The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Global Argument from Evil 73 (or any other topic) impossible. 10 Let us leave him to his own devices and presuppose the Thomist account of omnipotence, which at least makes rational discourse about what an omnipotent being can do possible. Theist’s presentation of the free-will defense immediately suggests several objections. Here are two that would immediately occur to most people: How could anyone possibly believe that the evils of this world are outweighed by the good inherent in our having free will? Perhaps free will is a good and would outweigh, in Theist’s words ‘‘a certain amount of evil’’, but it seems impossible to believe that it can outweigh the amount of physical suffering (to say nothing of other sorts of evil) that actually exists. Not all evils are the result of human free will. Consider, for example, the Lisbon earthquake or the almost inconceivable misery and loss of life produced by the Asian tsunami of December 2004. Such events are not the result of any act of human will, free or unfree. In my view, the simple form of the free-will defense I have put into Theist’s mouth is unable to deal with either of these objections. The simple form of the free-will defense can deal with at best the existence of some evil—as opposed to the vast amount of evil we actually observe—and the evil with which it can deal is only the evil that is caused by the acts of human beings. I believe, however, that more sophisticated forms of the free-will defense do have interesting things to say about the vast amount of evil in the world and about those evils that are not caused by human beings. Before I discuss these ‘‘more sophisticated’’ forms of the free-will defense, however, I want to examine some objections that have been raised against the free-will defense that are so fundamental that, if valid, they would refute any elaboration of the defense, however sophisticated. These objections have to do with the nature of free will. I am not going to inject them into my dialogue between Atheist and Theist, for the simple reason that—in my view, anyway—they have not got very much force, and I do not want it to be accused of fictional character assassination; my Atheist has more interesting arguments at her disposal. Nevertheless, I am going to discuss these arguments. One of them I will discuss because it played an important part in early debates about the argument from evil. (From my parochial point of view, the ‘‘early’’ debates about the argument from evil took place in the Fifties and Sixties.) I will discuss the others because, although they cannot be said to
74 The Global Argument from Evil have played an important part in the debate, they have some currency. Since, like the first, they involve philosophical problems about free will, it will be convenient to discuss them in connection with the first. I will begin the next lecture with a discussion of these three arguments: the argument that, since free will is compatible with determinism, an omnipotent and omniscient being could indeed determine the free choices of its creatures; the argument that, although free will and determinism are incompatible, God is able to ensure that human beings freely choose one course of action over another without determining their actions (owing to his having what is called ‘‘middle knowledge’’); and the argument that since God’s omniscience is incompatible with free will, the free-will defense is logically self-contradictory.
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74 <strong>The</strong> Global Argument from <strong>Evil</strong><br />
have played an important part in the debate, they have some currency.<br />
Since, like the first, they involve philosophical problems about free will,<br />
it will be convenient to discuss them in connection with the first.<br />
I will begin the next lecture with a discussion <strong>of</strong> these three arguments:<br />
the argument that, since free will is compatible with determinism, an<br />
omnipotent and omniscient being could indeed determine the free<br />
choices <strong>of</strong> its creatures; the argument that, although free will and<br />
determinism are incompatible, God is able to ensure that human beings<br />
freely choose one course <strong>of</strong> action over another without determining<br />
their actions (owing to his having what is called ‘‘middle knowledge’’);<br />
and the argument that since God’s omniscience is incompatible with<br />
free will, the free-will defense is logically self-contradictory.
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