The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

70 The Global Argument from Evil
that a morally perfect being would, all other things being equal, prefer
a world in which horrible things were confined to dreams to a world in
which they existed in reality. The general point this example is intended
to illustrate is simply that the resources of an omnipotent being are
unlimited—or are limited only by what is intrinsically possible—and
that a defense must take account of these unlimited resources.
Thereseemstometobeonlyonedefensethathasanyhopeof
succeeding, and that is the so-called free-will defense. 9 In saying this, I
place myself in a long tradition that goes back at least to St Augustine,
although I do not propose, like many in that tradition, to offer a
theodicy. I do not claim to know that free will plays any central part in
God’s reasons for allowing the existence of evil. I employ the free-will
defense as just precisely a defense, a story that includes both God and
evil and, given that there is a God, is true for all anyone knows. If
I have anything to add to what others in this tradition have said, it
derives from the fact (I firmly believe it to be a fact) that today we
understand free will better than philosophers and theologians have in
the past. Those of you who know my work on free will may be puzzled
by this last statement, for I have always insisted (though not always as
explicitly and vehemently as I have in recent years) that free will is a
mystery, something we don’t understand at all. Am I not, therefore,
saying that we now understand something we don’t understand at all
better than philosophers used to understand it? And is it not a form of
obscurantism to argue for the conclusion that the argument from evil,
which is a very straightforward argument indeed, is a failure by telling a
story that essentially involves a mystery?
These are good questions, but I am confident I have good answers to
them. Here is what I mean by saying that free will is a mystery: Anyone
who has thought carefully about the problem of free will and who
has come to a conclusion about free will that is detailed and systematic
enough to be called a theory of free will must accept some proposition that
seems self-evidently false. To choose what theory of free will to accept is
to choose which seemingly self-evidently false proposition one accepts.
And this choice cannot be evaded by accepting some deflationary or
‘‘commonsense’’ or naturalistic theory of free will. To do that is simply
to choose a theory of free will, and, if I am right, it is therefore to choose
to accept some proposition that seems self-evidently false. Well, this is
a controversial thesis; that is, it is controversial whether free will is in
this sense a mystery. And, fortunately, my use of the free-will defense
in these lectures will not depend on it. I mention it only to absolve