The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
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<strong>The</strong> Sufferings <strong>of</strong> Beasts 127<br />
<strong>The</strong> lions, roaring after their prey, do seek their meat from God.<br />
<strong>The</strong> sun ariseth, and they get them away together, and lay them down in their<br />
dens. (Ps. 104: 20–2)<br />
This and many other biblical texts seem to imply that the whole subrational<br />
natural world proceeds according to God’s plan (except ins<strong>of</strong>ar<br />
as we human beings have corrupted nature). And this, as the Psalmist<br />
tells us in his great hymn <strong>of</strong> praise to the order that God has established<br />
in nature, includes the phenomenon <strong>of</strong> predation. 20<br />
However this may be, the composite defense I have <strong>of</strong>fered raises—by<br />
the very fact that I have <strong>of</strong>fered it—an obvious question. Why need<br />
my defense be a composite defense? Why did I bother with the<br />
lengthy and elaborate expanded free-will defense when I had the antiirregularity<br />
defense (so to call it) at my disposal? After all, human<br />
beings are sentient animals. If the anti-irregularity defense satisfactorily<br />
explains the sufferings <strong>of</strong> sub-rational sentient animals, why does it<br />
not satisfactorily explain the sufferings <strong>of</strong> rational sentient animals, <strong>of</strong><br />
human beings?<br />
I have two things to say in reply to this question. First, or so it seems<br />
to me, the sufferings <strong>of</strong> human beings are a much worse evil than the<br />
sufferings <strong>of</strong> beasts. And it is not only I to whom things seem this way.<br />
Almost all human beings agree that, although it is a bad thing for animals<br />
to suffer, the sufferings <strong>of</strong> human beings are to be prevented, if there is<br />
no other way to do it, at the cost <strong>of</strong> animal suffering—even quite large<br />
amounts <strong>of</strong> animal suffering. Not everyone agrees, <strong>of</strong> course—not Peter<br />
Singer, for example. Still, this judgment <strong>of</strong> mine is not an idiosyncratic<br />
one. It seems to me, in fact, that the suffering <strong>of</strong> human beings, the<br />
actual total suffering <strong>of</strong> human beings, is so much worse a thing than<br />
the suffering <strong>of</strong> beasts, the actual total suffering <strong>of</strong> beasts, that, although<br />
I am confident that I do not know whether a pattern <strong>of</strong> suffering like<br />
the actual suffering <strong>of</strong> beasts constitutes a graver moral defect in a world<br />
than massive irregularity, I am not willing to say that I have no idea<br />
whether the pattern <strong>of</strong> suffering actually exhibited by human beings<br />
constitutes a graver moral defect in a world than massive irregularity. In<br />
fact, I am inclined to deny this thesis; I am inclined to say that the mere<br />
avoidance <strong>of</strong> massive irregularity cannot be a sufficient justification for<br />
the actual sufferings <strong>of</strong> human beings. (And there is this point to be<br />
made: there have been so few human beings, compared with the number<br />
<strong>of</strong> sentient living things that there have been, that it is not evident that