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World Development Report 1984

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get in GDP. Alternatively, all or part of the savings capital widening. For most countries the same is<br />

could be used to increase spending per pupil or to true of jobs. In contrast to school-age populations,<br />

increase the enrollment rate in Malawi's secondary whose rate of growth starts to slow five or six years<br />

schools which in 1980 stood at only 4 percent. The after a decline in fertility, the growth of workingreturns<br />

to using the resources saved on account of age populations is more or less fixed for fifteen to<br />

lower population growth for improving school twenty years. People born in 1980-84 will be enterquality<br />

are likely to be higher than the returns to ing the labor force in 2000 and will still be there<br />

forced rapid expansion of the system if population almost halfway through the twenty-first century.<br />

growth does not slow. But improving quality will High-fertility countries face large increases in<br />

be difficult until a larger share of the population their labor forces. As an example, Nigeria's high<br />

has access to basic education, which itself is fertility in the 1970s guarantees that its workingdelayed<br />

if the numbers of school-age children are age population will double by the end of this cenconstantly<br />

increasing. tury. Kenya can expect an even larger increase.<br />

The potential for cutting educational costs Where fertility has fallen in the past two decades,<br />

through lower fertility is obviously largest for the increases will be smaller (see Figure 5.1). China<br />

those countries with the highest fertility rates. will experience a rise of no more than 45 percent.<br />

Four African countries-Burundi, Ethiopia, Korea's working-age population has already fallen<br />

Malawi, Zimbabwe-could save between 50 and 60 substantially and will change little between now<br />

percent of their educational spending by 2015 (see and the year 2000. In all these countries the actual<br />

Table 5.3), whereas a rapid fertility decline would labor force-people who are working or looking for<br />

reduce educational costs by only 5 percent in jobs-will grow even faster if, for example, more<br />

Colombia, by 1 percent in Korea, and by even less women start looking for paid employment.<br />

in China, where there is virtually no difference In countries with growing labor forces, the stock<br />

between the rapid and standard fertility assump- of capital (both human and physical) must contintions.<br />

But these lower-fertility countries have ually increase just to maintain capital per worker<br />

already gained considerably from slower popula- and current productivity. Unless this happens,<br />

tion growth. For example, if Korea's fertility rate each worker will produce less using the reduced<br />

had remained at its 1960 level, the number of pri- land and capital each has to work with. Productivmary<br />

school-age children in 1980 would have been ity, and thus incomes, will then stagnate or even<br />

about one-third (2 million) larger than it was. fall. Wages will fall in relation to profits and rents,<br />

Applying actual 1980 costs per student ($300) to and thus increase income inequalities-another<br />

that difference gives a saving in a single year of example of how rapid population growth harms<br />

$600 million, about 1 percent of Korea's GDP. the poor.<br />

For incomes to rise, investment needs to grow<br />

GROWTH OF LABOR FORCE AND CAPITAL WIDENING. faster than the labor force, to ensure capital deep-<br />

Keeping up with schooling needs is only one way ening. Capital deepening involves a growing<br />

whereby rapid population growth contributes to demand for spending on education, health, roads,<br />

energy, farm machinery, ports, factories, and so<br />

forth. These requirements have to be traded off<br />

TABLE 5.3 against extra consumption. Of course, if educa-<br />

Potential savings in primary-school costs under tional levels are rising quickly, rapid restocking of<br />

rapid fertility decline, selected countries, 2000 the labor force with young, better-educated people<br />

and 2015 can be an advantage. But, as shown above, it is<br />

also difficult to increase educational spending per<br />

Cost savings child if population growth is rapid.<br />

Totalfertility (percent) Even when developing countries manage to<br />

Country rate (1 98 1) 2000 2015 raise investment in line with the growth in their<br />

Korea, Rep. of 3.0 12 1 labor force, the contrasts with developed countries<br />

Colombia 3.7 23 5 are striking. The gap in educational quality has<br />

Egypt 4.8 27 23 already been described. Investment in physical<br />

Burundi 6.5 26 56 al been decied. Ivstment in ic<br />

Ethiopia 6.5 25 60 capital per new worker is also much larger in<br />

Kenya 8.0 22 50 industrial countries because their labor-force<br />

Zimbabwe 8.0 19 48 growth is slower and their GDP per capita is so<br />

a. Compared with standard fertility assumption. much higher. Even a middle-income country such<br />

86

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