The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Local Argument from Evil 109 into the troublesome real world—troublesome because the real world is a world of all but infinite complexity, and if we talk of the real world, we shall never come to the end of the conversation, for there will always be more to say. I offer in place of this real example an artificially simple philosopher’s example. If this example does not correspond very closely to anything in the real world, it can at any rate be discussed within the restricted scope of a lecture like this one: One thousand children have a disease that is fatal if untreated. We have a certain amount of a medicine that is effective against the disease. Effective, that is, if the dose is large enough. If we distribute it evenly, if we give one one-thousandth of the medicine we have on hand to each of the children, all one thousand of them will certainly die, for one one-thousandth of the medicine is definitely too little to do anyone any good. We decide to divide the medicine into N equal parts (N being some number less than one thousand) and divide it among N of the children. (The N children will be chosen by lot, or by some other ‘‘fair’’ means.) Call each of these N equal parts a ‘‘unit’’. And where do we get the number N? Well, we get it somewhere—perhaps it is the result of some sort of optimality calculation; perhaps no optimality calculation is a practical possibility, and some expert on the disease has made an educated guess, and N is that guess. But we have somehow to come up with a number, for, of logical necessity, once we have decided to distribute the medicine in equal doses, a certain number of children are going to get doses in that amount. Now, since N is less than one thousand, less than the number of children who have the disease, whatever we do must have the following consequence: at most 999 of the children will live; at least one of them will die. Now consider any one of the children who die if this plan is carried out (the lots have been drawn but the medicine has not yet been distributed); suppose the child’s name is Charlie. Our plan, as I said, is this: to give each of N children one unit of medicine. But suppose now that Charlie’s mother proposes an alternative plan. She points to the N units of medicine laid out in N little bottles on the table, waiting to be distributed, and says: Take 1/N + 1 units from each bottle and give N/N + 1 units to my Charlie. Then each of the N children who would have received one unit will instead receive 1 − (1/N + 1) units—which is (N + 1/N + 1) − (1/N + 1), whichisN/N+ 1.
110 The Local Argument from Evil If this redistribution is carried out, each of the N children and Charlie will receive N/N + 1 units. Now, thus algebraically represented, her plan is rather too abstract to be easily grasped. Let us look at a particular number. Suppose N is 100. Then here is what will happen if the ‘‘original’’ plan of distribution is carried out: each of 100 children will get 1 unit of medicine and live (at least if 100 was a small enough number); 900 children will die. And here is what will happen if Charlie’s mother’s plan is carried out: Charlie and each of 100 other children get 100/101 units of medicine—about 99 percent of a unit—and live; 899 children will die. Or, if you like, we can’t say that this is what would have happened; we can’t assert this counterfactual without qualification. (For that matter, we weren’t able to predict with certainty that all 100 children would live in the actual case.) But we can say this: this is almost certainly what would have happened. ‘‘So,’’ Charlie’s mother argues, ‘‘you see that you can avert the certain death of a child at very small risk to the others; perhaps no risk at all, for your guess that N should be set at 100 was just that, a guess. One hundred and one would have been an equally good guess.’’ We can make her argument watertight if we assume that for any determination of what number to set N equal to, that number plus 1 would have been an equally reasonable determination. That seems plausible enough to me; if you don’t find it plausible, we can always make it plausible by making the number of children larger: suppose there were not 1,000 children but 1,000 million, and that everyone’s best guess at N is somewhere around 100 million. You will not, I think, find it easy to deny the following conditional: if a certain amount of some medicine or drug has a certain effect on someone, then that amount minus one part in 100 million would not have a significantly different effect. ‘‘Well,’’ someone may say, ‘‘Charlie’s mother has a good point. But the fact that she has a good point just shows that the authorities haven’t picked the optimum value for N. N should have been some larger number.’’ But I had my fictional authorities choose the number 100 only for the sake of having a concrete number with which to illustrate Charlie’s mother’s argument. She could have presented essentially the same argument no matter what number the authorities chose, and they had to choose some number. And what shall the authorities say to Charlie’s mother? They must either accept her proposal or reject it. If (on the one hand) they accept it, they will
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<strong>The</strong> Local Argument from <strong>Evil</strong> 109<br />
into the troublesome real world—troublesome because the real world is<br />
a world <strong>of</strong> all but infinite complexity, and if we talk <strong>of</strong> the real world,<br />
we shall never come to the end <strong>of</strong> the conversation, for there will always<br />
be more to say. I <strong>of</strong>fer in place <strong>of</strong> this real example an artificially simple<br />
philosopher’s example. If this example does not correspond very closely<br />
to anything in the real world, it can at any rate be discussed within the<br />
restricted scope <strong>of</strong> a lecture like this one:<br />
One thousand children have a disease that is fatal if untreated. We<br />
have a certain amount <strong>of</strong> a medicine that is effective against the<br />
disease. Effective, that is, if the dose is large enough. If we distribute<br />
it evenly, if we give one one-thousandth <strong>of</strong> the medicine we have on<br />
hand to each <strong>of</strong> the children, all one thousand <strong>of</strong> them will certainly<br />
die, for one one-thousandth <strong>of</strong> the medicine is definitely too little<br />
to do anyone any good. We decide to divide the medicine into N<br />
equal parts (N being some number less than one thousand) and<br />
divide it among N <strong>of</strong> the children. (<strong>The</strong> N children will be chosen<br />
by lot, or by some other ‘‘fair’’ means.) Call each <strong>of</strong> these N equal<br />
parts a ‘‘unit’’. And where do we get the number N? Well, we get<br />
it somewhere—perhaps it is the result <strong>of</strong> some sort <strong>of</strong> optimality<br />
calculation; perhaps no optimality calculation is a practical possibility,<br />
and some expert on the disease has made an educated guess, and N<br />
is that guess. But we have somehow to come up with a number, for,<br />
<strong>of</strong> logical necessity, once we have decided to distribute the medicine<br />
in equal doses, a certain number <strong>of</strong> children are going to get doses in<br />
that amount. Now, since N is less than one thousand, less than the<br />
number <strong>of</strong> children who have the disease, whatever we do must have<br />
the following consequence: at most 999 <strong>of</strong> the children will live; at<br />
least one <strong>of</strong> them will die.<br />
Now consider any one <strong>of</strong> the children who die if this plan is carried<br />
out (the lots have been drawn but the medicine has not yet been<br />
distributed); suppose the child’s name is Charlie. Our plan, as I said,<br />
is this: to give each <strong>of</strong> N children one unit <strong>of</strong> medicine. But suppose<br />
now that Charlie’s mother proposes an alternative plan. She points to<br />
the N units <strong>of</strong> medicine laid out in N little bottles on the table, waiting<br />
to be distributed, and says: Take 1/N + 1 units from each bottle<br />
and give N/N + 1 units to my Charlie. <strong>The</strong>n each <strong>of</strong> the N children<br />
who would have received one unit will instead receive 1 − (1/N + 1)<br />
units—which is (N + 1/N + 1) − (1/N + 1), whichisN/N+ 1.