The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism
The Local Argument from Evil 105 threatened horror is prevented. But he cannot remove all the horrors from the world, for that would frustrate his plan for reuniting human beings with himself. And if he prevents only some horrors, how shall he decide which ones to prevent? Where shall he draw the line?—the line between threatened horrors that are prevented and threatened horrors that are allowed to occur? I suggest that wherever he draws the line, it will be an arbitrary line. That this must be so is easily seen by thinking about the Mutilation. If God had added that particular horror to his list of horrors to be prevented, and that one alone, the world, considered as a whole, would not have been a significantly less horrible place, and the general realization of human beings that they live in a world of horrors would not have been significantly different from what it is. The existence of that general realization is just that factor in his plan for humanity that (according to the expanded free-will defense) provides his general reason for allowing horrors to occur. Therefore, preventing the Mutilation would in no way have interfered with his plan for the restoration of our species’ original perfection. If the expanded free-will defense is a true story, God has made a choice about where to draw the line, the line between the actual horrors of history, the horrors that are real, and the horrors that are mere averted possibilities, might-have-beens. And the Mutilation falls on the ‘‘actual horrors of history’’ side of the line. And this fact shows that the line is an arbitrary one; for if he had drawn it so as to exclude the Mutilation from reality (and had excluded no other horror from reality), he would have lost no good thereby and he would have allowed no greater evil. He had no reason for drawing the line where he did. And what justifies him in doing this? What justifies him in allowing the Mutilation to occur in reality when he could have excluded from reality it without losing any good thereby? Has the victim of the Mutilation not got a moral case against him? He could have saved her, and he did not; and he does not even claim to have achieved some good by not saving her. It would seem that God is, in C. S. Lewis’s words, in the dock; if he is, then I, Theist, am playing the part of his barrister, and you, the agnostics, are the jury. I offer the following obvious defense. There was no non-arbitrary line to be drawn. Wherever he drew the line, there would have been countless horrors left in the world—his plan requires the actual existence of countless horrors—and the victim or victims of any of those horrors could bring the same charge against him that we have imagined the victim of the Mutilation bringing against him.
106 The Local Argument from Evil But I see Atheist stirring in protest; she is planning to tell you that, given the terms of the expanded free-will defense, God should have allowed the minimum number of horrors consistent with his project of reconciliation, and that it is obvious he has not done this. She is going to tell you that there is a non-arbitrary line for God to draw, and that it is the line that has the minimum number of horrors on the ‘‘actuality’’ side. But there is no such line to be drawn. There is no minimum number of horrors consistent with God’s plan of reconciliation, for the prevention of any one particular horror could not possibly have anyeffectonGod’splan.Foranyn, if the existence of at most n horrors is consistent with God’s plan, the existence of at most n − 1 horrors will be equally consistent with God’s plan. 4 To ask what the minimum number of horrors consistent with God’s plan is, is like asking, What is the minimum number of raindrops that could have fallen on France in the twentieth century that is consistent with France’s having been a fertile country in the twentieth century? France was a fertile country in the twentieth century, and if God had prevented any one of the raindrops that fell on France in the twentieth century from reaching the earth, France would still have been a fertile country. And the same, of course, goes for any two raindrops, or any thousand raindrops, or any million raindrops. But, of course, if God had allowed none of the raindrops that in fact fell from the clouds over France in the twentieth century to reach the earth, France would have been a desert. And France would have been a desert if he had allowed only one, or only a thousand, or only a million, of those raindrops to reach the earth. And no one, I expect, thinks that there is some number n such that (1) if God had prevented n or fewer of the raindrops that fell on France in the twentieth century from reaching the earth, France would have been fertile, and (2) if God had prevented n + 1ormoreof those raindrops from reaching the earth, France would not have been fertile. I expect no one thinks this. But the operative concept in this case is vagueness—the vagueness of fertility—and vagueness is such a puzzling topic that philosophers who have banged their heads against it for extended periods have said some very startling things. Very able philosophers, for example, have been heard to say that there is a perfectly sharp cutoff point between ‘‘being tall’’ and ‘‘not being tall’’, a height such that someone of that height is tall and someone one millimeter shorter is not tall, even though no one knows, and no one can find
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106 <strong>The</strong> Local Argument from <strong>Evil</strong><br />
But I see Atheist stirring in protest; she is planning to tell you that,<br />
given the terms <strong>of</strong> the expanded free-will defense, God should have<br />
allowed the minimum number <strong>of</strong> horrors consistent with his project <strong>of</strong><br />
reconciliation, and that it is obvious he has not done this. She is going<br />
to tell you that there is a non-arbitrary line for God to draw, and that it<br />
is the line that has the minimum number <strong>of</strong> horrors on the ‘‘actuality’’<br />
side. But there is no such line to be drawn. <strong>The</strong>re is no minimum<br />
number <strong>of</strong> horrors consistent with God’s plan <strong>of</strong> reconciliation, for<br />
the prevention <strong>of</strong> any one particular horror could not possibly have<br />
anyeffectonGod’splan.Foranyn, if the existence <strong>of</strong> at most n<br />
horrors is consistent with God’s plan, the existence <strong>of</strong> at most n − 1<br />
horrors will be equally consistent with God’s plan. 4 To ask what the<br />
minimum number <strong>of</strong> horrors consistent with God’s plan is, is like<br />
asking, What is the minimum number <strong>of</strong> raindrops that could have<br />
fallen on France in the twentieth century that is consistent with France’s<br />
having been a fertile country in the twentieth century? France was a<br />
fertile country in the twentieth century, and if God had prevented<br />
any one <strong>of</strong> the raindrops that fell on France in the twentieth century<br />
from reaching the earth, France would still have been a fertile country.<br />
And the same, <strong>of</strong> course, goes for any two raindrops, or any thousand<br />
raindrops, or any million raindrops. But, <strong>of</strong> course, if God had allowed<br />
none <strong>of</strong> the raindrops that in fact fell from the clouds over France in<br />
the twentieth century to reach the earth, France would have been a<br />
desert. And France would have been a desert if he had allowed only<br />
one, or only a thousand, or only a million, <strong>of</strong> those raindrops to reach<br />
the earth. And no one, I expect, thinks that there is some number n<br />
such that (1) if God had prevented n or fewer <strong>of</strong> the raindrops that<br />
fell on France in the twentieth century from reaching the earth, France<br />
would have been fertile, and (2) if God had prevented n + 1ormore<strong>of</strong><br />
those raindrops from reaching the earth, France would not have been<br />
fertile.<br />
I expect no one thinks this. But the operative concept in this<br />
case is vagueness—the vagueness <strong>of</strong> fertility—and vagueness is such a<br />
puzzling topic that philosophers who have banged their heads against<br />
it for extended periods have said some very startling things. Very able<br />
philosophers, for example, have been heard to say that there is a perfectly<br />
sharp cut<strong>of</strong>f point between ‘‘being tall’’ and ‘‘not being tall’’, a height<br />
such that someone <strong>of</strong> that height is tall and someone one millimeter<br />
shorter is not tall, even though no one knows, and no one can find
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