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The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

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<strong>The</strong> Sufferings <strong>of</strong> Beasts 133<br />

animals; he is, therefore, under no moral obligation to eliminate or<br />

ameliorate their sufferings. 22<br />

Thisargumentseemstometohavetwodefects.<br />

First, it proves too much: if it shows that God is under no obligation<br />

to eliminate or minimize the physical sufferings <strong>of</strong> beasts, an exactly<br />

parallel argument shows that he is under no obligation to eliminate or<br />

minimize the physical sufferings <strong>of</strong> human beings. Geach writes:<br />

God is not an animal as men are, and if he does not change his designs to<br />

avoid pain and suffering to animals he is not violating any natural sympathies as<br />

Dr Moreau did. Only anthropomorphic imagination allows us to accuse God<br />

<strong>of</strong> cruelty in this regard. (p. 80)<br />

But why would someone who accepted this argument not also accept<br />

the following argument:<br />

God is not an animal as men are, and if he does not change his designs<br />

to avoid pain and suffering to human beings he is not violating any<br />

natural sympathies as Hitler did. Only anthropomorphic imagination<br />

allows us to accuse God <strong>of</strong> cruelty in this regard. 23<br />

Secondly, the argument assumes that if God is under any moral<br />

obligation to remove or lessen the sufferings <strong>of</strong> beasts, this obligation<br />

must be grounded in sympathy. But why should this be so? <strong>The</strong> suffering<br />

<strong>of</strong> a higher animal is an intrinsically bad thing, and the incompatibility<br />

<strong>of</strong> physical suffering with the divine nature is no barrier to God’s<br />

knowing this to be true. This, surely, is enough to place him under<br />

a moral obligation to eliminate or ameliorate the sufferings <strong>of</strong> higher<br />

animals (a prima facie obligation, to be sure, an obligation that may well<br />

be overridden by some other consideration). Or, if this is not evident,<br />

owing perhaps to considerations pertaining to the differences between<br />

God and creatures, it is at any rate evident that the fact that a certain<br />

being cannot feel sympathy with physical suffering does not show that<br />

that being is not under a prima facie obligation to eliminate or ameliorate<br />

physical suffering. If even that much is not evident to you, I invite you<br />

to consider the following analogy. In the distant future, human beings<br />

visit a planet orbiting the star Epsilon Eridani, and discover that it is<br />

inhabited by a species <strong>of</strong> rational beings. We establish communication<br />

with the Eridanans, but only with great difficulty, and with much<br />

uncertainty about what is being communicated because they’re very,<br />

well, alien. But we’re clear on one thing, at least: that they have urgently

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