World Development Report 1984

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get in GDP. Alternatively, all or part of the savings capital widening. For most countries the same is could be used to increase spending per pupil or to true of jobs. In contrast to school-age populations, increase the enrollment rate in Malawi's secondary whose rate of growth starts to slow five or six years schools which in 1980 stood at only 4 percent. The after a decline in fertility, the growth of workingreturns to using the resources saved on account of age populations is more or less fixed for fifteen to lower population growth for improving school twenty years. People born in 1980-84 will be enterquality are likely to be higher than the returns to ing the labor force in 2000 and will still be there forced rapid expansion of the system if population almost halfway through the twenty-first century. growth does not slow. But improving quality will High-fertility countries face large increases in be difficult until a larger share of the population their labor forces. As an example, Nigeria's high has access to basic education, which itself is fertility in the 1970s guarantees that its workingdelayed if the numbers of school-age children are age population will double by the end of this cenconstantly increasing. tury. Kenya can expect an even larger increase. The potential for cutting educational costs Where fertility has fallen in the past two decades, through lower fertility is obviously largest for the increases will be smaller (see Figure 5.1). China those countries with the highest fertility rates. will experience a rise of no more than 45 percent. Four African countries-Burundi, Ethiopia, Korea's working-age population has already fallen Malawi, Zimbabwe-could save between 50 and 60 substantially and will change little between now percent of their educational spending by 2015 (see and the year 2000. In all these countries the actual Table 5.3), whereas a rapid fertility decline would labor force-people who are working or looking for reduce educational costs by only 5 percent in jobs-will grow even faster if, for example, more Colombia, by 1 percent in Korea, and by even less women start looking for paid employment. in China, where there is virtually no difference In countries with growing labor forces, the stock between the rapid and standard fertility assump- of capital (both human and physical) must contintions. But these lower-fertility countries have ually increase just to maintain capital per worker already gained considerably from slower popula- and current productivity. Unless this happens, tion growth. For example, if Korea's fertility rate each worker will produce less using the reduced had remained at its 1960 level, the number of pri- land and capital each has to work with. Productivmary school-age children in 1980 would have been ity, and thus incomes, will then stagnate or even about one-third (2 million) larger than it was. fall. Wages will fall in relation to profits and rents, Applying actual 1980 costs per student ($300) to and thus increase income inequalities-another that difference gives a saving in a single year of example of how rapid population growth harms $600 million, about 1 percent of Korea's GDP. the poor. For incomes to rise, investment needs to grow GROWTH OF LABOR FORCE AND CAPITAL WIDENING. faster than the labor force, to ensure capital deep- Keeping up with schooling needs is only one way ening. Capital deepening involves a growing whereby rapid population growth contributes to demand for spending on education, health, roads, energy, farm machinery, ports, factories, and so forth. These requirements have to be traded off TABLE 5.3 against extra consumption. Of course, if educa- Potential savings in primary-school costs under tional levels are rising quickly, rapid restocking of rapid fertility decline, selected countries, 2000 the labor force with young, better-educated people and 2015 can be an advantage. But, as shown above, it is also difficult to increase educational spending per Cost savings child if population growth is rapid. Totalfertility (percent) Even when developing countries manage to Country rate (1 98 1) 2000 2015 raise investment in line with the growth in their Korea, Rep. of 3.0 12 1 labor force, the contrasts with developed countries Colombia 3.7 23 5 are striking. The gap in educational quality has Egypt 4.8 27 23 already been described. Investment in physical Burundi 6.5 26 56 al been decied. Ivstment in ic Ethiopia 6.5 25 60 capital per new worker is also much larger in Kenya 8.0 22 50 industrial countries because their labor-force Zimbabwe 8.0 19 48 growth is slower and their GDP per capita is so a. Compared with standard fertility assumption. much higher. Even a middle-income country such 86
as Korea, with a high investment ratio of 31 per- * It is likely to exacerbate income inequalities, cent in 1980, could provide only $30,000 of gross particularly if many new young workers have little investment per new worker, compared with education. When a large proportion of workers are $189,000 in the United States, which had an invest- young and inexperienced, their productivity tends ment ratio of only 18 percent. (The investment to be lower. Except for those who have more eduratio is gross domestic investment as a percentage cation than older workers, their starting wages will of gross domestic product.) If all investment in tend to be lower, and they must compete with each countries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nepal, other. Relatively few will receive employer training and Rwanda had been allocated to potential new to upgrade their skills. Over time, the weight of workers during 1980, each person would have had numbers of the unskilled will hold down their less than $1,700 invested on his or her behalf (see wages in relation to those of skilled workers. A * Table 5.4). At the other extreme, new workers in <strong>World</strong> Bank study of what determines income Japan would have had about $535,000 of gross growth among countries found that as overall investment available. Countries with the lowest income rises, the average contribution of individabsolute levels of investment per potential new ual workers without education falls-uneducated worker tend to be those also facing the fastest workers contribute (and probably earn) relatively growth in their working-age populations. Just to less than they once did. maintain the current small amount of investment * It