The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Hiddenness of God 143 These epistemological questions obviously have the same force in the real world as in our secular utopia. The most pointed of them, the one I wish to discuss, is this: Why does God not show us that he exists by providing us with signs and wonders? Anyone who thinks that this question has no answer can present an argument for the non-existence of God whose premise is the absence of signs and wonders. We have seen a simple version of this argument. Here is a more careful version of the argument—a version that turns on one component of knowledge, belief, rather than knowledge itself: (1) If God exists, he wants all finite rational beings to believe in his existence. (2) If every finite rational being observed signs and wonders of the right sort, every finite rational being would believe in God. (3) There is, therefore, something that God could do to ensure that every finite rational being believed in his existence. (4) If God wants all finite rational beings to believe in his existence and there is something he can do to bring this about, he will do something to bring it about. (5) But not all finite rational beings believe in God. Hence, (6) God does not exist. I will make two observations about this argument, which I will call the doxastic argument. First, it is not formally valid, but it could easily be made so, and it hardly seems plausible to suppose that any of the premises that would have to be added to make the argument formally valid would be false. If there is any defect in this argument, it must be that one or more of the premises of the argument as I have stated it are false. And these premises seem to be, to say the least, plausible. It is certainly true that not all people believe in God. Although no one is likely to dispute this premise, I want to make it clear that widespread unbelief is almost certainly not a recent thing, even in officially Christian cultures. Here are some remarkable words, written by one Peter of Cornwall, Prior of Holy Trinity, Aldgate, around the year 1200: There are many people who do not believe that God exists, nor do they think that a human soul lives on after the death of the body. They consider that the universe has always been as it is now and is ruled by chance rather than by Providence. 8
144 The Hiddenness of God If this was the best God could do in twelfth-century England, it would seem that he just wasn’t trying! (And, obviously, he hasn’t done any better since.) My second observation is that some might find this argument more persuasive if ‘rational belief’ were substituted for ‘belief’ in it. If this substitution is made, the first two premises of the argument read: If God exists, he wants all finite rational beings to believe rationally in his existence. If every finite rational being observed signs and wonders of the right sort, every finite rational being would believe in God rationally. I am not sure which version of the argument is the more persuasive, but I mean my remarks to apply equally to either. Now how should the theist respond to this argument? I propose that the theist’s response be strictly parallel to Theist’s response to the global argument from evil. That is, that the theist should attempt to tell a story that has the following logical consequences: The world was created and is sustained by a necessary, omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect being—that is, by God. There are rational beings in this world, and God wants these beings, or some of them at some times, to believe in his existence. The world is devoid of signs and wonders—of ‘‘special effects’’. Or if the world contains any such events, they are so rare that very few people have actually observed one or even encountered anyone who claims to have observed one. (In the latter case, among those people whom God wants to believe in his existence are many of the people who are distant in space and time from any of the very rare signs and wonders.) And I propose that the doxastic argument should be judged a failure just in the case that the theist is able to tell a story with these consequences such that an audience of ideal agnostics (who have been presented with the doxastic argument and have been trying to decide whether it is convincing) will respond to it by saying, ‘‘Given that God exists, the rest of that story may well be true. I don’t see any reason to rule it out.’’ And, of course, we require that this reaction be achieved in the presence of an ideal atheist who does everything possible to block this reaction, everything possible to defend the truth of the premises of the argument against the doubts raised by the theist’s story. We may as well call such a story what we called stories that played an analogous role in relation to the argument from evil: we may as well
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<strong>The</strong> Hiddenness <strong>of</strong> God 143<br />
<strong>The</strong>se epistemological questions obviously have the same force in the<br />
real world as in our secular utopia. <strong>The</strong> most pointed <strong>of</strong> them, the one<br />
I wish to discuss, is this: Why does God not show us that he exists<br />
by providing us with signs and wonders? Anyone who thinks that this<br />
question has no answer can present an argument for the non-existence<br />
<strong>of</strong> God whose premise is the absence <strong>of</strong> signs and wonders. We have<br />
seen a simple version <strong>of</strong> this argument. Here is a more careful version <strong>of</strong><br />
the argument—a version that turns on one component <strong>of</strong> knowledge,<br />
belief, rather than knowledge itself:<br />
(1) If God exists, he wants all finite rational beings to believe in his<br />
existence.<br />
(2) If every finite rational being observed signs and wonders <strong>of</strong> the right<br />
sort, every finite rational being would believe in God.<br />
(3) <strong>The</strong>re is, therefore, something that God could do to ensure that<br />
every finite rational being believed in his existence.<br />
(4) If God wants all finite rational beings to believe in his existence<br />
and there is something he can do to bring this about, he will do<br />
something to bring it about.<br />
(5) But not all finite rational beings believe in God.<br />
Hence,<br />
(6) God does not exist.<br />
I will make two observations about this argument, which I will call the<br />
doxastic argument. First, it is not formally valid, but it could easily be<br />
made so, and it hardly seems plausible to suppose that any <strong>of</strong> the premises<br />
that would have to be added to make the argument formally valid would<br />
be false. If there is any defect in this argument, it must be that one or<br />
more <strong>of</strong> the premises <strong>of</strong> the argument as I have stated it are false. And<br />
these premises seem to be, to say the least, plausible. It is certainly true<br />
that not all people believe in God. Although no one is likely to dispute<br />
this premise, I want to make it clear that widespread unbelief is almost<br />
certainly not a recent thing, even in <strong>of</strong>ficially Christian cultures. Here<br />
are some remarkable words, written by one Peter <strong>of</strong> Cornwall, Prior <strong>of</strong><br />
Holy Trinity, Aldgate, around the year 1200:<br />
<strong>The</strong>re are many people who do not believe that God exists, nor do they think<br />
that a human soul lives on after the death <strong>of</strong> the body. <strong>The</strong>y consider that the<br />
universe has always been as it is now and is ruled by chance rather than by<br />
Providence. 8
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