The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

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The Idea of God 29 Here I will remark only that whatever omnipresence may come to, it is obviously incompatible with God’s having any sort of spatial or physical structure (and hence with his being either male or female). And what is our relation to this omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, immutable, omnipresent being? He is, of course, our creator and we, like the heavens and everything else besides himself, are the work of his fingers: In the beginning, God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form, and void. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. And God said, Let there be light: and there was light. (Gen. 1: 1–3) For thus says the Lord, who created the heavens (he is God!), who formed the earth and made it (he established it; he did not create it a chaos, he formed it to be inhabited!) (Isa. 45: 18, RSV) I believe in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible. (The Nicene Creed, The Book of Common Prayer) To say that God is the creator of all things besides himself is not to say that he formed them out of some pre-existent stuff, like the cosmic craftsman of the Timaeus. If there is a God, then there never was a chaos of prime matter that existed independently of his power and his will, waiting through an eternity of years for him to impress form on it. This could not be, for, if there is a God, nothing does or could exist independently of his will or independently of his creative power. God creates things from the ground up, ontologically speaking. His creation is, as they say, ex nihilo. And even he, in his omnipotence, is not capable of bringing a thing into existence and then leaving it entirely to its own devices, for a thing that exists, even for an instant, independently of God’s creative power is as impossible as a gaseous vertebrate or an invisible object that casts a shadow. This fact—I mean this conceptual fact—is sometimes emphasized by saying that God is not only the creator of everything but the sustainer of everything as well; but this is only for emphasis, for sustainer is included in the meaning of creator—at least in theological contexts. Having said this, we must face a minor logical problem created by our criterion for membership in the list of divine attributes; for we said, among other things, that an attribute was to be included in this list only if it was an essential attribute of God. And being a creator is, according to the Abrahamic religions, one of God’s accidents: it is a property he lacks in certain perfectly good—but, fortunately for us, non-actual—possible

30 The Idea of God worlds: those in which he never creates anything. Jews, Christians, and Muslims insist that whether God creates a world—that is, whether he creates anything—is a matter of his free choice. Nothing in his nature compels him to create. He is not, for example, compelled to create by his moral perfection, for it is not better that there should be created things than that there should be no created things. It could not be better, for all goods are already contained—full and perfect and complete—in God. (In the matter of his free will, he does not have a free choice between good and evil, as we imperfect beings do, but he does have a free choice between various alternative goods, and there being created things and there being no created things is one of the pairs of alternative goods between which he has a choice.) But if being a creator is an accidental property of God, then, by our criterion it cannot occur in the list of divine attributes. The solution to this problem is simply to say that the following is the relevant attribute: God is —the creator of such things other than God as there may be. God has this property vacuously, as philosophers say, in those possible worlds in which he exists and creates nothing, and non-vacuously in all other worlds in which he exists; but he has it in every world in which he exists, and it is therefore one of his essential properties. I have just used the phrase ‘in those possible worlds in which he exists’; but are there any possible worlds in which he does not exist? His possession of the next attribute in our list implies that there are none: God is —necessary. That is, he exists in all possible worlds; he would exist no matter what. Thirty or forty years ago, many philosophers denied that the concept of a necessary being made any sense. It is easy to refute them. Consider me. I might not have existed; I am, therefore, in the language of metaphysics, a contingent being. And, surely, if the concept of a contingent being makes sense, the concept of a non-contingent being makes sense. If a concept is intelligible, then the concept of a thing that does not fall under that concept is at least prima facie intelligible. (I say ‘‘at least prima facie intelligible’’, for Russell’s Paradox threatens the general thesis. But Russellian scruples hardly seem relevant to the present case. The thesis ‘If the concept of a contingent being is intelligible, the concept of a

<strong>The</strong> Idea <strong>of</strong> God 29<br />

Here I will remark only that whatever omnipresence may come to, it is<br />

obviously incompatible with God’s having any sort <strong>of</strong> spatial or physical<br />

structure (and hence with his being either male or female).<br />

And what is our relation to this omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, immutable,<br />

omnipresent being? He is, <strong>of</strong> course, our creator and we, like the<br />

heavens and everything else besides himself, are the work <strong>of</strong> his fingers:<br />

In the beginning, God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was<br />

without form, and void. And the Spirit <strong>of</strong> God moved upon the face <strong>of</strong> the<br />

waters. And God said, Let there be light: and there was light. (Gen. 1: 1–3)<br />

For thus says the Lord, who created the heavens (he is God!), who formed the<br />

earth and made it (he established it; he did not create it a chaos, he formed it<br />

to be inhabited!) (Isa. 45: 18, RSV)<br />

I believe in one God, the Father Almighty, maker <strong>of</strong> heaven and earth, and<br />

<strong>of</strong> all things visible and invisible. (<strong>The</strong> Nicene Creed, <strong>The</strong> Book <strong>of</strong> <strong>Common</strong><br />

Prayer)<br />

To say that God is the creator <strong>of</strong> all things besides himself is not to<br />

say that he formed them out <strong>of</strong> some pre-existent stuff, like the cosmic<br />

craftsman <strong>of</strong> the Timaeus. If there is a God, then there never was a<br />

chaos <strong>of</strong> prime matter that existed independently <strong>of</strong> his power and his<br />

will, waiting through an eternity <strong>of</strong> years for him to impress form on<br />

it. This could not be, for, if there is a God, nothing does or could exist<br />

independently <strong>of</strong> his will or independently <strong>of</strong> his creative power. God<br />

creates things from the ground up, ontologically speaking. His creation<br />

is, as they say, ex nihilo. And even he, in his omnipotence, is not capable<br />

<strong>of</strong> bringing a thing into existence and then leaving it entirely to its<br />

own devices, for a thing that exists, even for an instant, independently<br />

<strong>of</strong> God’s creative power is as impossible as a gaseous vertebrate or an<br />

invisible object that casts a shadow. This fact—I mean this conceptual<br />

fact—is sometimes emphasized by saying that God is not only the<br />

creator <strong>of</strong> everything but the sustainer <strong>of</strong> everything as well; but this is<br />

only for emphasis, for sustainer is included in the meaning <strong>of</strong> creator—at<br />

least in theological contexts.<br />

Having said this, we must face a minor logical problem created by<br />

our criterion for membership in the list <strong>of</strong> divine attributes; for we said,<br />

among other things, that an attribute was to be included in this list only<br />

if it was an essential attribute <strong>of</strong> God. And being a creator is, according to<br />

the Abrahamic religions, one <strong>of</strong> God’s accidents: it is a property he lacks<br />

in certain perfectly good—but, fortunately for us, non-actual—possible

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