The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

42 Philosophical Failure
which premises of the argument from evil might seem doubtful to the
members of an ideal audience—an audience composed of people whose
nature is suggested by that ‘‘ideal observer’’ to which certain ethical
theories appeal. But in trying, in my own mind, to flesh out this idea,
I have found it necessary to consider not only an ideal audience but an
ideal presentation of an argument to that audience. The concept of an
ideal presentation of an argument, I think, is best explained by supposing
that argument to be presented within the context of an ideal debate.
Let us take a moment to think about what a debate is, for there is
more than one way to understand this idea. When philosophers think
of a debate—at least this is what my experience of philosophers seems
to show—they usually think of two people, generally two philosophers,
arguing with each other. On this model, so to call it, of debate, a debate
comprises two people who hold opposed positions on some issue each
trying to convert the other to his own position—and each trying himself
to avoid being converted to the other’s position. Thus, a debate about
the reality of universals would be of this nature: Norma the nominalist
and Ronald the realist carry on an exchange of arguments; Norma’s
purpose in this exchange is to turn Ronald into a nominalist (and, of
course, to prevent Ronald from turning her into a realist), and Ronald’s
purpose is to turn Norma into a realist (and, of course, to prevent
Norma from turning him into a nominalist). This model of debate
suggests a definition of what it is for a philosophical argument to be a
success. A successful argument for nominalism would be an argument
that a nominalist could use to turn a realist into a nominalist—and
a successful argument for realism would be similarly understood. But
how are we to understand the generality implied by the phrases ‘‘a
nominalist’’ and ‘‘a realist’’? Perhaps we could make this generality
more explicit, and therefore clearer, by saying something like this: A
successful argument for nominalism would be an argument that any
ideal nominalist could use to turn any ideal realist into a nominalist. By
ideal nominalists, I understand nominalists who satisfy the following
two conditions, or something that could be obtained from them by a
minimal amount of tinkering and adjustment of detail:
ideal nominalists are of the highest possible intelligence and of the highest
degree of philosophical and logical acumen, and they are intellectually
honest in this sense: when they are considering an argument for some
thesis, they do their best to understand the argument and to evaluate it
dispassionately.