The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
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<strong>The</strong> Global Argument from <strong>Evil</strong> 71<br />
myself <strong>of</strong> the charge <strong>of</strong> contradiction, for I believe that it is consistent<br />
to say that free will is a mystery in this sense and that philosophers<br />
today understand free will better than philosophers <strong>of</strong> the past have<br />
understood it. I claim to have a better philosophical understanding <strong>of</strong><br />
free will than, for example, Augustine and Aquinas. By this I mean that,<br />
although I find free will an impenetrable mystery, I have at my disposal<br />
a better family <strong>of</strong> ideas, a set <strong>of</strong> unambiguous, sharply defined, and<br />
more useful technical terms relating to the problem <strong>of</strong> free will than<br />
Augustine and Aquinas had. And I know <strong>of</strong> all manner <strong>of</strong> arguments<br />
pertaining to free will that were unknown (or only vaguely, gropingly<br />
formulated) before the 1960s.<br />
As to the charge <strong>of</strong> obscurantism—well, free will is a real thing. (If<br />
anyone denies that free will exists, that is a theory about free will, or an<br />
important part <strong>of</strong> one, and it commits its adherents to the seemingly<br />
self-evidently false proposition that free will does not exist.) I will, <strong>of</strong><br />
course, include in my version <strong>of</strong> the free-will defense (that is, in the<br />
version <strong>of</strong> the free-will defense that I put into the mouth <strong>of</strong> <strong>The</strong>ist),<br />
some statements that imply the existence <strong>of</strong> free will. In my view,<br />
however, none <strong>of</strong> these statements are ones that are known to be false or<br />
probably false or unreasonable to believe. Remember that the free-will<br />
defense is a defense, not a theodicy, and that the person who <strong>of</strong>fers a<br />
defense is not obliged to include in it only statements that are known to<br />
be true. I shall, for example, suppose that free will is incompatible with<br />
determinism, but that is not a thesis that is known to be false. <strong>The</strong>re are<br />
philosophical arguments that can be brought against ‘‘incompatibilism’’<br />
<strong>of</strong> course, but that fact is nicely accommodated by my methodology,<br />
by my placing <strong>The</strong>ist’s use <strong>of</strong> the free-will defense in the context <strong>of</strong> a<br />
debate: Atheist is perfectly free to bring these arguments to the attention<br />
<strong>of</strong> the agnostics.<br />
Let us now return to that debate. I am going to imagine <strong>The</strong>ist<br />
putting forward a very simple form <strong>of</strong> the free-will defense; I will go on<br />
to ask what Atheist might say in response:<br />
God made the world and it was very good. An indispensable part <strong>of</strong><br />
the goodness he chose was the existence <strong>of</strong> rational beings: self-aware<br />
beings capable <strong>of</strong> abstract thought and love and having the power <strong>of</strong><br />
free choice between contemplated alternative courses <strong>of</strong> action. This last<br />
feature <strong>of</strong> rational beings, free choice or free will, is a good. But even an<br />
omnipotent being is unable to control the exercise <strong>of</strong> the power <strong>of</strong> free<br />
choice, for a choice that was controlled would ipso facto not be free. In