The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

Detailed Contents
LECTURE I. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND THE
ARGUMENT FROM EVIL
In this lecture, I defend my approach to the problem of evil: my
decision to approach the problem of evil by way of an examination of
the argument from evil. I distinguish several different ‘‘problems of evil’’
and several different ‘‘arguments from evil’’. I examine the contention
that there is an ‘‘overarching’’ problem of evil, a problem that confronts
both theists and atheists, and conclude that this contention is simply
false.
LECTURE II. THE IDEA OF GOD
I present a more or less traditional list of the ‘‘divine attributes’’ and
conclude that this list represents an attempt to flesh out the Anselmian
notion of a ‘‘something than which a greater cannot be conceived’’. I
contend that the concept of God should be understood in this Anselmian
sense, and that it is implausible to suppose that a ‘‘something than which
a greater cannot be conceived’’ should lack any of the attributes in the
traditional list. I raise and try to answer the question: To what extent
is it possible to revise the traditional list of divine attributes without
thereby replacing the concept of God with another concept?
LECTURE III. PHILOSOPHICAL FAILURE
My thesis in these lectures is that the argument from evil is a failure.
But what is it for a philosophical argument to fail? I propose that a
philosophical argument fails if it cannot pass a certain test. The test
is the ability of the argument to win assent from the members of
a neutral audience who have listened to an ideal presentation of the
argument. That is: the argument is presented by an ideal proponent
of the argument to an ideal audience whose members, initially, have
no tendency either to accept or to reject its conclusion; the proponent
lays out the argument in the presence of an ideal critic whose brief it is
to point out any weaknesses it may have to the audience of ‘‘ideal