asia and the Middle East, forecasts of a
twentieth century stands out for its remarkable lower rate of population growth are based more on
population growth. Consider that in the year 1 the hope than on present trends. For much of Africa
world had about 300 million people. Its population and Central America, population growth rates are
then took more than 1,500 years to double. rising and could rise still further. In Africa couples
Though the general trend was rising, population say they want more children than in fact they are
growth was not steady; the balance of births over having, while mortality-though high-can be
deaths was tenuous, and crises such as war or expected to decline.
plague periodically reduced populations in parts of Furthermore, population "momentum" means
the world. Only in the eighteenth century did the that growth rates in developing countries will
number of people start to rise steadily. From 1750 remain high for several decades even if couples
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