The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

134 The Sufferings of Beasts
warned us not to release any significant quantities of the inert gas argon
into their atmosphere. If we do, they tell us, something very bad will
happen to them. We try to learn the nature of this bad thing, but the
statements about it that we can understand are mostly negative: it will
not involve physical suffering or illness or famine or a diminution of
their population or diminished mental capacities—indeed, for every
bad thing we can think of, we learn that it isn’t that thing or in any way
like it (apart from its badness). The Eridanans insist, however, that it is
abadthingwhosebadnessisasobjective as the badness of widespread
physical suffering. (It’s not, they assure us, that their religions teach
that argon is an ‘‘unclean gas’’ or anything else that is ‘‘subjective’’ or
dependent on some cultural contingency.) Suppose we believe them.
Should we not then regard ourselves as being under a moral obligation
(prima facie, at least) not to release argon into their atmosphere? And
is it not clear that this moral obligation would not rest on sympathy?
(If we did release the argon, and if the Eridanans then said, ‘‘Well, you
did it, and the very bad thing we warned you of has now happened
to us,’’ we could feel no sympathy with them.) Is it not clear that the
obligation arises simply from the fact that we believe that the release of
argon would cause something very bad to happen to the Eridanans?
Neither of these two alternatives to the anti-irregularity defense,
therefore—neither the angelic-corruption-of-nature defense nor the nodivine-sympathy-with-beasts
defense, is satisfactory. It is my conviction
that the most promising defense as regards the sufferings of beasts is the
anti-irregularity defense. How plausible an audience of neutral agnostics
would find this defense is a question I will leave to you to answer.