increases various forms of unemployment. per potential new worker, they will have to Although population growth has had a relatively increase their investment rapidly. In contrast, small effect on open unemployment in developing developed countries can increase the capital avail- countries, this fact does not demonstrate any able to each potential new worker in 2000 even if demographic stimulus to job creation. It simply investment grows by less than 1 percent a year. indicates that unemployment is not a feasible Rapid growth in the labor force has two other option for most people. Open unemployment is effects. typically found most among educated urban TABLE 5.4 Gross domestic investment per potential new worker, selected countries, 1980 Gross domestic Projected Gross Increase in investment increase in domestic zworking-age per potential vorking-age Investment investment population' new worker population ratio' (billions 1979-80 (thousands of 1980-2000 Countrygroup (percent) of dollars) (millions) l980 dollars) (percent) Developing countries Bangladesh 17 1.90 1.70 1.09 74 Ethiopia 10 0.37 0.24 1.53 76 Nepal 14 0.26 0.21 1.26 78 Rwanda 16 0.18 0.11 1.66 99 Kenya 22 1.31 0.28 4.70 134 Egypt, Arab Rep. 31 7.12 0.80 8.96 68 Thailand 27 9.03 0.65 10.66 73 Colombia 21 6.21 0.62 10.10 66 Korea, Rep. of 31 18.06 0.61 29.85 45 Brazil 22 52.35 1.30 40.36 65 Industrialized countries Japan 32 332.80 0.62 535.04 11 Australia 24 35.53 0.16 219.35 19 France 23 149.94 0.33 461.34 13 Germany 25 204.79 0.43 481.33 1 United States 18 465.68 2.46 188.99 15 Note: Countries are listed in ascending order of their GNP per capita in 1982. a. Gross domestic investment as percentage of gross domestic product. b. Age cohort 15-64 years. 87
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Public Disclosure Authorized Public
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Oxford University Press NEW YORK OX
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labor markets. And they have a vest
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8 The policy agenda 155 Population
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Boxes 1.1 The arithmetic of populat
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Glossary Demographic terms informat
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I I
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countries regain their momentum of
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4 Box 1.1 The arithmetic of populat
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example. Between 1955 and 1980 inco
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ment-all the more so if human skill
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etween 1 and 2 percent-moderate com
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FIGURE 2.1 directions-with a lag in
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14 Distribution of product among se
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TABLE 2.2 Rates of growth in the re
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export restraints and orderly marke
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Box 2.2 Comparisons between the 193
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TABLE 2.6 indebtedness is denominat
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TABLE 2.7 Change in export prices a
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Burundi, Guinea, Mali, Malawi, and
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TABLE 2.9 Exports from developing c
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of rapid and painful adjustment for
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In many countries internal adjustme
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3 Prospects for sustained growth Wi
Page 50 and 51: TABLE 3.2 Growth of GDP per capita,
Page 52 and 53: TABLE 3.4 Current account balance a
Page 54 and 55: over time. The main focus of indust
Page 56 and 57: TABLE 3.6 Growth of trade in develo
Page 58 and 59: Box 3.3 Delinking from the world ec
Page 60 and 61: nal surplus. The resulting rise in
Page 62 and 63: Because the public sector in low-in
Page 64 and 65: developing-country creditworthiness
Page 66 and 67: themselves and, by caring for young
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Page 70 and 71: nize contraceptive services. As wil
Page 72 and 73: Economic transformation: Europe, Ja
Page 74 and 75: scious control of family size, prob
Page 76 and 77: Box 4.3 The European fertility tran
Page 78 and 79: FIGURE 4.2 Birth and death rates an
Page 80 and 81: Box 4.4 Alternative measures of fer
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Page 84 and 85: FIGURE 4.4 Fertility in relation to
Page 86 and 87: government goal is a nationwide rat
Page 88 and 89: North America's population in 2000
Page 90 and 91: IBox 4.6 Three views of population
Page 92 and 93: TABLE 4.6 Population size and densi
Page 94 and 95: Box 5.1 Consequences of population
Page 96 and 97: implied by a simple division of tot
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Page 102 and 103: youths, who are presumably able to
Page 104 and 105: saving because they come from the c
Page 106 and 107: acre increased from 15.4 million to
Page 108 and 109: food they need. Although the amount
Page 110 and 111: is so scarce, they can do so only o
Page 112 and 113: from rural to urban areas mainly re
Page 114 and 115: other developing countries suggests
Page 116 and 117: emigration by providing information
Page 118 and 119: Box 5.7 Coping with rapid fertility
Page 120 and 121: 6 Slowing population growth Experie
Page 122 and 123: feTtility; nor is it easy to judge
Page 124 and 125: the education of mothers increases
Page 126 and 127: etter education and health services
Page 128 and 129: TABLE 6.1 Total fertility rates and
Page 130 and 131: effectiveness of existing laws, ins
Page 132 and 133: in the 1950s and 1960s, fertility w
Page 134 and 135: FIGURE 6.6 Fertility dedine within
Page 136 and 137: Box 6.3 Mleasuring the value of chi
Page 138 and 139: few births; to encourage spacing, T
Page 140 and 141: Box 6.4 A deferred incentive scheme
Page 142 and 143: Box"7.1 Family planning for health
Page 144 and 145: FIGURE 71 88 in Romania (1979). Res
Page 146 and 147: 132 Box 7.2 Birth planning technolo
Page 148 and 149: TABLE 7.2 Percentage of married wom
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TABLE 7.3 Discontinuation of contra
