The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
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Lecture 2<br />
<strong>The</strong> Idea <strong>of</strong> God<br />
I said that in this lecture I would ‘‘discuss this God whose non-existence<br />
the argument from evil is supposed to prove’’. My purpose in this lecture<br />
is to say what a being would have to be like to be God, to count as God,<br />
to have the attributes, qualities, properties, characteristics, or features<br />
that are the components <strong>of</strong> the concept <strong>of</strong> God. But can this be done in<br />
any principled way? Do people who say they believe in God not disagree<br />
about his attributes? Who’s to say what features God is supposed to<br />
have? I will respond to these questions with a proposal, a proposal I<br />
do not think is arbitrary. It is this: the list <strong>of</strong> properties that should<br />
be included in the concept <strong>of</strong> God are just those properties ascribed<br />
to God in common by Jews, Christians, and Muslims—the properties<br />
that adherents <strong>of</strong> these religions would all agree belong to God. 1<br />
Having said this, I now qualify it. If we obtain a list <strong>of</strong> properties by<br />
the method I have proposed, the list will contain some properties that<br />
are thought to belong to God only contingently or accidentally: the<br />
property <strong>of</strong> having spoken to Abraham, for example. Let us therefore<br />
restrict our list to properties that Jews, Christians, and Muslims will<br />
agree would have been properties <strong>of</strong> God no matter what—that belong<br />
to God independently <strong>of</strong> the contingencies <strong>of</strong> history, independently,<br />
indeed, <strong>of</strong> whether there is such a thing as history, independently <strong>of</strong> the<br />
existence <strong>of</strong> a created world, independently <strong>of</strong> any contingent matter <strong>of</strong><br />
fact. Thus our list <strong>of</strong> properties, the defining properties <strong>of</strong> the concept<br />
<strong>of</strong> God, will be a list <strong>of</strong> his essential properties—although, <strong>of</strong> course, it<br />
is not meant to be a complete list <strong>of</strong> his essential properties.<br />
Now a further qualification. By ‘‘Jews, Christians, and Muslims’’,<br />
I mean those Jews, Christians, and Muslims who have attained to a<br />
high level <strong>of</strong> philosophical and theological reflection; for some <strong>of</strong> the<br />
properties in the list I shall propose will be ones that most ordinary<br />
believers will not have so much as heard <strong>of</strong>. (I do not take seriously the<br />
idea that ‘‘the God <strong>of</strong> the philosophers’’, the bearer <strong>of</strong> the attributes in