The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

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Philosophical Failure 53 conclusion had the power to covert an unbiased ideal audience to its conclusion (given that it was presented to the audience under ideal conditions), then, to a high probability, assent to the conclusion of that argument would be more widespread among philosophers than assent to any substantive philosophical thesis actually is. 5 Now if it is indeed true that no philosophical argument for any substantive conclusion is successful in the sense that I have proposed, it immediately follows that the argument from evil is not a success in that sense—given, at any rate, two premises that I don’t think anyone would deny: that the argument from evil is a philosophical argument and that the non-existence of God is a substantive philosophical thesis. If we think of what I have just said as an argument for the conclusion that the argument from evil is (in my sense) a failure, I don’t think it’s a bad argument. But even if it’s a good argument, it has an important limitation: it doesn’t really tell us anything of philosophical interest about the argument from evil; it doesn’t interact with the content of the argument from evil. I might have offered essentially the same argument for the conclusion that the private-language argument or the ontological argument or the analogical argument for the existence of other minds was a failure. It is my project in these lectures to try to convince you that the argument from evil does not have the power to turn ideally rational and serious and attentive and patient neutral agnostics into atheists. And, of course, I mean to do this by actually coming to grips with the argument. Even if it’s true (as I believe it is) that no philosophical argument for a substantive conclusion has the power to convert every member of an ideal and initially neutral audience to its conclusion, I don’t mean to argue from that premise. I mean to show how Theist can block Atheist’s every attempt to turn the audience of agnostics into atheists like herself. I mention my general thesis about the inability of philosophical argument to produce uniformity of belief even among the ideally rational simply because I think it is a plausible thesis, and if you agree with me on this point, your agreement will predispose you to accept a conclusion that I will defend on other grounds. Let me put the point this way. Lay to one side for a moment the argument from evil and all other arguments for the existence or the non-existence of God. Consider only philosophical arguments for substantive conclusions that do not imply the existence or non-existence of God—non-theological arguments, so to call them. And let us also lay aside those arguments whose conclusions almost everyone would have believed without argument—arguments for the existence of other
54 Philosophical Failure minds, say, or for the thesis that it is possible for one runner to overtake another. Do you think that any substantive philosophical argument that does not fall into either of these categories is a success by the standard I have proposed? If so, how do you account for the fact that its conclusion is controversial? For controversial it certainly is. Leaving aside those philosophical theses that almost everyone would accept without argument, there are no philosophical theses that are both substantive and uncontroversial. If the argument is a success by the terms of my definition, why has it not got the power to produce considerably greater uniformity of opinion among philosophers in the matter of its conclusion than in fact exists? Or if it has got that power, why has this power not been exercised? These questions, I believe, have no good answers. And if they have no good answers, it seems reasonable to believe that no non-theological philosophical argument for a substantive conclusion is a success. Is it plausible to hold that philosophy can provide a successful argument for the non-existence of God, even though philosophy is unable to provide a successful argument for any other substantive thesis? I have to say that this seems implausible to me. It seems antecedently highly improbable that philosophy, in whose house there have been debated scores (at least) of important questions, should be able to provide a decisive answer to exactly one of them. It is implausible to suppose that philosophy should be able to answer the question ‘‘Does free will exist?’’—but no other substantive philosophical question. It is implausible to suppose that philosophy should be able to answer the question ‘‘Are thoughts events in the brain?’’—but no other substantive philosophical question. It is implausible to suppose that philosophy should be able to answer the question ‘‘Does mathematics treat of an objective reality that exists independently of the physical world?’’—but no other substantive philosophical question. One would expect that either philosophy would be able to answer lots of the questions that philosophy has posed, or else it would be able to answer none of them. There is something suspicious about the number one, about uniqueness. It is implausible to suppose that philosophy should be able to answer the question ‘‘Does God exist?’’—but no other substantive philosophical question. Still, highly implausible things, or things that at one point in the history of thought seemed highly implausible, have turned out to be true. It seemed implausible at one point in history to suppose that the solid earth beneath our feet was in rapid motion, but it turned out to be true. Further investigation of this question would require a
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THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
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1 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX
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Preface These lectures were deliver
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Outline Contents Detailed Contents
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xii Detailed Contents agnostics’
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xiv Detailed Contents he is ‘‘h
Page 19 and 20: 2 The Problem and Argument from Evi
Page 27 and 28: 10 The Problem and Argument from Ev
Page 35 and 36: Lecture 2 The Idea of God I said th
Page 37 and 38: 20 The Idea of God unifying princip
Page 39 and 40: 22 The Idea of God ‘‘God was in
Page 41 and 42: 24 The Idea of God And Demiourgos i
Page 43 and 44: 26 The Idea of God evil. When we fi
Page 45 and 46: 28 The Idea of God —immutable. Th
Page 47 and 48: 30 The Idea of God worlds: those in
Page 49 and 50: 32 The Idea of God (it would certai
Page 51 and 52: 34 The Idea of God Now why do I dra
Page 53 and 54: 36 The Idea of God not a possible p
Page 55 and 56: 38 Philosophical Failure Note the w
Page 57 and 58: 40 Philosophical Failure proved by
Page 59 and 60: 42 Philosophical Failure which prem
Page 61 and 62: 44 Philosophical Failure thesis. Al
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Page 73 and 74: Lecture 4 The Global Argument from
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Page 113 and 114: 96 The Local Argument from Evil tha
Page 115 and 116: 98 The Local Argument from Evil (3)
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104 The Local Argument from Evil ha
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106 The Local Argument from Evil Bu
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108 The Local Argument from Evil In
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110 The Local Argument from Evil If
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112 The Local Argument from Evil ca
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114 The Sufferings of Beasts the ac
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116 The Sufferings of Beasts balls
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118 The Sufferings of Beasts state
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120 The Sufferings of Beasts Let us
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122 The Sufferings of Beasts gift f
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124 The Sufferings of Beasts What I
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126 The Sufferings of Beasts on the
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128 The Sufferings of Beasts a worl
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130 The Sufferings of Beasts told t
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132 The Sufferings of Beasts to ens
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134 The Sufferings of Beasts warned
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136 The Hiddenness of God hiddennes
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138 The Hiddenness of God admiratio
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140 The Hiddenness of God Theist. S
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142 The Hiddenness of God about the
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144 The Hiddenness of God If this w
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146 The Hiddenness of God (2) Patri
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148 The Hiddenness of God in genera
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150 The Hiddenness of God intellect
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Notes LECTURE 1 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
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154 Notes 14. But here is a defense
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156 Notes to the metaphysical probl
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158 Notes greatest possible being m
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160 Notes matters was said only to
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162 Notes I believe as strongly as
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164 Notes 10. Note that I do not sa
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166 Notes Christianity.) Let us say
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168 Notes LECTURE 6 THE LOCAL ARGUM
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170 Notes of them: all of them but
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172 Notes 20. One might, however, w
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174 Notes 3. Those who think that t
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176 Notes that the first conjunct i
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178 Works Cited Providence and Evil
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180 Works Cited ‘‘What is the P
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182 Index free will (free choice) 2
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REVELATION
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