The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

72 The Global Argument from Evil
other words, if I have a free choice between x and y, even God cannot
ensure that I choose x. To ask God to give me a free choice between x
and y and to see to it that I choose x instead of y is to ask God to bring
about the intrinsically impossible; it is like asking him to create a round
square, a material body that has no shape, or an invisible object that
casts a shadow. Having this power of free choice, some or all human
beings misused it and produced a certain amount of evil. But free will is
a sufficiently great good that its existence outweighs the evils that have
resulted and will result from its abuse; and God foresaw this.
We should note that the free-will defense depends on the Thomist, as
opposed to the Cartesian, conception of omnipotence, for, according
to Descartes, an omnipotent being can bring about the intrinsically
impossible. But that is no real objection to Theist’s defense. In adopting
the Thomist conception of omnipotence, Theist actually makes things
harder for himself—for on the Cartesian conception of omnipotence,
it is absurdly easy to reply to the argument from evil in any of its
forms. (Absurdly easy, I would say, because the Cartesian conception of
omnipotence is absurd.) The Cartesian need only say that there is no evil.
And, in saying this, he need not be in agreement with Leibniz and Pope,
who refuse to say that there is evil. He can say that there is evil—and
also that there isn’t. After all, if God can bring it about that evil both
exists and does not exist, who’s to say that he hasn’t? (Well, Descartes says
that God in fact hasn’t brought about the truth of any self-contradictory
statements, but that thesis is not inherent in his theory of omnipotence.)
‘‘But a morally perfect God, even if he could bring about the truth of
contradictions, wouldn’t bring it about that there both is and isn’t evil;
he’d do something even better: he’d bring it about that there isn’t evil,
and not bring it about that there is; he’d bring it about that there isn’t
any evil, full stop.’’ I agree, replies the Cartesian theodicist, but that
doesn’t count against my argument, for he has done just that. ‘‘But that
contradicts what you just said. You said that God has brought it about
that there both is and isn’t evil, and then you said that he brought it
about that there isn’t any evil, full stop.’’ ‘‘Yes,’’ the Cartesian theodicist
replies, ‘‘that’s a contradiction all right. But there’s nothing wrong with
asserting a contradiction if it’s true, and that one is, for God has brought
about its truth. He’s omnipotent, you know.’’ And there is no reply to the
Cartesian theodicist; a reply is a species of rational discourse, and anyone
who, like the Cartesian theodicist, affirms the truth of contradictions, has
the resources to make rational discourse about the argument from evil