The Problem of Evil - Common Sense Atheism

The Local Argument from Evil 103
that many individual horrors have no explanation whatever.) And to
explain why there are horrors is not to meet the local argument from
evil. I will consider this point in a moment, but first I will qualify my
statement that the expanded free-will defense accounts for the existence
of horrors. What is strictly correct is that the story accounts for the
existence of what we might call ‘‘post-lapsarian’’ horrors—horrors that
are consequences of humanity’s separation from God. It cannot account
for ‘‘pre-lapsarian’’ horrors (such as a ‘‘Rowe’s fawn’’ case if the fawn’s
horrible death is imagined to have occurred before there were human
beings). I shall first discuss post-lapsarian horrors (like the Mutilation);
only when this discussion is complete shall I turn to the difficult topic
of pre-lapsarian horrors. [As I said in the previous lecture, I’m not going
to allow Theist to keep this promise. I’ll discuss pre-lapsarian horrors in
the next lecture, but in my own person.]
A general account of the existence of horrors does not constitute a
reply to the argument from horrors, because it does not tell us which
premise of the argument to deny. Let us examine this point in detail.
According to the expanded free-will defense, the answer to the question,
‘‘Why are there horrors in a world created by an all-powerful and
morally perfect God?’’ is this:
When human beings misused their free will and separated themselves
from God, the existence of horrors was one of the natural and
inevitable consequences of this separation. Each individual horror,
however, may well have been due to chance. Let us, in fact, say
that all horrors are individually due to chance. (Remember, the
expanded free-will defense is a defense, not a theodicy. If a theist
believes that some horrors are brought about by God, in each case to
achieve some specific end—and both the Hebrew Bible and the New
Testament imply this3 —that is no reason for that theist to object to a
philosopher’s employing as a defense a story according to which every
individual horror is due to chance.) As regards physical suffering and
untimely death, rebelling against God is like disregarding a clearly
worded notice, climbing a fence, and wandering about in a mine field.
If someone does that, it’s very close to a dead certainty that sooner or
later something very bad will happen to him. But whether it’s sooner
or later, when and where it happens, may well be a matter of chance.
In separating ourselves from God, we have become, as I said, the
playthings of chance. Even those horrors most closely connected with
human planning and deliberation are due to chance. Winifrid may