The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
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<strong>The</strong> Global Argument from <strong>Evil</strong> 63<br />
that he never does anything morally wrong—that he could not possibly<br />
do anything morally wrong. 6 Omnipotence and moral perfection are,<br />
as I said, non-negotiable components <strong>of</strong> the idea <strong>of</strong> God. A being that is<br />
the greatest being possible and is less powerful than it might have been<br />
(or is less powerful than some other possible being might have been)<br />
is a contradiction in terms, and so is a being who is the greatest being<br />
possible and sometimes acts wrongly. If the universe was made by an<br />
intelligent being, and if that being is less than omnipotent (and if there’s<br />
no other being who is omnipotent), then the atheists are right: God<br />
does not exist. If the universe was made by an omnipotent being, and if<br />
that being has done even one thing that was morally wrong (and if there<br />
isn’t another omnipotent being, one who never does anything morally<br />
wrong), then the atheists are right: God does not exist. If the Creator <strong>of</strong><br />
the universe lacked either omnipotence or moral perfection, and if he<br />
claimed to be God, he would be either an impostor or confused—an<br />
impostor if he claimed to be both omnipotent and morally perfect, and<br />
confused if he admitted to being either not omnipotent or not morally<br />
perfect and still claimed to be God.<br />
I began this lecture with a simple statement <strong>of</strong> the global argument<br />
from evil. One premise <strong>of</strong> this argument was: ‘If there were a God, we<br />
should not find vast amounts <strong>of</strong> horrendous evil in the world.’ But the<br />
statement ‘‘If there were an omnipotent and morally perfect being, we<br />
should not find vast amounts <strong>of</strong> horrendous evil in the world’’ might<br />
well be false if the all-powerful and morally perfect being were ignorant,<br />
and not culpably ignorant, <strong>of</strong> certain evils. But this is not a difficulty<br />
for the proponent <strong>of</strong> the global argument from evil, for God is, as we<br />
have seen, omniscient. <strong>The</strong> proponent <strong>of</strong> the simple argument could,<br />
in fact, defend his premise by an appeal to far weaker theses about the<br />
extent <strong>of</strong> God’s knowledge than ‘God is omniscient’. If the evils <strong>of</strong> the<br />
world constitute an effective prima facie case for the conclusion that<br />
there is no omnipotent, morally perfect, and omniscient being, they<br />
present an equally effective prima facie case for the conclusion that there<br />
is no omnipotent and morally perfect being who has even as much<br />
knowledge <strong>of</strong> what goes on in the world as we human beings have. <strong>The</strong><br />
full panoply <strong>of</strong> omniscience, so to speak, does not really enter into the<br />
initial stages <strong>of</strong> a presentation and discussion <strong>of</strong> an argument from evil.<br />
Omniscience—omniscience in the full sense <strong>of</strong> the word—will become<br />
important only later, when we come to discuss the free-will defense.<br />
It is time now to turn to our promised ideal debate, the debate<br />
between Atheist and <strong>The</strong>ist before the audience <strong>of</strong> ideal agnostics.