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may be delaying a first pregnancy,
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family planning and maternal and ch
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clients may develop can be promptly
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Box 7.6 The impact of service quali
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medical examination was not always
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measuring social acceptability, or
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Box 7.7 Military versus social expe
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costs per user. Public cost per use
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sanguine, however, as soon as one t
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TABLE 8.1 Population policy indicat
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Box 8.2 China's census: counting a
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FAMILY PLANNING. In many countries-
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improving the availability of famil
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Box 8.4 Africa: how much land, how
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Box 8.5 Infertility: a challenge to
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FIGURE 8.2 upper Egypt want no more
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growth. Fertility has declined in t
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Box 8.7 Changing policies and attit
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FIGURE 8.6 childbearing age have un
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able several types of condoms, pill
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housing schemes to parents with onl
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and training, data collection and a
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9 Ten years of experience Much that
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ecause few effective methods are of
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Population data supplement The six
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Table 4. Factors influencing fertil
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190 Births and total fertility =Ice
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Table 1. Population projections Rat
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Table 2. Population composition Low
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Table 3. Contraceptive use and unme
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Table 5. Status of women Number enr
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Table 6. Family planning policy _ _
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Bibliographical note This Report ha
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Background papers Note: Source refe
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-1984. "The Malthusian Case: Preind
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I I
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Table 10. Structure of merchandise
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Key In each table, economies are li
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same order is used in all tables. T
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Population I~~~~ - * S: ~ -- ' X -
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Table 1. Basic indicators GNP per c
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Table 2. Growthi of production Aver
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Table 3. Structure of production GD
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Table 4. Growth of consumption-and
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Tadble 5. Structure of demand Distr
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Table 6. Agriculture and food Value
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Table 7. Industr Distribution of ma
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Table 8. Commercial energy Energy c
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Table 9. Growthi of merchandise tra
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Table 12. Origin and destination of
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Table 13. Origin and destination of
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Table 14. Balance of payments and r
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Table 15. Flow of public and public
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Table 16. External public debt and
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Table 17. Terms of public borrowing
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Table 18. Official development assi
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Table 19. Population growth and pro
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Table 20. Demographic and fertility
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Table 21. Labor force Percentage of
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Table 22. Urbanization Urban popula
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Table 23. Indicators related to lif
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Table 24. Health-related indicators
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Table 25. Education Number Number e
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Table 26. Central goverrnment expen
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Table 27. Central government curren
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Table 28. In-come distribution Perc
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Technical notes This edition of the
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difficulties in assigning subsisten
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series in national currencies are a
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Public loans are external obligatio
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estimates, the total fertility rate
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expenditure and current revenue sho
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Bibliography of data sources Nation
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World Development Report 1984

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