The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Hiddenness of God 151 the sexes would simply raise such emotional barriers, such waves of sullen resentment among the self-deceived, that there would be no hope of their gradually coming to listen to what their senses were saying to them in the course of ordinary human social interaction? If there is, as St Paul has said, a natural tendency in us to see the existence and power and deity of the maker of the world in the things around us (Rom. 2: 20), and if many people do not see this because they do not want to see it, is it not possible that grains of sand bearing the legend ‘‘Made by God’’ (or articulate thunder or a rearrangement of the stars bearing a similar message) would simply raise such emotional barriers, such waves of sullen resentment among the self-deceived, that there would be no hope of their eventually coming to perceive the power and deity of God in the ordinary, everyday operations of the things he has made?
Notes LECTURE 1 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND THE ARGUMENT FROM EVIL 1. Lord Gifford’s will is printed in Stanley L. Jaki, Lord Gifford and his Lectures: A Centenary Retrospect, 66–76. The quoted passage appears on pp. 72–3. 2. Ibid. 74. I should mention that various obiter dicta in his will suggest that Lord Gifford did not mean the intended subject-matter of the lectures he was endowing to be understood so narrowly as the two quotations, taken in isolation, imply. 3. According to Alvin Plantinga, who gives no citation. See The Nature of Necessity, 58. The rule is ‘Possibly everything is F; hence, Everythingis possibly F’. The counterexample is: Let ‘is F’ be ‘is God’; suppose that God never created anything; then ‘Everything is God’ is true; but, although our supposition is false, it is possibly true; ‘Possibly everything is God’ is therefore true (true in fact, true in actuality); but ‘Everything is possibly God’ is false (in actuality) because there are (in actuality) creatures and none of them is possibly God. 4. The former is edited by Marilyn and Robert Adams, and the latter by Michael L. Peterson. I concede that several of the readings in Part I of Peterson’s collection are not addressed specifically to the argument from evil. 5. I don’t know what to make of this fact, but there are three other ‘‘the problem of ’’ phrases that are supposed to be the standard names of famous philosophical problems: ‘the problem of universals’, ‘the problem of free will’, and ‘the mind-body problem’, which, like ‘the problem of evil’, have no definite meaning: none of them is the name of a single, well-defined philosophical problem. 6. ‘‘Primarily’’ because what I am calling ‘an encounter with evil’ is usually, is in almost all cases, an encounter with a particular evil; but if we imagine a situation, and situations like this are not unknown, in which the evils of the world suddenly become ‘‘real’’ to a theist—a situation in which the theist learns no new fact about the evils of the world but in which the facts he had always known assume a new and horrible significance for him—that too would be a case of what I mean by ‘an encounter with evil’. 7. I would distinguish the case, mentioned in the previous note, the case of the theist for whom the evils of the world at some point take on a new and
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Notes<br />
LECTURE 1 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND<br />
THE ARGUMENT FROM EVIL<br />
1. Lord Gifford’s will is printed in Stanley L. Jaki, Lord Gifford and his<br />
Lectures: A Centenary Retrospect, 66–76. <strong>The</strong> quoted passage appears on<br />
pp. 72–3.<br />
2. Ibid. 74. I should mention that various obiter dicta in his will suggest that<br />
Lord Gifford did not mean the intended subject-matter <strong>of</strong> the lectures he<br />
was endowing to be understood so narrowly as the two quotations, taken<br />
in isolation, imply.<br />
3. According to Alvin Plantinga, who gives no citation. See <strong>The</strong> Nature <strong>of</strong><br />
Necessity, 58. <strong>The</strong> rule is ‘Possibly everything is F; hence, Everythingis<br />
possibly F’. <strong>The</strong> counterexample is: Let ‘is F’ be ‘is God’; suppose that God<br />
never created anything; then ‘Everything is God’ is true; but, although<br />
our supposition is false, it is possibly true; ‘Possibly everything is God’ is<br />
therefore true (true in fact, true in actuality); but ‘Everything is possibly<br />
God’ is false (in actuality) because there are (in actuality) creatures and<br />
none <strong>of</strong> them is possibly God.<br />
4. <strong>The</strong> former is edited by Marilyn and Robert Adams, and the latter by<br />
Michael L. Peterson. I concede that several <strong>of</strong> the readings in Part I <strong>of</strong><br />
Peterson’s collection are not addressed specifically to the argument from<br />
evil.<br />
5. I don’t know what to make <strong>of</strong> this fact, but there are three other ‘‘the<br />
problem <strong>of</strong> ’’ phrases that are supposed to be the standard names <strong>of</strong> famous<br />
philosophical problems: ‘the problem <strong>of</strong> universals’, ‘the problem <strong>of</strong> free<br />
will’, and ‘the mind-body problem’, which, like ‘the problem <strong>of</strong> evil’, have<br />
no definite meaning: none <strong>of</strong> them is the name <strong>of</strong> a single, well-defined<br />
philosophical problem.<br />
6. ‘‘Primarily’’ because what I am calling ‘an encounter with evil’ is usually, is<br />
in almost all cases, an encounter with a particular evil; but if we imagine a<br />
situation, and situations like this are not unknown, in which the evils <strong>of</strong> the<br />
world suddenly become ‘‘real’’ to a theist—a situation in which the theist<br />
learns no new fact about the evils <strong>of</strong> the world but in which the facts he<br />
had always known assume a new and horrible significance for him—that<br />
too would be a case <strong>of</strong> what I mean by ‘an encounter with evil’.<br />
7. I would distinguish the case, mentioned in the previous note, the case <strong>of</strong><br />
the theist for whom the evils <strong>of</strong> the world at some point take on a new and