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The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

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<strong>The</strong> Sufferings <strong>of</strong> Beasts 127<br />

<strong>The</strong> lions, roaring after their prey, do seek their meat from God.<br />

<strong>The</strong> sun ariseth, and they get them away together, and lay them down in their<br />

dens. (Ps. 104: 20–2)<br />

This and many other biblical texts seem to imply that the whole subrational<br />

natural world proceeds according to God’s plan (except ins<strong>of</strong>ar<br />

as we human beings have corrupted nature). And this, as the Psalmist<br />

tells us in his great hymn <strong>of</strong> praise to the order that God has established<br />

in nature, includes the phenomenon <strong>of</strong> predation. 20<br />

However this may be, the composite defense I have <strong>of</strong>fered raises—by<br />

the very fact that I have <strong>of</strong>fered it—an obvious question. Why need<br />

my defense be a composite defense? Why did I bother with the<br />

lengthy and elaborate expanded free-will defense when I had the antiirregularity<br />

defense (so to call it) at my disposal? After all, human<br />

beings are sentient animals. If the anti-irregularity defense satisfactorily<br />

explains the sufferings <strong>of</strong> sub-rational sentient animals, why does it<br />

not satisfactorily explain the sufferings <strong>of</strong> rational sentient animals, <strong>of</strong><br />

human beings?<br />

I have two things to say in reply to this question. First, or so it seems<br />

to me, the sufferings <strong>of</strong> human beings are a much worse evil than the<br />

sufferings <strong>of</strong> beasts. And it is not only I to whom things seem this way.<br />

Almost all human beings agree that, although it is a bad thing for animals<br />

to suffer, the sufferings <strong>of</strong> human beings are to be prevented, if there is<br />

no other way to do it, at the cost <strong>of</strong> animal suffering—even quite large<br />

amounts <strong>of</strong> animal suffering. Not everyone agrees, <strong>of</strong> course—not Peter<br />

Singer, for example. Still, this judgment <strong>of</strong> mine is not an idiosyncratic<br />

one. It seems to me, in fact, that the suffering <strong>of</strong> human beings, the<br />

actual total suffering <strong>of</strong> human beings, is so much worse a thing than<br />

the suffering <strong>of</strong> beasts, the actual total suffering <strong>of</strong> beasts, that, although<br />

I am confident that I do not know whether a pattern <strong>of</strong> suffering like<br />

the actual suffering <strong>of</strong> beasts constitutes a graver moral defect in a world<br />

than massive irregularity, I am not willing to say that I have no idea<br />

whether the pattern <strong>of</strong> suffering actually exhibited by human beings<br />

constitutes a graver moral defect in a world than massive irregularity. In<br />

fact, I am inclined to deny this thesis; I am inclined to say that the mere<br />

avoidance <strong>of</strong> massive irregularity cannot be a sufficient justification for<br />

the actual sufferings <strong>of</strong> human beings. (And there is this point to be<br />

made: there have been so few human beings, compared with the number<br />

<strong>of</strong> sentient living things that there have been, that it is not evident that

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