The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

44 Philosophical Failure
thesis. Although the ideal philosophers and ideal circumstances of the
debate I have imagined do not exist, reasonable approximations of them
have existed at various times and places, and the recorded results of
philosophical debate seem (to me at least) to tell very strongly against
the thesis that any argument has this sort of power.
Letmemovetoanotherpictureofwhatitisforaphilosophical
argument to be a success, a suggestion based on another model of
debate. Let us not think of a debate as an attempt by two persons with
opposed views each to convert the other. Let us think of a debate rather
on the forensic model. On this model, two representatives of opposed
positions carry on an exchange of arguments before an audience, and
their purpose is not to convert each other but rather to convert the
audience—an audience whose members (in theory) bear no initial
allegiance to either position, although they regard the question ‘‘Which
of these two positions is correct?’’ as an interesting and important one.
This situation, too, we shall consider in an ideal form. We retain the
idealization of the two debaters that we set out in describing the first
model, and the idealization of the circumstances of debate as well. We
proceed to an idealization of the audience.
The audience is composed of what we may call agnostics. That is, they
are agnostic as regards the subject-matter of the debate. If the debate
is about nominalism and realism (let us continue to use that famous
debate as our example), each member of the audience will have no
initial opinion about whether there are universals, and no predilection,
emotional or otherwise, for nominalism or for realism. As regards a
tendency to accept one answer or the other, they will stand to the
question whether there are universals as you, no doubt, stand to the
question of whether the number of Douglas firs in Canada is odd or
even. But that is not the whole story; for you, no doubt, have no desire
to have the question whether that number is odd or even settled. My
imaginary agnostics are not like that in respect of the question of the
existence of universals. They would very much like to come to some
sort of reasoned opinion about the existence of universals—in fact, to
achieve knowledge on that matter if it were possible. They don’t care
which position, nominalism or realism, they end up accepting, but they
very much want to end up accepting one or the other. And, of course, we
attribute to them the same unlimited leisure and superhuman patience
as we previously ascribed to our ideal nominalist and ideal realist—and
the same high intelligence and high degree of logical and philosophical
acumen and intellectual honesty.