The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

The Hiddenness of God 145
call it a defense. The term is appropriate enough because God is, once
more, in the dock—the charge being that he has not presented us
with indisputable evidence in the form of signs and wonders in the
important matter of his existence—and the theist is the counsel for
the defense. We may remember at this point the famous story of Lord
Russell’s reply to a woman at a London dinner party (or an American
undergraduate—the story comes in various versions) who had asked
him what he would say to God on the Day of Judgment (if, contrary
to his expectations, there should be such a day): ‘‘Lord, you gave me
insufficient evidence.’’ 9 Russell’s indignant post-mortem protest is one
formulation of the accusation that the God in the dock faces. How
should counsel for the defense reply?
In discussions of the global argument from evil, the kernel of every
defense is a reason (or a set of reasons), God’s reason or reasons for
permitting the existence of evil. So it should be with discussions of the
doxastic argument: the kernel of every defense should be a reason or
reasons, God’s reason or reasons for not providing the human species
with ubiquitous signs and wonders, despite the fact that he thinks it
very important that they believe in his existence.
I will try to present such a defense. This defense will build upon the
expanded free-will defense that I had Theist present in our discussion
of the argument from evil. The essential idea of that defense was that
the elimination of all evil from the world by an enormous congeries
of local miracles would frustrate God’s plan of atonement, his plan
for reuniting separated humanity with himself. The essential idea of
the defense I shall present in response to the doxastic argument is
that ubiquitous signs and wonders would also frustrate God’s plan of
atonement.
I begin with an observation. Note that the proposition
God wants people to believe in his existence
does not entail the proposition
God wants people to believe in his existence—and he does not care
why anyone who believes in him has this belief.
The former proposition, in fact, is consistent with the proposition that
God would regard the following list as presenting three states of affairs
in order of decreasing value:
(1) Patricia believes, for reason A, that God exists.