The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
Lecture 7 The Sufferings of Beasts In this lecture, I will present a defense that accounts for the sufferings of non-human terrestrial animals—‘‘beasts’’—or, more exactly, for the sufferings of beasts that cannot be ascribed to the actions of human beings. Since non-human animals presumably do not have free will, and since some (most, in fact) of the sufferings of non-human animals occurred before there were human beings, no extension or elaboration of the free-will defense can account for all animal suffering. (Or not unless it attributed the suffering of beasts to the free actions of angels or non-human rational animals. At the end of this lecture, I will briefly consider a version of the free-will defense that has this feature.) I maintain that the defense I shall present, when it is conjoined with the free-will defense, will constitute a composite defense that accounts for the sufferings of both human beings and beasts, both rational or sapient animals and merely sentient animals. In this lecture, I will abandon explicit reference to Atheist, Theist, and their debate before the audience of agnostics. I will present the second half of my composite defense in my own narrative voice. But I remind you that the ideal debate I have imagined remains my standard for evaluating a defense. In my view, the question we should attend to is not what I think of a defense or what you think of it, not what religious believers or committed atheists think of it, but what genuinely neutral agnostics think of it (or what they would think of it if there were any of them). My role in relation to a defense is to present it in as strong a form as possible; the role of atheists is to see to it that those who evaluate it are made aware of all its weak points; it is agnostics, neutral agnostics, who should be assigned the role of evaluating it. I will now tell a story, a story that, I maintain, is true for all anyone knows, a story according to which God allows beasts to suffer (and in which the extent of their suffering and the ways in which they suffer are
114 The Sufferings of Beasts the actual extent and the actual ways). The story comprises the following four propositions: (1) Every world God could have made that contains higher-level sentient creatures either contains patterns of suffering morally equivalent to those of the actual world, or else is massively irregular. 1 (2) Some important intrinsic or extrinsic good depends on the existence of higher-level sentient creatures; this good is of sufficient magnitude that it outweighs the patterns of suffering found in the actual world. (3) Being massively irregular is a defect in a world, a defect at least as great as the defect of containing patterns of suffering morally equivalent to those found in the actual world. (4) The world—the cosmos, the physical universe—has been created by God. The four key terms contained in this story may be explained as follows. Higher-level sentient creatures are animals that are conscious in the way in which (pace Descartes) the higher non-human mammals are conscious. Two patterns of suffering are morally equivalent if there are no morally decisive reasons for preferring one to the other: if there are no morally decisive reasons for creating a world that embodies one pattern rather than the other. To say that A and B are in this sense morally equivalent is not to say that they are in any interesting sense comparable. Suppose, for example, that the Benthamite dream of a universal hedonic calculus is an illusion, and that there is no answer to the question whether the suffering caused by war is equal to, the same as, or greater than the suffering caused by cancer. It does not follow that these two patterns of suffering are not morally equivalent. On the contrary: unless there is some ‘‘non-hedonic’’ morally relevant distinction to be made between a world that contains war and no cancer and a world that contains cancer and no war (i.e. a distinction that does not depend on comparing the amounts of suffering caused by war and cancer), it follows that the suffering caused by war and the suffering caused by cancer are, in the present technical sense, morally equivalent. A massively irregular world is a world in which the laws of nature fail in some massive way. 2 A world, a physical universe, containing all the miracles recorded in the Old and New Testaments would not, on that account, be massively irregular, for those miracles were too small (if size is measured in terms of the amounts of matter directly affected) and
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114 <strong>The</strong> Sufferings <strong>of</strong> Beasts<br />
the actual extent and the actual ways). <strong>The</strong> story comprises the following<br />
four propositions:<br />
(1) Every world God could have made that contains higher-level<br />
sentient creatures either contains patterns <strong>of</strong> suffering morally<br />
equivalent to those <strong>of</strong> the actual world, or else is massively irregular. 1<br />
(2) Some important intrinsic or extrinsic good depends on the existence<br />
<strong>of</strong> higher-level sentient creatures; this good is <strong>of</strong> sufficient magnitude<br />
that it outweighs the patterns <strong>of</strong> suffering found in the actual world.<br />
(3) Being massively irregular is a defect in a world, a defect at least<br />
as great as the defect <strong>of</strong> containing patterns <strong>of</strong> suffering morally<br />
equivalent to those found in the actual world.<br />
(4) <strong>The</strong> world—the cosmos, the physical universe—has been created<br />
by God.<br />
<strong>The</strong> four key terms contained in this story may be explained as follows.<br />
Higher-level sentient creatures are animals that are conscious in the<br />
way in which (pace Descartes) the higher non-human mammals are<br />
conscious.<br />
Two patterns <strong>of</strong> suffering are morally equivalent if there are no morally<br />
decisive reasons for preferring one to the other: if there are no morally<br />
decisive reasons for creating a world that embodies one pattern rather<br />
than the other. To say that A and B are in this sense morally equivalent<br />
is not to say that they are in any interesting sense comparable. Suppose,<br />
for example, that the Benthamite dream <strong>of</strong> a universal hedonic calculus<br />
is an illusion, and that there is no answer to the question whether the<br />
suffering caused by war is equal to, the same as, or greater than the<br />
suffering caused by cancer. It does not follow that these two patterns<br />
<strong>of</strong> suffering are not morally equivalent. On the contrary: unless there is<br />
some ‘‘non-hedonic’’ morally relevant distinction to be made between a<br />
world that contains war and no cancer and a world that contains cancer<br />
and no war (i.e. a distinction that does not depend on comparing the<br />
amounts <strong>of</strong> suffering caused by war and cancer), it follows that the<br />
suffering caused by war and the suffering caused by cancer are, in<br />
the present technical sense, morally equivalent.<br />
A massively irregular world is a world in which the laws <strong>of</strong> nature fail<br />
in some massive way. 2 A world, a physical universe, containing all the<br />
miracles recorded in the Old and New Testaments would not, on that<br />
account, be massively irregular, for those miracles were too small (if size<br />
is measured in terms <strong>of</strong> the amounts <strong>of</strong> matter directly affected) and
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