The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Idea of God 25 a definition of omnipotence. It is a difficult problem, and a useful discussion of it would lead us deep into the forbidding territory of technical metaphysics. I will suppose in these lectures that we have some sort of pre-analytic grasp of the notion of omnipotence, and I will justify employing this concept in the absence of an adequate definition of it by pointing out that not having at my disposal an adequate definition of omnipotence does not make my task, the task of trying to show that the argument from evil is a failure, any easier. It is, after all, philosophers who employ the argument from evil, and not their critics, who make assertions about what God is able to do or would be able to do if he existed. The critics’ statements about God’s abilities are always denials: the critics, insofar as they say anything about God’s abilities, are always concerned to deny that God can do some of the things that various premises of the argument imply he can do. In my discussion of the argument from evil, I’ll always simply accept any statement that starts ‘God can ...’ or ‘God could have ...’—unless the thing God is said to be able to do implies a metaphysical impossibility. (After all—pace Cartesii—whatever ‘omnipotent’ may properly mean, the proposition that God cannot do X is consistent with the proposition that God is omnipotent if X is metaphysically impossible.) And, of course, I don’t propose simply to assert that some act that God is alleged to be able to perform involves a metaphysical impossibility; I propose to present arguments for any such statement. Aquinas, in the famous discussion of omnipotence that I quoted in note 5, says that ‘‘whatever implies a contradiction does not fall within the scope of divine omnipotence’’, and I have been more or less following his lead. (More or less, but closer to less than to more: the notion of metaphysical impossibility is richer than the notion ‘‘implies a contradiction’’.) There is, of course, another, stronger conception of omnipotence, whose most famous advocate is Descartes. According to this conception, God is able to do anything, including (Descartes tells us) creating two mountains that touch at their bases and have no valley between them. 6 I shall not discuss this ‘‘strong’’ conception of omnipotence, which seems to me to be pretty obviously incoherent—incoherent because ability (the concept that is expressed by sentences of the form ‘x is able to do y’) is no more and no less than the power to choose among possible states of affairs, to determine which of various incompatible possible states of affairs are to be actual. But I will make a promise. Our interest in the attribute of omnipotence in these lectures has to do only with the role it plays in the argument from
26 The Idea of God evil. When we finally get round to discussing the argument from evil, I shall show that the argument is not even faintly plausible if God is omnipotent in the ‘‘strong’’, or ‘‘Cartesian’’, sense. (When we see why this is the case, we shall probably regard the fact that the argument from evil can be answered in this way if God is omnipotent in the Cartesian sense as just one more absurd consequence of understanding omnipotence in that sense.) I turn now to the next ‘‘divine attribute’’ in our list. God is —omniscient (all-knowing). Here is the standard definition of omniscience: A being is omniscient if and only if that being knows the truth-value of every proposition. And here is a second definition, one I like rather better for a number of reasons. A being is omniscient if, for every proposition, that being believes either that proposition or its denial, and it is metaphysically impossible for that being to have false beliefs. 7 The second definition makes a stronger claim on behalf of an omniscient being than the first, but it is a claim that theists would be willing to accept on God’s behalf. 8 The existence of an omniscient being raises a famous philosophical problem: if there is an omniscient being, that being either knows that when I am put to the test tomorrow I shall lie or knows that when I am put to the test tomorrow I shall tell the truth. How, then, can I have a free choice between lying and telling the truth? (Or, in terms of the second definition: If there is an omniscient being, that being either believes that when I am put to the test tomorrow I shall lie or believes that when I am put to the test tomorrow I shall tell the truth; and it is metaphysically impossible for this being to have false beliefs. How, then, can I have a free choice between lying and telling the truth?) I defer discussion of this problem to the fifth lecture, where it will arise naturally. (It will arise in connection with the famous reply to the argument from evil called the free-will defense—for whatever virtues or defects the free-will defense may have, it obviously isn’t going to work if human beings do not have free will.) In addition to being omnipotent and omniscient, God is said to be —morally perfect (perfectly good). That is to say, God has no moral defect whatever. It follows that he is in no way a subject of possible moral criticism. If someone says something
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26 <strong>The</strong> Idea <strong>of</strong> God<br />
evil. When we finally get round to discussing the argument from evil,<br />
I shall show that the argument is not even faintly plausible if God is<br />
omnipotent in the ‘‘strong’’, or ‘‘Cartesian’’, sense. (When we see why<br />
this is the case, we shall probably regard the fact that the argument<br />
from evil can be answered in this way if God is omnipotent in the<br />
Cartesian sense as just one more absurd consequence <strong>of</strong> understanding<br />
omnipotence in that sense.) I turn now to the next ‘‘divine attribute’’ in<br />
our list. God is<br />
—omniscient (all-knowing).<br />
Here is the standard definition <strong>of</strong> omniscience: A being is omniscient<br />
if and only if that being knows the truth-value <strong>of</strong> every proposition.<br />
And here is a second definition, one I like rather better for a number<br />
<strong>of</strong> reasons. A being is omniscient if, for every proposition, that being<br />
believes either that proposition or its denial, and it is metaphysically<br />
impossible for that being to have false beliefs. 7 <strong>The</strong> second definition<br />
makes a stronger claim on behalf <strong>of</strong> an omniscient being than the first,<br />
but it is a claim that theists would be willing to accept on God’s behalf. 8<br />
<strong>The</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> an omniscient being raises a famous philosophical<br />
problem: if there is an omniscient being, that being either knows that<br />
when I am put to the test tomorrow I shall lie or knows that when I<br />
am put to the test tomorrow I shall tell the truth. How, then, can I<br />
have a free choice between lying and telling the truth? (Or, in terms <strong>of</strong><br />
the second definition: If there is an omniscient being, that being either<br />
believes that when I am put to the test tomorrow I shall lie or believes<br />
that when I am put to the test tomorrow I shall tell the truth; and it<br />
is metaphysically impossible for this being to have false beliefs. How,<br />
then, can I have a free choice between lying and telling the truth?)<br />
I defer discussion <strong>of</strong> this problem to the fifth lecture, where it will<br />
arise naturally. (It will arise in connection with the famous reply to the<br />
argument from evil called the free-will defense—for whatever virtues or<br />
defects the free-will defense may have, it obviously isn’t going to work<br />
if human beings do not have free will.)<br />
In addition to being omnipotent and omniscient, God is said to be<br />
—morally perfect (perfectly good).<br />
That is to say, God has no moral defect whatever. It follows that he is in<br />
no way a subject <strong>of</strong> possible moral criticism. If someone says something
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