The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

126 The Sufferings of Beasts
on the ‘‘actuality’’ side of the particular line through the set of possible
instances of suffering that God chose. If, therefore, theists can tell a
story according to which God has a good reason for permitting the
sufferings of beasts, if theists have a defense that can be used successfully
to counter the global argument from animal suffering, they need not be
embarrassed by the fact that they are unable to see what outweighing
good might depend on some particular instance of animal suffering. It
mightbethattheycannotseewhatgoodmighthavethisfeaturefor
the simple reason that no possible good has this feature; but, as we
have seen, a morally perfect God might have allowed this instance of
suffering even though no good at all came of it. 19
I will now consider some questions raised by, and possible objections
to, the defense I have used to counter the global argument from animal
suffering.
I will begin by remarking that I make no apology for the fact that
my ‘‘total’’ defense, the composite defense, comprises two quite different
parts. If there is a God who permits the sufferings of both beasts and
human beings, it seemsto me to be not at all implausible to suppose that he
has one reason for permitting the sufferings of beasts and another, entirely
different, reason for permitting the sufferings of human beings. This
seems to me to be plausible because human beings are radically different
from all other terrestrial animals, even the most intelligent primates. We
may share 98 percent of our DNA (or whatever the latest figure is) with
chimpanzees, but that other 2 percent is the genetic substrate of a great
gulf. It may be surprising that we are so different from chimpanzees if
our DNA is (as I am told) more similar to theirs than the DNA of grizzly
bears is to the DNA of Kodiak bears; but there it is. The world is full of
surprises. It is, after all, we human beings, or some of us, who are surprised
by this fact. The chimps—perhaps you will have noticed this—aren’t in
a position to be surprised by the fact that surprises us.
Although it is not strictly to our purpose, I will point out that a
‘‘two-part’’ defense, a defense that treats the sufferings of beasts and the
sufferings of human beings differently, is consonant with the most usual
Christian view of suffering. On the one hand, Christians have typically
held that human suffering is not a part of God’s plan for the world, but
exists only because that plan has gone awry. On the other:
Thou makest darkness, that it may be night; wherein all the beasts of the forest
do move.