The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

120 The Sufferings of Beasts
Let us now consider the second component of our defense: Some
important intrinsic or extrinsic good depends on the existence of
higher-level sentient creatures; this good is of sufficient magnitude that
it outweighs the patterns of suffering contained in the actual world. It
is not very hard to believe (is it?) that a world that was as the Earth
was just before the appearance of human beings would contain a much
larger amount of intrinsic good, and would, in fact, contain a better
balance of good over evil, than a world in which there were no organisms
higher than worms. (Which is not to say that there could not be worlds
lacking intelligent life that contained a still better balance of good
over evil—say, worlds containing the same organisms, but significantly
less suffering.) And then there is the question of extrinsic value. One
consideration immediately suggests itself: intelligent life—creatures
made in the image and likeness of God—could not evolve directly from
worms or oysters; the immediate evolutionary precursors of intelligent
animals must possess higher-level sentience.
We now turn to the third component of our defense: Being massively
irregular is a defect in a world, a defect at least as great as the defect of
containing patterns of suffering morally equivalent to those contained
in the actual world. We should recall that a defense is not a theodicy,
and that I am not required to show that it is plausible to suppose that
massive irregularity is a defect in a world, a defect so grave that creating
a world containing animal suffering morally equivalent to the animal
suffering of the actual world is a reasonable price to pay to avoid it. I am
required to show only that for all anyone knows this judgment is correct.
The third component of our defense is objectionable only if we have
some prima facie reason for believing that the actual sufferings of beasts
are a graver defect in a world than massive irregularity would be. Have
we any such reason? It seems to me that we do not. To begin with, it
does seem that massive irregularity is a defect in a world. One minor
point in favor of this thesis is the witness of deists and other thinkers
who have deprecated the miraculous on the ground that any degree
of irregularity in a world is a defect, a sort of unlovely jury-rigging of
things that is altogether unworthy of the power and wisdom of God.
Presumably such thinkers would regard massive irregularity as a very
grave defect indeed. And perhaps there is something to this reaction. It
does seem that there is something right about the idea that God would
include no more irregularity than was necessary in his creation. A second
point is that many, if not all, massively irregular worlds are not only
massively irregular but massively deceptive. This is obviously true of a