The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

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The Local Argument from Evil 103 that many individual horrors have no explanation whatever.) And to explain why there are horrors is not to meet the local argument from evil. I will consider this point in a moment, but first I will qualify my statement that the expanded free-will defense accounts for the existence of horrors. What is strictly correct is that the story accounts for the existence of what we might call ‘‘post-lapsarian’’ horrors—horrors that are consequences of humanity’s separation from God. It cannot account for ‘‘pre-lapsarian’’ horrors (such as a ‘‘Rowe’s fawn’’ case if the fawn’s horrible death is imagined to have occurred before there were human beings). I shall first discuss post-lapsarian horrors (like the Mutilation); only when this discussion is complete shall I turn to the difficult topic of pre-lapsarian horrors. [As I said in the previous lecture, I’m not going to allow Theist to keep this promise. I’ll discuss pre-lapsarian horrors in the next lecture, but in my own person.] A general account of the existence of horrors does not constitute a reply to the argument from horrors, because it does not tell us which premise of the argument to deny. Let us examine this point in detail. According to the expanded free-will defense, the answer to the question, ‘‘Why are there horrors in a world created by an all-powerful and morally perfect God?’’ is this: When human beings misused their free will and separated themselves from God, the existence of horrors was one of the natural and inevitable consequences of this separation. Each individual horror, however, may well have been due to chance. Let us, in fact, say that all horrors are individually due to chance. (Remember, the expanded free-will defense is a defense, not a theodicy. If a theist believes that some horrors are brought about by God, in each case to achieve some specific end—and both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament imply this3 —that is no reason for that theist to object to a philosopher’s employing as a defense a story according to which every individual horror is due to chance.) As regards physical suffering and untimely death, rebelling against God is like disregarding a clearly worded notice, climbing a fence, and wandering about in a mine field. If someone does that, it’s very close to a dead certainty that sooner or later something very bad will happen to him. But whether it’s sooner or later, when and where it happens, may well be a matter of chance. In separating ourselves from God, we have become, as I said, the playthings of chance. Even those horrors most closely connected with human planning and deliberation are due to chance. Winifrid may

104 The Local Argument from Evil have carefully planned her husband’s murder for months, but it was by chance they met on that bus 28 years before. Now why doesn’t God miraculously prevent each horror? Why didn’t he see to it that the man responsible for the Mutilation broke his ankle earlier in the day that would have been the day of his encounter with his victim—or something of that sort? And why hasn’t he done the same mutatis mutandis with respect to every horror? According to the expanded free-will defense, he has not done this because to have done it would have frustrated his plan for restoring human beings to their original union with him by removing an essential motive for cooperating with him—namely, the realization that there is something horribly wrong with the world they live in. The best that could come of a miraculous prevention of each of the horrors that resulted from our separation from God would be a state of perfect natural happiness—like the state of the souls of infants who die unbaptized, according to traditional Roman Catholic theology. But allowing horrors to occur opens the possibility of a supernatural good for humanity that is infinitely better than perfect natural happiness. God’s strategy, so to call it, is like the strategy contemplated by Dororthy’s doctor: to refuse to give Dorothy a drug that would stop the pains in her chest because doing so would frustrate the doctor’s project of getting her to stop smoking and lose weight. (And such a strategy is morally permissible for God, whether or not it is for a human physician.) Now God perhaps does act to prevent any number of horrors. For all we know, he reduces the number of horrors in our world to some very small fraction of what it would have been if not for his specific and local miraculous action. Still, he has to leave the unredeemed world a horrible place or his plan for the redemption of humanity will fail. This is what the expanded free-will defense says. This much we have already said. And this much, we have said, is not a reply to the argument from horrors, because it does not—by itself—seem to entail the falsity of any of the premises Atheist set out. But we are now in a position to imagine how one might reply to her invitation to Theist to say which of the premises of the argument to ask the agnostics to declare ‘‘not proven’’. God, then, removes many horrors from the world—that is, in many cases, he sees that if he interacts with the world simply by sustaining the existence and normal causal propensities of its inhabitants, a horror will occur, and he does more than this; he makes specific local changes in the world in such a way that what would have happened doesn’t, and the

104 <strong>The</strong> Local Argument from <strong>Evil</strong><br />

have carefully planned her husband’s murder for months, but it was<br />

by chance they met on that bus 28 years before. Now why doesn’t God<br />

miraculously prevent each horror? Why didn’t he see to it that the<br />

man responsible for the Mutilation broke his ankle earlier in the day<br />

that would have been the day <strong>of</strong> his encounter with his victim—or<br />

something <strong>of</strong> that sort? And why hasn’t he done the same mutatis<br />

mutandis with respect to every horror? According to the expanded<br />

free-will defense, he has not done this because to have done it would<br />

have frustrated his plan for restoring human beings to their original<br />

union with him by removing an essential motive for cooperating with<br />

him—namely, the realization that there is something horribly wrong<br />

with the world they live in. <strong>The</strong> best that could come <strong>of</strong> a miraculous<br />

prevention <strong>of</strong> each <strong>of</strong> the horrors that resulted from our separation<br />

from God would be a state <strong>of</strong> perfect natural happiness—like the state<br />

<strong>of</strong> the souls <strong>of</strong> infants who die unbaptized, according to traditional<br />

Roman Catholic theology. But allowing horrors to occur opens the<br />

possibility <strong>of</strong> a supernatural good for humanity that is infinitely better<br />

than perfect natural happiness. God’s strategy, so to call it, is like<br />

the strategy contemplated by Dororthy’s doctor: to refuse to give<br />

Dorothy a drug that would stop the pains in her chest because doing<br />

so would frustrate the doctor’s project <strong>of</strong> getting her to stop smoking<br />

and lose weight. (And such a strategy is morally permissible for God,<br />

whether or not it is for a human physician.) Now God perhaps does<br />

act to prevent any number <strong>of</strong> horrors. For all we know, he reduces<br />

the number <strong>of</strong> horrors in our world to some very small fraction <strong>of</strong><br />

what it would have been if not for his specific and local miraculous<br />

action. Still, he has to leave the unredeemed world a horrible place<br />

or his plan for the redemption <strong>of</strong> humanity will fail.<br />

This is what the expanded free-will defense says. This much we have<br />

already said. And this much, we have said, is not a reply to the argument<br />

from horrors, because it does not—by itself—seem to entail the falsity<br />

<strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> the premises Atheist set out. But we are now in a position to<br />

imagine how one might reply to her invitation to <strong>The</strong>ist to say which <strong>of</strong><br />

the premises <strong>of</strong> the argument to ask the agnostics to declare ‘‘not proven’’.<br />

God, then, removes many horrors from the world—that is, in many<br />

cases, he sees that if he interacts with the world simply by sustaining the<br />

existence and normal causal propensities <strong>of</strong> its inhabitants, a horror will<br />

occur, and he does more than this; he makes specific local changes in the<br />

world in such a way that what would have happened doesn’t, and the

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